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‘Within a system which denies the existence of basic human 
rights, fear tends to be the order of the day. Fear of 
imprisonment, fear of torture, fear of death, fear of losing 
friends, family, property or means of livelihood, fear of poverty, 
fear of isolation, fear of failure. A most insidious form of fear is 
that which masquerades as common sense or even wisdom, 
condemning as foolish, reckless, insignificant or futile the small, 
daily acts of courage which help to preserve man’s self-respect 
and inherent human dignity. It is not easy for a people 
conditioned by fear under the iron rule of the principle that 
might is right to free themselves from the enervating miasma of 
fear. Yet even under the most crushing state machinery courage 
rises up again and again, for fear is not the natural state of 
civilized man.’ 
 
[Aung San Suu Kyi, ‘Freedom from Fear’ Speech, 1990]
2
 
                                                             
2 Aung San Suu Kyi, ‘Freedom from Fear’ (Speech, 1990) Available at: ‘Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s Essay “Freedom from Fear”’, (Asia Society, 2011) 
http://sites.asiasociety.org/asia21summit/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/1.-Aung-San-Suu-
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The international community has never been more fragmented: 
authoritarianism and nationalism increasingly prevail despite a fully-fledged 
globalised world of interconnectivity and an abundance of power-sharing structures 
and institutions seeking to neutralise and balance such conflicting political 
affiliations and interests. This is exacerbated further by tensions between states 
which often render them on the cusp of full-scale military intervention and/or force, 
in clear contravention of international law. Thus, for many of us we live in a ‘state 
of fear’, wherein our political representatives instil in us a terror of the unknown, 
‘the other’, and utilise this in order to implement politically-favourable policies and 
deviate from their constitutional and human rights obligations, often invoking the 
justification of a ‘state of exception’. Within this ‘state of fear’ we are blinded by, 
and confined within, a perpetual ‘state of exception’. On the face of it, the victims 
are the citizens of the afflicted states, whose constitutional and human rights 
protections have been infringed- however, if we gauge victimhood from a long-term 
angle, we will perhaps discover that the greatest harm will be suffered by the 
international institutions and international law as a whole. The impact on the 
infrastructure will prove most deleterious. I assert that we must combat this 
unpredictability of the enforceability and clout of international law, especially with 
regard to human rights protections, through strengthening the constitution of 
international law and its mandate in order to prevent future deviation by 
authoritarian states.  
In 1999 the government of Tunisia, spearheaded by former Tunisian President 
Mohamed Moncef Marzouki, recommended to the international community the 
establishment of an International Constitutional Court, akin to that of the 
International Criminal Court, in order to denounce constitutions, unconstitutional 
actions and elections. Although these efforts made headway in striving for the 
creation of an International Constitutional Court, in this paper I hope to seize the 
baton, so to speak, and further advance the necessity of such an institution on a 
theoretical plane.  
As each day passes, the media and politicians construct and reveal new groups, 
individuals and states whom we should supposedly collectively fear- and yet fear 
and isolationism will prove more detrimental in the long-term to the status of human 
rights than any actions of those we are taught to fear. If we allow ourselves to 
respond to authoritarianism and the inherent fear which typifies it by compromising 
human rights and the structures of international law to a level of irreparability, then 
not only do we afford these self-appointed ‘masters’ the satisfaction of doing so, but 
we also send a message to the world that exceptionalism warrants a breaking from 
human rights obligations. If we normalise this rule, the message becomes clear: 
during periods of exceptionalism, we all bear the risk of being reduced to the ‘bare 
life’ of the ‘Homo Sacer’, and such a determination will not be our own to make. In 
the comfort of our 21
st
 century, western capitalist lives, most of us have proven to 
be the deciders, or at least not the victims (‘Homo Sacer’)- but as the tide of change 
sweeps over our globalised world, we increasingly see a protectionist and fearful 
world of increased authoritarianism within which the number of deciders has been 
reduced to a select few, and the number of ‘Homo Sacer’ has proliferated. Post-
09/11, we all must now bear the risk of being reduced to ‘bare life’: exceptionalism 
reigns supreme. In such a vitriolic context, where we are all capable of becoming 
victims of authoritarianism, we must fight for human rights protections with more 
zeal than ever. We must refrain from simply responding to a fearful-world with a 
corresponding fear and regression from our institutions and international norms- 
such a primitive instinct is impulsive and counterintuitive, tarnishing decades of 
progress by international institutions and international law, their mandate is to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
‘I’m sorry, but I don’t want to be an emperor. That’s not my business. I 
don’t want to rule or conquer anyone. I should like to help everyone…we 
all want to help one another. Human beings are like that…The way of life 
can be free and beautiful, but we have lost the way… 
Greed has poisoned men’s souls, has barricaded the world with hate, has 
goose-stepped us into misery and bloodshed… 
To those who can hear me, I say- do not despair.  
The misery that is now upon us is but the passing of greed- the bitterness of 
men who fear the way of human progress. The hate of men will pass, and 
dictators die, and the power they took from the people will return to the 
people.’ 




Travelling forwards over 70 years from the release date of ‘The Great 
Dictator’ (1940) and the lamentations of Charlie Chaplin amid the heinous 
atrocities committed in Nazi Germany, how can we reconcile the fact that our world 
is plagued with spectres akin to those we had hoped and worked tirelessly to 
                                                             
3 Charlie Chaplin, Final Speech in ‘The Great Dictator’ (Charles Chaplin Film Corporation, 
1940). Transcript available at: http://www.charliechaplin.com/en/synopsis/articles/29-The-




confine to history books? How is it possible that these elements of the past we 
largely disassociate ourselves from, foreshadow our present-day reality? Can we 
truly plead the international entrenchment of human rights law and thus, human 
progress, faced with such an actuality? 
In the wake of the Second World War, the world was shaken to its core; 
subsequently, the nation state structure, modelled on the notion of an impenetrable 
state sovereignty, which had proven robust historically, was unequivocally 
remodelled and realigned in favour of international cooperation, dialogue and a 
more formally interconnected community of states. Thus, we witnessed the 
establishment of the United Nations (UN),
4
 and the signing of the United Nations 
Charter in 1945,
5
 which demonstrated the commitment of then 51, now 193,
6
 
member states to ‘maintain international peace and security’,
7
 ‘save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold 
sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.’
8
 Likewise, a 
regional example of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
9
 which was 
founded by The Treaty of Paris in 1951,
10
 provided further impetus for 
supranationalism through endeavouring to connect states for the purposes of 
economic growth and as a preventative measure to ensure a lasting peace. 
                                                             
4 The United Nations, thenceforth referred to as the ‘UN’.  
5
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945 1 UNTS XVI. Available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html Last accessed July 2017.  
6 United Nations, ‘Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945- Present’. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-
present/index.html Last accessed July 2017.  
7 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945 1 UNTS XVI, Preamble. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html Last accessed 
July 2017.  
8 Ibid. 
9 The European Coal and Steel Community, thenceforth referred to as the ‘ECSC’.  
10 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, commonly referred to as 
The Treaty of Paris (1951). Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-




Thus, an intricate body of international legal norms has been carefully constructed 
and enforced through the legal mechanisms of said international organisations and 
their subsidiaries. At the crux of these norms are what we may refer to as 
‘international constitutional law’, ‘peremptory norms’ or ‘international legal 
doctrine’- these norms set the parameters of state responsibility regarding the 
protection of human rights both domestically and internationally.  
Despite this seemingly optimistic backdrop following WW2, the international 
community has struggled to maintain stability and peace between increasingly 
divergent states, coupled with a resurgence of nationalism and authoritarianism 
which has ignited further discord. The aforementioned institutions, norms and 
mechanisms are being tested to their limits. Thus, how can we strengthen these 
institutions and their mandates in order to preclude future abandonment of 
international human rights obligations?  
In this paper, I hope to advance and develop the proposal of the former Tunisian 
President, Mohamed Moncef Marzouki,
11
 who recommended to the international 
community the establishment of an International Constitutional Court,
12
 akin to that 
of the International Criminal Court,
13
 in order to denounce constitutions, 
unconstitutional actions and elections.  
It is with such an intention, and within this increasingly fearful and vitriolic setting, 
exemplified by an upsurge in ‘states of exception’, that I proceed with my analysis. 
In order to do so, permit me first to advance a rebuttal to the reasoning of Chaplin 
                                                             
11 Former President of Tunisia, Mohamed Moncef Marzouki, is a Tunisian human rights 
activist, physician and politician. He was elected as President of Tunisia by the Constituent 
Assembly on 12 December 2011, before being defeated by Beji Caid Essebsi in November-
December 2014 elections.  
12 International Constitutional Court, thenceforth referred to as ‘IConC’ for ease of 
understanding. 




that we must merely wait for a natural return to a ‘state of normalcy’, despite 
potential human rights abuses in the interim period. The price of such a waiting 
game is not only high, but the result is also far from certain- ultimately, it is a game 
we must refrain from playing.    
 
I.  ‘The Hate of Men Will Pass’: A Rebuttal 
 
Although one concurs with Chaplin’s understanding of the natural ebb and 
flow of human progress, it appears nonsensical to rely upon it to justify heinous 
crimes and authoritarian behaviour. Instead, it appears necessary to depart from this 
logic of viewing the troughs as an inevitable by-product of the sporadic peaks. Why 
should we settle for this erratic sequence, when we could instead embrace our vices, 
not abscond and find preventative solutions? If we fail to create an innovative way 
of preventing the depth of trough we have seen historically and continue to see in 
the present-day, then we will remain shackled to this sequence and our histories will 
prove ironically homogenous and linear.  
Moreover, if we accept an inevitability of this cycle, then we will remain forever 
fearful of the next trough. The world we see before us, post-09/11,
14
 is one tainted 
by a fear-instilled populace, provoked further by politicians who utilise this fear in 
order to pursue unjust and unconstitutional policies.  Resultantly, an age of 
authoritarianism and exceptionalism has prevailed. Thus, if we are capable of 
preventing the troughs from occurring, or limiting them, then we are able to break 
the cyclical nature of our histories and more actively promote human progress. 
                                                             




Although we of course cannot erase our histories, we are capable of learning from 
our past mistakes and should refuse to settle for the inevitability of the 
aforementioned cycle. 
 
II.  Institutional Fearlessness and Flaws: Locating the Void 
 
Indeed, after the Second World War, the initial refusal to accept this natural 
ebb and flow saw the aforementioned creation of the UN and the ECSC- both of 
which aimed to ensure peace and stability for future generations, the former largely 
politically and socially, the latter more so economically. Although the international 
institutions which were established in the 1940’s and 1950’s may have taken a 
variety of forms, their aims and intentions were alike, namely finding preventative 
solutions to build a more stable world, simply, the pursuit of the linear in 
international relations.  
These institutions have, in the main, faced new challenges with fearlessness and 
have moulded their capabilities and mandates according to new threats posed to the 
global/European communities. Though not consistently proving wholly fruitful, 
their ability to mould themselves to a constantly fluctuating terrain is commendable. 
In recent years, we have witnessed some states attempt to detach from, and 
disassociate with, said international organisations; we are indeed spectators of an 
increasingly isolationist world which is tainted by fear- a natural result of the 
growing number of ‘states of exception’. What we seek, therefore, is a return to 
normalcy and greater interaction with international organisations, in order to truly 




How can we translate this increasing disassociation of many states from the world 
of international law and international organisations? On whose door-step do we lay 
the blame? Or perhaps more usefully, in which area do we require reform? Over the 
years, international law has proven more successful in its endeavours than it has 
detrimental, although this is of course worthy of debate. It is not my stance, 
although it may be that of many reputable legal commentators that the system of 
international law needs to be dismantled and reconstructed. I strongly believe that 
such a measure would be counter-intuitive- the phrase ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ 
immediately comes to mind.
15
 Rather, I would assert that the system which has been 
carefully-constructed over decades, which has without-doubt withstood the test of 
time merely needs updating and refining.  
Perhaps the most ground-breaking update which we have seen in recent years is the 
establishment of the ICC, through The Rome Statute of the ICC (1998).
16
 Although 
many criticisms of this latest initiative have surfaced, including its costliness and 
the vast resources and man-power it requires in order to function effectively- in my 
mind, its mandate and the extension of criminal jurisdiction from the local terrain to 
the international stage is pioneering and positive. With this backdrop set, the former 
President of Tunisia, Mohamed Moncef Marzouki, recommended to the 
international community the establishment of an International Constitutional Court 
in 1999,
17
 akin to that of the ICC, in order to denounce constitutions, 
                                                             
15 ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’: ‘said when you recognise that something is in a satisfactory 
state, and there is no reason to try to change it’ (Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 
and Thesaurus, Cambridge University Press) Available at: 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/if-it-ain-t-broke-don-t-fix-it Last accessed 
July 2017.  
16Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc A/ CONF. 183/9 Available at: 
http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm Last accessed July 2017.  
17 His Excellency Mr. Moncef Marzouki, President of Tunisia, ‘Statement Summary’ 
(General Assembly of the United Nations, 67th Session, 27 September 2012) Available at: 




unconstitutional actions and elections. It is upon these theoretical foundations that I 
aim to cultivate his proposal, and translate it into a model capable of practical 
application in the future.  
We will return to the proposed solution of an International Constitutional Court 
(IConC) shortly, but in the meantime, we are forced to posit the question of how it 
is possible that the international community boasts an abundance of organisations 
and a coherent body of international law, and yet we live in such an unstable world? 
If we merely add yet another institution, with a similar mandate and enforceability 
mechanism into this melting-pot, will it suffer the same fate? It saddens me to admit 
that our existing international mechanisms are often futile in attempting to influence 
key thinking and events in certain political and constitutional situations. For 
example, at one particular moment in time, a legitimate and democratic state may be 
upholding international law, adhering to its human rights obligations and diplomatic 
ties between itself and other states may be strong and positive. However, a moment 
later, with a change in political leadership or direction, its interaction with the 
international community can alter drastically and its domestic protection of human 
rights and adherence to constitutional law diminish. We must therefore, beg the 
question of whether the aforementioned institutions which have been carefully-
crafted are ultimately futile if a foundational protective mechanism does not exist- 
namely, an organisation for international constitutional protection?  Such an 
institution could prevent or hold to account any deviation from the key tenets of 
international law, and could prove especially beneficial in circumstances such as 
that of an illegitimate or unrepresentative election.  
The international community has largely accepted the extension of criminal 
jurisdiction, albeit a concurrent, complementary power-sharing mechanism, from 




required in the interests of the constitutional world as a preventative measure, which 
would also in turn ease the burden placed on the ICC?  
 
III.  Building Bridges: The ‘Constitutionalisation’ of 
International Law 
 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest an alternative solution to the plight 
of the international community we see before us- comprised of increasingly 
authoritarian, isolationistic states who are distorted by a ‘state of exception’, which 
is ironically proving more perpetual than it is a finite state. I assert that the 
mechanisms and institutions which have been constructed over decades are only 
capable of proving effective when certain domestic political and constitutional 
arrangements are in place, but are rendered largely futile when that terrain changes.  
Moreover, if we allow leaders and politicians to manipulate their way around and 
through these institutions- the age-old criticism of the unenforceability of 
international law will reign supreme it seems. How do we grant the existing 
institutions teeth to act decisively? We locate the root of the problem through 
determining the inadequacies in the existing system- where is the void which 
politicians and leaders alike are exploiting? Can we truly sit-idle and allow them to 
jeopardise decades of progress, expanding this void to an irreconcilable degree until 
the structure crumbles? Or do we instead choose to build an overarching bridge 
which strings together the mandate of all previous mechanisms, strengthening the 




individuals and political parties who seek power and influence above the pursuit of 
justice and the protection of human rights.  
 
‘Let us fight to free the world- to do away with national barriers- to do 














                                                             
18 Charlie Chaplin, Final Speech in ‘The Great Dictator’ (Charles Chaplin Film Corporation, 
1940) Transcript available at: http://www.charliechaplin.com/en/synopsis/articles/29-The-




Chapter 2: On the Cusp of a Constitutional World in 
‘Crisis’: The Domestic Paradigm  
 
‘The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word “crisis”. One brush 
stroke stands for danger; the other for opportunity. In a crisis, be aware of 
the danger- but recognise the opportunity.’  




 In order to ascertain if we are indeed in the midst of an international ‘crisis’, 
fraught with authoritarian states and a neglect of the rule of law, constitutional 
protections and thus human rights, we must first define how we are to understand 
‘crises’ and analyse our understanding of exceptionalism and then identify whether 
a global crisis does in fact exist. Upon establishing these requisites, we must then 
prove that this crisis is of such a severity and worrisome in nature that it demands 
the international community’s full attention. It is only in this way that we are able to 
set the backdrop to my thesis, prevent the arguments herein from falling victim to 
allegations of immateriality and assert the dire need for an IConC with conviction.  
Therefore, we begin by dissecting our understanding of the term ‘crisis’, and asking 
ourselves what we can learn from the word in plotting a course forwards. In Chinese, 
                                                             
19 John F. Kennedy, Former President of the United States, ‘Speech at United Negro College 
Fund’ (Fundraiser, Indianapolis Indiana, 12 April 1959) Available at: 
https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-




as per the abovementioned quotation, the word 危机 (weiji) can be separated into 
two distinct concepts- the former character (危) denotes a ‘danger’, the latter (机) 
has numerous connotations, including a ‘crucial point’, ‘opportunity’ or ‘pivot’.
20
  
Drawing on this conception of a ‘crisis’ we can view it as both a dangerous situation, 
coupled with the potential of providing a turning-point. Applying this translation to 
our current predicament of constitutional law, we can transform the danger we see, 
and fear we feel, into a positive opportunity to refine the mechanisms and 
institutions of international law. Thus, the emotions and reactions we commonly-
associate with a crisis, such as fear and hopelessness, the raw sentiments which 
often lead to ‘states of exception’ can instead be translated into notions of progress 
and evolution. In this way, we can reconceptualise our 21
st
 century predicament in a 
positive-light, framing it as an opportunity to redefine the parameters of state 
responsibility regarding human rights protections.  
Bearing this in mind, we next turn to examine our understanding of ‘crises’ in more 
detail, exploring the notion of a ‘state of exception’ and differentiating it from a 
‘state of normalcy’ by analysing both the events of 1933, the turning point for the 
Nazi party in Germany, and the dynamics of our post-09/11 world. In this way, we 
can identify how exceptionalism creates a dichotomy of ‘us’ vs ‘them’, which, 
when translated into the domestic domain of constitutional legal protections, proves 
most dangerous. Next, we are required to understand the vitriolic backdrop within 
which ‘states of exception’ function, how they got there and where they are 
naturally heading if left undisturbed. We do so through exploring the post-09/11 
world in which we live- characterised by fear, propaganda and exclusivity. The 
latter proving especially threatening to the nature of human rights, as exclusivity in 
                                                             
20 Definition of ‘Crisis’ in Chinese: 危机: 危 meaning ‘danger’ , 机 meaning ‘opportunity’, 




determining and attributing constitutional protections stands in firm opposition to 
the key tenets of universal human rights.  
After we have examined the concept of a crisis in terms of ‘states of exception’, 
within the context of 1933 Nazi Germany and post-09/11 policies, it is necessary to 
broaden our understanding of ‘constitutional crises’ by drawing upon the analysis of 
Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin.
21
 Their commentary on ‘Constitutional Crises’ 
has proven particularly valuable to my research, and thus their model of 
categorising the various permeations of possible ‘constitutional crises’ has been 
replicated in my work, though our directions and conclusions ultimately differ. My 
subsequent analysis focuses predominantly on their category (1) crises (‘states of 
exception’),
22
 as this is the area which is arguably the most concerning in terms of 
evidence of derogation from international human rights norms, and thus the 
category which best demonstrates our need for an IConC and the identification and 
recognition of international constitutional legal norms.  
Lastly, we determine if this ‘crisis’ situation is constitutional in nature, and thus can 
be confronted and remedied utilising a constitutional lens of analysis. Thus, if we 
are capable of locating consistency and widespread evidence of constitutional legal 
issues internationally across a plethora of states with diverse political, social, 
cultural, religious backdrops, then we will be well-placed and well-evidenced in the 
assertion that we are indeed witnessing an imminent ‘constitutional world in crisis’. 
Through proving the commonality of these constitutional issues across different 
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states and across a lengthy duration, we will likewise demonstrate that this is not 
merely a situation ‘in flux’ which is capable of being naturally remedied. If such a 
situation was likely to organically dissipate given a little time, we would surely be 
guilty of mistakenly seeking solutions to unsubstantiated problems. However, given 
our prior analysis which showcased the need to confront authoritarianism, the abuse 
of power and the neglect of human rights protections and constitutional law, and not 
merely elevate these deviations to a sphere of acceptability through characterising 
them as a natural ebb and flow of human progress, we can negate this notion of a 
situation ‘in flux’. After all, we cannot rely on the notion that ‘the hate of men will 
pass’,
23
 nor can we settle for the depths of troughs we have witnessed historically- 
continuity and progress ultimately demand fearlessness and proactivity, not apathy.  
 
I. Normalised Crises & ‘States of Exception’ 





 The concept of a ‘state of exception’ was coined by the jurist and political 
theorist Carl Schmitt in the 1920’s;
25
 the original term in German, 
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 is often translated as ‘state of emergency’ or ‘state of 
exception’. Although Schmitt’s legacy is somewhat tarnished by the work he 
undertook for the Nazi regime in justifying their actions,
27
 his academic research on 
the roots of power and sovereignty have proven invaluable in helping us to 
understand the politics of the world we live in, especially concerning authoritarian 
regimes and their legal agendas. The term ‘state of exception’, in all its forms, 
loosely denotes the extent to which constitutional norms and the rule of law can be 
disregarded, or deviated from, by the executive/sovereign in the wake of, or 
perceived threat of, an emergency, with limited checks on said power. Gross (2000) 
depicts Schmitt’s stance on exceptionalism in stating: 
‘The exception is comprised of sudden, urgent, usually unforeseen events or 
situations that require immediate action, often without time for prior reflection and 
consideration…according to Schmitt, the existence of exceptional situations refutes 
the formal face of legal liberalism, which argues that pre-established general norms 
cover and apply to all possible situations.’
28
 
In his seminal work, Die Diktatur (1921),
29
 Schmitt explored the power of declaring 
a ‘state of emergency’ which is granted to the Office of the President. To Schmitt, 
this power was praised as ‘dictatorial’, viewing the mechanism of executive power 
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as more effective and immediate during times of crisis, than the process of 
legislative power and decision-making through parliamentary dialogue. According 
to Schmitt: 
‘If the constitution of a state is democratic, then every exceptional negation of 
democratic principles, every exercise of state power independent of the approval of 
the majority, can be called dictatorship.’
30
 
Thus, to Schmitt, at the crux of his understanding of executive power was a 
dictatorial element, enshrined within the Constitution, which inherently allowed for 
decisive and deviatory action by the sovereign. His emphasis on the word 
‘exceptional’ is pivotal in our examination, as it stands in direct juxtaposition to the 
norm, legal certainty and the continual non-derogatory protection of human rights 
for all. With this interpretation, sovereignty is inherently the power to decide on the 
‘exception’ and declare a ‘state of emergency’ in order to suspend the current law 
and ultimately create a new constitution.  
However, in recent times, the lines between exceptionalism and normalcy, 
dictatorship and democracy have become blurred to such an extent that it is often 
difficult to judge where on the spectrum states stand, exacerbated and obscured 
further by the machines of propaganda. Where states fall into the former category of 
exceptionalism, this is often difficult to decipher on account of being normalised to 
such an extent that the exception seems to be, and is presented as the norm. Thus, 
often the most troubling feature of contemporary ‘states of exception’ lay in the fact 
that such exceptionalism is no longer a clearly-identifiable malfunction in the 
normal life of a state, but instead is a perpetual ailment which is often carefully-
crafted to appear terminal in nature, and thus deviation from the new norm, namely 
                                                             




the exception, is often impermissible. In this way, we increasingly see the starting 
position as exceptionalism. If it is indeed true that we are confronted with a 
situation wherein an executive is capable of continually deviating from their 
constitutional and international legal obligations as a matter of ‘normality’- this 
‘exceptionalism’ has thus become ‘the rule’.  
Notably, this exceptionalism does not apply uniformly to all under the ambit of the 
sovereign’s power, it is spatialized, and within this division emerges the ‘homo 
sacer’ and ‘qualified life’ dichotomy of ‘us’ vs ‘them, which will be later 
expounded by Giorgio Agamben.  
‘For Schmitt, the relationship between friend and enemy is always spatialized, both 




How can we plead universal human rights protections and an elevated respect for 
the rule of law on the international stage if states and their executives are able to 
deviate from the will of the legislative and judicial branches at will, construct 
exceptional spaces and render executive power unchecked and teetering on the 
balance of authoritarianism? If we are to concur with this appraisal of the normalcy 
of ‘states of exception’ and their commonality, then the need for an international 
check on executive powers through the creation of an international constitutional 
mechanism has never been more urgent.  
Schmitt’s work is commonly cited by legal theorists who wish to invoke the theory 
of strong executive power in order to justify practices which contravene 
international law, for example torture or measures taken in the interests of national 
security. Therefore, in order to comprehend how authoritarian regimes manipulate 
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the system of law and order in order to strengthen their grip on power and 
implement their often controversial policies, we must understand from where they 
derive their power theoretically, and how this is then translated into an unchecked 
legalised power. In this way, Schmitt provides for us an academic portal through 
which we are better-placed to understand authoritarianism and how we end-up in 
such vitriolic situations. The turning point is often the moment when a ‘state of 
exception’ or ‘state of emergency’ is declared; if we are capable of locating this 
‘fork in the road’ then we can discern the exact moment where intervention is 
necessary to prevent worsening conditions. A ‘state of exception’ is an ailment of a 
state, a breaking away from its normal conditions- after all, the term is often 
described as being roused by a ‘threat to the life of a nation’.
32
 In order to 
resuscitate the state to ‘normalcy’, we must understand the symptoms and be 
equipped and prepared to identify them ahead of time, capable of reacting swiftly 
and preventing further deterioration in condition.  
Post-09/11, the international community has oft proven reluctant to identify many 
state situations as ‘crises’ and refrained from reacting and intervening with candour 
and conviction, despite said states displaying many of the worrying symptoms we 
have identified as precursors of the deterioration of a state into a perpetual ‘state of 
exception’. We must ask ourselves why international institutions which were 
established to protect against such situations and ensure lasting peace and security, 
are proving ill-equipped to intervene and act? Schmitt would perhaps argue that the 
deficiencies we see in the international legal infrastructure can be attributed to the 
fact that the mechanisms have ‘[disregarded] the state of exception, and [pretended] 
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that the legal universe is governed by a complete, comprehensive and exceptionless 
normative order.’
33
 As Gross (2000) has described, taking Schmitt’s assertions to 
their natural conclusion, would mean a ‘complete destruction of the normal by the 
exception’ and thus an ‘authoritarian exceptionless exception’-
34
 pivotally, it is this 
trend which we can increasingly identify in state behaviour and thus this is the 
direction which we must strive to prevent. The international community, which is 
largely based on universal norms and yet allows for exceptionalism through 
derogatory provisions within human rights treaties etc., has attempted to find a 
balance between normalcy and exceptionalism in this way, but to little avail. The 
balancing act between protecting state sovereignty in times of supposed 
‘exceptionalism’ and ensuring international human rights are guarded throughout is 
yet to be achieved, with the latter paying the ultimate price. With the proliferation 
of instances of alleged ‘exceptionalism’ or ‘emergency/crisis’ situations in the 
domestic sphere, we can no longer neglect this interplay in legal academia.  
‘We must contend with a reality in which the fusion of normalcy and exception 
leads to an ever-greater role for the latter at the expense of the former.’
35
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I assert that the deficiencies we see in the legal mechanisms of the international 
community are not a matter of apathy, but more so an indicator that the operating 
theatre is not well-equipped to perform the surgery required. Having analysed the 
symptoms, later in this paper we will turn our attention to examining a number of 
states which are presently queued outside the operating theatre, and posit why 
physicians have failed to treat their ailments. In sum, why has international law 
proven ill-equipped to confront these states which teeter on the edge of 
exceptionalism, and could an IConC offer a remedy? Importantly though, we cannot 
allow for a complete usurpation of the norm by the exception on the international 
level- after all, the definition of the latter (‘exceptionalism’) is grounded in the 
former, without a notion of the ‘norm’ we cannot locate ‘exceptionalism’. Thus, a 
world devoid of ‘normalcy’ would resemble a normalised exception, and the 
inevitable exception to this new norm would surely catalyse an even more 
tumultuous situation.  
‘Not only have emergencies expanded to an even greater number of nations, but 
within the affected nations, it has extended its scope and strengthened its grip. 
Observations that “[e]mergency government has become the norm” can no longer 
be dismissed. While rejecting Schmitt’s solutions, we should not ignore the 
important questions that he raises.’
36
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 Giorgio Agamben, an Italian philosopher, examined and developed the 
aforementioned work of Carl Schmitt and wrote extensively on the ‘state of 
exception’. His central premise was the reduction of people to ‘bare life’ or ‘homo 
sacer’, as opposed to ‘qualified life’ by a sovereign power- the former as an 
exceptional situation wherein the rights of certain individuals are withdrawn.
39
  
‘“Bare life” is undoubtedly a powerful and revealing metaphor. It accurately sums 
up the perversity of a world, which, while being more integrated than ever before, is 
also able to isolate and push whole swathes of people to the margins, for example 
refugees, slum dwellers, terrorist suspects etc…they are the first victims of an ever-
encroaching sovereign power over life.’
40
 
‘Homo Sacer’, Latin for ‘the accursed man’ conveys (in Roman law) the exclusion 
of someone from accepted society, an outlaw. Legally the term denotes someone 
who could be killed without the perpetrator being rendered a murderer and being 
held accountable for their crime- this individual is not merely excluded from society, 
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but also from the law.
41
  In his work, he draws upon the example of the 
concentration camps used by the Nazi regime during WW2, as he explains how the 
camp conditions were so inhumane that we are unable to register the crimes on the 
ordinary spectrum of humanity and law- thus, they were permitted under the 
exceptional laws of the Nazi regime.
42
 When a ‘state of exception’ materialises, to 
Agamben, the victims (‘outlaws’) lose their right to defend themselves, they are 
rendered voiceless by the regime and their agency over their own life is removed. In 
this way, ‘Agamben identifies the state of exception with the power of decision over 
life.’
43
 The distinction Agamben makes is between the Greek ‘Bios’ (the life of the 
citizen) and ‘Zoe’ (the life of the homo sacer), and this is often decided by those 
who hold power.
44
 It is this vast ‘machinery of power’ which we must analyse, in 
order to ‘halt it in its tracks.’
45
 In direct correlation to Agamben’s ‘homo sacer’ is 
Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘biopolitics’, which draws on the central idea that 




‘This acting of power directly on our bodies, on life itself, is biopolitics.’
47
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We need look no further than Guantanamo Bay in the United States of America to 
identify a suitable case study for such a distinction. The detainees are deprived of 
their basic human rights and thus placed outside of the law, their lives are reduced 
to ‘bare life’ or ‘homo sacer’. In response to such a dehumanising situation, often 
prisoners or detainees undertake hunger strikes as an act of defiance and attempt to 
regain the power over their own lives and find their voice. The reaction from the 
authorities in such circumstances is often to force-feed prisoners and detainees in 
order to keep them alive, however, this is yet another attempt to confine a human 
being to the ‘homo sacer’. Pivotally, such spaces are a state-construction, the 
sovereign determines who is to be afforded legal personality and ‘qualified life’ 
within their space, and who must be stripped ‘bare’ and yet remain within their 
sovereign space, albeit the exceptional/auxiliary space of concentration camps, 
detention centres, military prisons, refugee camps etc. Such spaces are located, 
although ordinarily within the territory of a sovereign, on the margins of the law and 
human rights protections; it is within such exceptional spaces that we witness grave 
human rights violations, spaces where existing international legal mechanisms and 
norms struggle to reach. Let us draw upon the plight of the Rohingya Muslims of 
Myanmar for evidence of these spaces- the Rohingya, who have faced ethnic 
cleansing by Buddhist majorities in Rakhine State, Myanmar, reside in degrading 
conditions in internal displacement camps. Erased from Burmese history and culture, 
disenfranchised from censuses and elections, the Rohingya have become ‘stateless’, 
outcastes from all spaces and responsibility. 
48
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Although a ‘homo sacer’ is deprived of their rights as a citizen, their life is still 
protected as ‘sacred’- in this way they are ‘under the spell’ of law.
49
 Whereas, 
Schmitt aimed to defend the concept of a ‘state of emergency’ by including it within 
our understanding of the rule of law, Agamben identifies the danger of allowing the 
executive to determine who are the ‘Bios’ (qualified lives who have rights of 
citizens), and ‘Zoe’ (bare lives, mere bodies). As early as Aristotle, people have 
been separated into two forms, ‘an animal born to life’ and the pursuance of ‘the 
good life…achieved through politics’.
50
 The former being akin to the ‘homo sacer’, 
which is only capable of being transformed into ‘qualified life’ (Bios) through the 
state. As such, the sovereign is equipped with the power to make the determination 
between legal entities and mere bodies with no legal or human rights protections- 
they decide who is within their boundaries and who are the ‘outlaws’.  
Therefore, to Agamben the line between dictatorship and democracy is a blurred 
one- the indefinite suspension of law under ‘states of emergency’ is the precursor to 
the former, but often under the guises of politics and fear, the transition from the 
latter to the former becomes less clear. It is in this space of uncertainty and 
volatility that spaces governed by exceptionalism reign supreme and prove to be 
perpetual.  
In such situations, where can we locate universal human rights and international law? 
Even if we are to accept that at the crux of the notion of sovereignty is the power to 
decide on the exception, the international community cannot allow for such a broad 
exceptional space wherein a state can devalue people, whether citizens or aliens, to 
mere bodies. If the Second World War taught us nothing else, it clearly 
demonstrated our need to elevate humanity and universal human rights above 
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domestic law and sovereignty: international law shall not be confined to a transient, 
‘spell-like’ state.  
 
B.  Lessons from 1933: A Post-09/11 World of Terror, 
Propaganda and Exclusivity 
‘The people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is 
easy. All you have to do is tell them that they are being attacked and 
denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to 
danger. It works the same way in every country.’ 




 A great deal of academic discussion after the Second World War focused 
on the initial ‘emergency’ measures and laws which were promulgated in line with 
the Weimar Constitution in Germany, in the years building up to the atrocities of the 
holocaust. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution has stood centre stage of such 
analyses.
52
 This provision provided for the suspension of ‘fundamental rights’ in 
circumstances where there was a threat to ‘security and public order’.
53
 Hitler used 
this provision repeatedly throughout his administration to allow for the 
                                                             
51 Gustav M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: Farrar, Strauss, 1947) pp. 287-279. 
Gilbert was an allied psychiatrist who spoke with Goering during the Easter recess of his 
trial, 18 April 1946. Cited in David Abraham, ‘The Bush Regime from Elections to 
Detentions: A Moral Economy of Carl Schmitt and Human Rights’ University of Miami 
Legal Studies Research Paper no 2007-20 (October 2006, University of Miami) p.12. 
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=942865 Last accessed July 2017.  
52 Constitution of the Weimar Republic of Germany (1919-1933), Article 48. 




implementation of his policies, and in this way, he legally suspended the rule of law 
to create a norm of ‘legal lawlessness’.
54
 With most present-day state constitutions 
containing a similar clause, permitting derogation from human rights protections in 
times of exceptionalism or emergency, we can clearly see that this is a slippery 
slope between normalcy and exceptionalism on a global scale. The example of 
Article 48 and its use by the Nazi regime stands at the furthest possible end of the 
exceptionalism spectrum, and provides our greatest warning, resultantly, this is 
where we begin.  
On 27 February 1933, the home of the German parliament building in Berlin, the 
Reichstag, was set alight allegedly by a Dutch council communist who was 
subsequently arrested and sentenced to death. The Nazi party used this attack as 
evidence that communists had been plotting against the German government. Many 
commentators have alleged that this arson attack was fabricated by the Nazi party as 
propaganda, to instil fear in the people. Irrespective of who the perpetrator was 
factually, the attack was used as propaganda and proved heavily influential in the 
initial establishment of the Nazi regime. Less than one month previously, Adolf 
Hitler had become the Chancellor of Germany- one of his initial endeavours was 
advising the then President Paul von Hindenburg to pass an emergency decree to 
suspend the protection of civil liberties and suppress the Communist Party of 
Germany, in line with Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution.
55
 Mass arrests of 
alleged communists followed, leaving many empty seats in Parliament; before long 
the Nazis had become the majority party and Hitler had largely unchecked power.  
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The aforementioned emergency decree, entitled the Enabling Act (1933),
56
 aimed to 
grant the Chancellor the power to pass legislation by decree, and thus bypass the 
Reichstag and their debate and approval. Once in place, such arrangements were in 
place for 4 years, and then were renewable for a boundless duration- thus resulting 
in a limitless ‘state of exception’. Ordinarily, under Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution (1919),
57
 the President was capable of exercising this decree power 
during a time of emergency- but the Enabling Act extended this jurisdiction to the 
Chancellor instead, namely Hitler. In order to pass this legislation through 
parliament, a two-thirds majority was required, and at this time the Nazi party only 
held 32% of the seats in the Reichstag.
58
 Thus, the party’s campaign focused on the 
supposedly dire need to pass the aforementioned law in order to prevent 
communists from instigating a full communist revolution. The support which the 
regime gained, perhaps goes some way to demonstrate the sheer power of 
propaganda and inciting hatred to create groups of ‘us’ and ‘the other’ or the ‘homo 
sacer’.  
After the Reichstag fire on 27 February 1933, Chancellor Hitler requested for 
President Hindenburg to pass the Reichstag Fire Decree which severely limited 
numerous civil liberties, including: freedom of expression, freedom of the press, 
peaceful assembly and habeas corpus. This decree was subsequently promulgated 
and the application of various rights to certain groups remained in place throughout 
the duration of the Nazi regime. As a result of widespread intimidation of 
politicians and the public at large, huge numbers of arrests and the use of 
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propaganda to instil a fear of communism, the Enabling Act was passed on 23 
March 1933. Thenceforth, Hitler had the power to rule by decree and the unchecked 
executive power which he had carved-out for himself was cemented into law, and 
the ‘state of exception’ rendered boundless.  
As Professor David Abraham, Professor of Law at the University of Miami, has 
commented: ‘the “genius” of the Nazis…lay not primarily in lies and deceptions 
(though certainly there were and would be plenty of those) but in being able to 
exaggerate and transform a real attack by their real enemies and to use it for their 
ends.’
59
 Professor Abraham asserts in his work that the arson attack on the 
Reichstag in February 1933 was indeed an attack on the government and was not 
fabricated by the Nazis as many critics claim- what we instead saw was the power 
of propaganda and inciting fear in the people. 
60
 
We need not look too far for present-day parallels of terror, fear and ‘us’ vs ‘them’ 
dichotomies which continue to punctuate 21
st
 century examples of ‘states of 
exception’. Professor Abraham juxtaposes the events of the Reichstag Fire in 1933, 
with the Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001. 
He explains:  
‘America was attacked in the Homeland…at its very iconic centers of business and 
military power, the World Trade Towers of Manhattan and the Pentagon in 
Washington. This was something Americans could hardly conceive of…it was 
widely, and correctly, remarked at the time that George W. Bush became President 
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not upon inauguration in January 2001 but on September 11…that was the moment 
of Bush’s Reichstag fire.’
61
 
In the aftermath of 09/11, the USA-PATRIOT Act was passed within 30 days. The 
full title of this legislation reads: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001.
62
 
Reminiscent of the Enabling Act of 1933 passed in Nazi Germany, the legislation 
enabled the executive to enact legislation without the prior consent of the legislature, 
and in the wake of 09/11 we saw the immediate arrest and secret detention of more 
than 1200 predominantly Muslim resident aliens. As Professor Abraham 
summarises:  
‘Thus was born the War on Terror that has brought us all the terror of war.’
63
 
The powers granted to President George W. Bush under this Act found their root, 
allegedly, in his role as Commander-in-Chief during times of war, and the Use of 
Military Force Resolution which was passed by Congress in the days following 
09/11. The Resolution granted ‘the President to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organisations or persons he determines planned, 
authorised, committed or aided the terrorist attacks.’
64
 During this time, 
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approximately 80,000 men from numerous mostly Muslim states were called to 
attend ‘voluntary’ interviews at Immigration and Naturalization Offices, under a 
Special Registration Program- around 14,000 of these individuals were 
subsequently deported. The result of such measures was ‘an intensified long-term 
fear of terrorism [accompanied by] a “second order” regime terrorism’.
65
  As 
Agamben explains: ‘President Bush’s decision to refer to himself constantly as the 
“Commander in Chief of the Army”…must be considered in the context of this 
presidential claim to sovereign powers in emergency situations.’
66
 In this way he 
was able to blur the very distinction between peace and war, and with regard to the 
latter, the ability to distinguish between a foreign and civil war.
67
  
A lasting legacy of President George W. Bush will be his success in blurring these 
boundaries of war and peace, foreign war and civil war. In much the same way, he 
also called into question the common interpretation of ‘prisoners of war’ and the 
application of the Geneva Conventions (1949).
68
 In reference to the aforementioned 
military order declared by President George W. Bush on 13 November 2001, 
Agamben explains:  
‘What is new about President Bush’s order is that it radically erases any legal 
status of the individual, thus producing a legally unnameable and unclassifiable 
being. Not only do the Taliban captured in Afghanistan not enjoy the status of 
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POW’s (Prisoners of War) as defined by the Geneva Convention, they do not even 
have the status of people charged with a crime according to American laws.’
69
 
From 2001 these detainees were rendered ‘enemy combatants’, or for our purposes 
‘homo sacer’, and excluded from the legal protections of the Geneva Conventions 
by the US government, under the US Military Commissions Act of October 2006.
70
    
With the United States at the centre of our world order, as Professor Abraham 
explains: ‘being the hegemon means that such practices will be contagious and 
become accepted by at least some of America’s allies.’
71
 This is worrying on 
various levels, and perhaps explains why I chose to parallel the 1933 situation of 
Nazi Germany with specifically, a post-09/11 United States - notably, because the 
stance of the US has tainted the global order and this nationalistic fear and 
propaganda has shattered through the domestic ceiling and has warped international 
law and policies (ironically it has warped the very laws and institutions which were 
established to prevent the arguably comparable 1933 Nazi Germany from 
reoccurring). This is precisely why we are forced to confront the issues we see in 
the domestic sphere of constitutional law on the international stage, and thus why I 
am asserting the need for an IConC. With legal commentators, such as Levinson 
and Balkin, contending that changes in media technology and warfare perhaps place 
the United States at the point of ‘a downward slide towards Caesarism, with 
presidents who claim greater and greater unaccountable authority in order to fight a 
                                                             
69 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (2005, University of Chicago Press) p. 3.  
70 Military Commissions Act (2006) (United States, 109th Congress) Available at: 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/senate-bill/3930 Last accessed July 2017.  
71 David Abraham, ‘The Bush Regime from Elections to Detentions: A Moral Economy of 
Carl Schmitt and Human Rights’ University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper no 
2007-20 (October 2006, University of Miami) p14. Available at: 




never-ending war against hidden enemies’
72
- can we truly trust the supposed 
‘beacon of freedom and democracy’ to set the benchmark for constitutional legal 
protections of human rights on the international stage? Should we question whom 
we entrust with the power of being a role-model for developing and transitioning 
states? Should we create a constitutionally-mandated international institution to set 
and rule on these standards? I advocate for the latter proposal as a more certain 
protection of human rights.  
If we are capable of paralleling 1933 Nazi Germany with post-09/11 US policies, 
then arguably we should refrain from asserting that the latter is a bastion for human 
rights and democracy and instead of elevating it to a status of superiority, angering 
those who are labelled US ‘enemies’, we should instead hold them accountable for 
their unconstitutional actions. Furthermore, if a state which appears to be 
increasingly authoritarian in its actions is setting the precedent, the enemies which 
they have identified for their own populace, often fabricated through propaganda 
and fear, translates into enemies of the international community- at which point 
politics and power-play between states too-heavily influences and dictates 
international legal norms and compliance. Professor Abraham, whilst quoting 
Ulrich Preuss, conveys it most succinctly in stating: 
‘When a Power is the protector of the international constitution, so to speak, the 
very real danger exists that “the enemies of the hegemonic state appear to be the 
enemies of all humanity”.’
73
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II.   Testifying a Constitutional World in ‘Crisis’: Tales of 
Turbulence 
 
 During periods where ‘states of exception’ or ‘states of emergency’ are 
invoked by the executive, the defence for such extreme measures is often a 
perceived, or perhaps a merely fabricated, threat to the security of a nation or its 
people. In such theoretically exceptional circumstances, it is argued that the 
constitutional legal frameworks which are in play during periods of ‘normalcy’ may 
constrain measures and policies which may be necessary in order to tackle the threat, 
and thus are deviated from within the confines of domestic legal legitimacy. 
Although historically this took the form of military necessity, from a direct and 
substantiated threat of war from another state, the spectrum of possible bases upon 
which a ‘state of exception’ can be declared has ballooned. With new interpretations 
of ‘war’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘jurisdiction’ challenging the foundations of 
international law, opportunities for disregarding constitutional protections has 
ballooned in tandem. The executive branches of states, thus often perform their 
powers largely in a domestic legal vacuum- it is during times of ‘exception’ that not 
only do we discover who is truly sovereign, but also how much power they have 
carved-out for themselves. In this vein, President George W. Bush tellingly coined 
himself ‘the decider’ after the events of 09/11.
74
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As we momentarily look beyond the sphere of the United States for examples of 
‘constitutional crises’, let us first recall the importance of the Nazi regime and the 
holocaust in not only catalysing the creation of the international institutions we aim 
to strengthen, but also in serving the overarching reminder of what is at stake and 
why the direction we choose today will dictate the global order for decades to come. 
According to Samantha Power, a US human rights figure, ‘holocaust consciousness’ 




‘From Armenia to Auschwitz, from former Yugoslavia to Rwanda, from Rwanda to 




In order to ascertain if the crisis which we are facing is of such a magnitude and 
breadth that it warrants our attention, we must look beyond the historical case of 
Nazi Germany, and further than merely the present-day US ‘War on Terror’. We 
must locate consistency in the duration and extent of constitutional issues across a 
multitude of varying nations, diverse in histories, cultures and religions. It is only 
through demonstrating constitutional crises across an array of states and forms that 
we can proceed with fruitful arguments and analysis, and propose an IConC as a 
possible remedy. Thus, I will endeavour to satisfy this requirement through 
highlighting constitutional crises sporadically, beginning with 2001 as the turning 
point for modern states in a post-09/11 world, and extending to 2017. This will 
hopefully serve as evidence of how widespread constitutional issues are in the 
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domestic sphere, and thus why there is a demand for a constitutionally-mandated 
international institution.  
To proceed in a methodical way, we first need to acknowledge and examine the 
different categories of crises which exist, according to the analysis of the 
aforementioned Levinson and Balkin.
77
 Although it may render my research more 
burdensome, it is important to recognise the variation in how states function, their 
constitutional structures and legal orders- thus, by extension, the variation in how 
states struggle and find themselves in the midst of ‘constitutional crises’.  
Ultimately, we must refrain from merely accepting the assertions of such thinkers as 
Carl Schmitt, and must instead refute their theoretical replacement of the norm 
(representing law and order) by exceptionalism (representing chaos and disorder), 
which threatens the very foundations of our international and domestic legal and 
political orders. In Gross’ (2000) concluding remarks on Schmitt’s exceptionalism, 
he beautifully acknowledges his own personal familial ties to the holocaust and the 
Nazi regime, in order to highlight that his critique is not merely a formal academic 
endeavour: ‘it is a matter of life, and even more so, of death.’
78
 It is worth 
remembering this as we proceed, that the theoretical can never be entirely detached 
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A.   Measuring and Categorising Crises 
 
We must bear in mind that the term ‘constitutional crisis’ is often used too 
liberally- labelling any time of conflict between government institutions as such. 
‘But the mere existence of conflict, even profound conflict, cannot be the definition 
of crisis.’
80
 In any system of checks and balances between the branches of 
government, there is an inherent need and desire for the branches to continually 
disagree with one another, and consequently conflict. Cautiousness is required in 
preventing the same fear we see taint our perceptions of the world post-09/11, from 
being transposed into a fear of a ‘constitutional crisis’. Overstatement without 
evidence is of course dangerous, but where circumstances indicate a ‘crisis’ we 
should not fear labelling it as such, nor be apathetic in confronting it.   
‘People have evoked the expression “constitutional crisis” so often that it is 
in danger of becoming synonymous with almost any deeply felt sense of conflict or 
urgency, as illustrated by Chief Justice Roberts’ plaintive cry that he deserves a 




For some, ‘constitutional crises’ are ‘givens of history… [which] do not call for 
particular identification or definition…everybody knows when one happens.’
82
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Though I concede that there is little to gain from the term’s over-usage, we must 
also admit that rendering it ‘undefinable’ restrains our ability to understand crises 
and makes us ill-prepared in identifying the early-warning signs which are capable 
of preventing the materialisation of fully-fledged crises. In line with the classical 
interpretation of ‘states of emergency’, we are required to locate the ‘common 
denominators’ of ‘temporal duration and [an] exceptional nature’,
83
 but in recent 
years such indicators are often difficult to decipher or are fabricated. The Questiaux 
Report, which was created by the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, similarly identified the key tenets 
of an ‘emergency model’ as including: ‘(1) the fundamental precept on limiting 
governments in bringing states of emergency into effect is consistency between 
emergency legislation and democratic principles; (2) emergency legislation predates 
the occurrence of the crisis; (3) such legislation contains a priori or a posteriori 
control procedures on the exercise of those emergency powers; and (4) such 
legislation and powers are to be applied as provisional, temporary measures.’
84
 
In such a way, in our subsequent analysis of whether ‘constitutional crises’ have 
materialised, we must use said models and precursors to determine whether our 
present-day ‘emergency’ situations are in fact conforming to our international 
models of exceptionalism. Through identifying evidence from state legislation, 
policy decisions, executive orders, case law and constitutional documents, we will 
likely prove well-equipped to decipher examples of states amidst exceptionalism, 
and better able to judge to what extent they fall within the remit of our expected 
international model. Although the international community may be capable of 
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confronting exceptional states which conform to this model, they appear to be 
struggling with post-09/11 examples of exceptionalism due to their indeterminacy 
and the sheer scope of their application. As Gross (2000) has most poignantly stated:  
‘Following the traditional view concerning the normalcy- emergency relationship 
has led domestic, as well as international judicial organs to give too little attention 
to, if not ignore altogether, the phenomena of permanent, entrenched, or de facto 
emergencies in the cases coming before them…this has led to attempts at solving 
the questions at hand by applying the wrong medicine because of a faulty diagnosis. 
By perpetuating a myth that emergencies follow a constant pattern, and by failing to 
identify shifting patterns of crisis management, academic commentary, court 
jurisprudence, and institutional international actors fail to adequately come to 
terms with the various phenomena of emergencies.’
85
 
It is worth noting that brandishing all states with the same brush, and failing to take 
account of differences in how and why state exceptionalism emerges, will 
ultimately render international efforts futile, after all: 
‘Happy countries, paraphrasing Tolstoy, may indeed look alike, but every unhappy 
country is unhappy very much in its own way.’
86
 
Levinson and Balkin assert, and I am inclined to agree, that depicting ‘constitutional 
crises’ as issues with ‘constitutional design’ is far preferable to locating 
‘constitutional disagreement’ which is too all-encompassing.
87
 In this way, the 
moment in which a crisis crystallises is the point at which the system of 
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‘constitutional design’ begins to break apart at the seams: ‘a turning point in the 
health and history of a constitutional order.’
88
 To ascertain whether the health of a 
constitution has been compromised, we must identify actors who assert different 
constitutional interpretations and thus hold differing opinions of who should hold 
power and to what degree, only then can we decipher differences in understanding 
of a state’s ‘constitutional design’.  
‘If no one with any institutional authority to oppose the actor, or no mass movement, 
objects, there is no constitutional crisis, even if there is significant constitutional 
change, or even revolution.’
89
 
Thus, we must constrain our understanding of ‘constitutional crises’ to three 
possible situations: (1) Declaring a ‘State of Exception’; (2) ‘Excessive Fidelity to a 
Failing Constitution’ and (3) ‘Struggles for Power Beyond the Boundaries of 
Ordinary Politics’.
90
 My analysis focuses predominantly on (1), ‘state of exception’ 
analysis, as this is the area where we have witnessed the most distressing violations 
of human rights protections both historically (the Nazi regime), and within the 
context of the alleged ‘War on Terror’. Later, I will draw upon type (3) crises, 
where political protests or armies mobilise and sometimes form a ‘coup d’état’ in 
defiance against an existing constitution, with the aim of toppling a regime or the 
existing constitutional order. Often this ‘people power’, the showcasing of public 
dissent against a regime, is catalysed by unconstitutional actions taken by the 
executive. In the examples later drawn upon, this tool is often a powerful and 
effective one, although sometimes violent and time-consuming. The more 
problematic form of type (3) crises are those concerning illegitimate or 
unconstitutional elections, often tainted by secrecy and corruption which are 
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difficult to evidence, thus the corresponding ‘people power’ is often weaker and 
dissenting voices largely silenced. 
In this way, the mandate of the proposed IConC which was advanced by the former 
President of Tunisia, Moncef Marzouki, is covered within the scope of this analysis, 
namely: denouncing constitutions, unconstitutional actions and illegitimate and 
illegal elections. Type (1) crises can be identified when constitutions fail to 
safeguard against exceptionalism, and when the executive acts unconstitutionally. 
Likewise, type (3) crises often occur when unconstitutional actions or illegitimate 
elections catalyse protest and revolutionary struggles. As such, through combining 
the scope of both Levinson and Balkin’s categorisation of ‘constitutional crises’ and 
the proposed mandate of Moncef Marzouki’s vision of an IConC, we are capable of 
deciphering how the model itself is capable of corresponding to, and confronting the 
contemporary domestic reality.  
Let me first offer one forethought on the inherent difficulties of category (3) crises, 
as it is often difficult to determine whether efforts to topple a constitutional order 
are just or not. Therefore, this category should be treated with special care. It is 
commonly-cited that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’,
91
 but in 
the constitutional legal context a ‘terrorist’s’ intentions are clearly distinguishable 
from those of a ‘freedom fighter’. If we merely compare the objectives and policies 
of the individual or group who are attempting a type (3) overhaul of the 
constitutional order, and whether they align with the pursuance of international 
standards of human rights and constitutional legal norms, then the ‘ends’ of a more 
just constitutional order may indeed outweigh the ‘means’ which may be unlawful 
or, at that time, unconstitutional.  
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For example, in the context of apartheid, the system of racial segregation and 
discrimination which was in place in South Africa between 1948 and 1991, despite 
the international community’s attempts to eradicate the practices therein. It took 
such figures as the late- Nelson Mandela and the work of the ANC (African 
National Congress) to use illegal means to topple the policies and government at 
that time. In this category (3) crisis, would these figures be branded ‘liberators’ or 
‘terrorists’? Considering the practices of other states at that time, customary 
international law and treaty law, we can easily justify the work of Nelson Mandela 
and assert that the illegal actions taken were in the best interests of the 
constitutional order and the state as a whole at that time. As Levinson and Balkin 
explain: ‘it all depends on the justice or injustice of the regime.’
92
 It is worth 
remembering that a ‘constitutional crisis’ does not necessarily result in the overall 
protection and preservation of an existing constitution, but may result in the death 
of a constitutional order, for example the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Sometimes ‘constitutional crises’ are capable of being ‘regarded as a positive good, 
if the constitution in question leads to outcomes that are deeply unjust.’
93
 
Irrespective of the eventual outcome on the constitutional order, these 
circumstances do indeed satisfy the requirements of a ‘constitutional crisis’- with 
the emphasis on ‘crisis’ as a turning-point in the ‘constitutional design’ of a state.  
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What all three categories of Levinson and Balkin’s crises have in common is that 
they ‘are conflicts about the legitimate uses of power by persons or institutions’;
94
 
thus, I proceed by locating case studies which conform to this definition, with 
particular emphasis on category (1) and (3) crises. The objective of doing so is to 
detail the intricacies of the constitutional crises we see on the domestic level, so we 
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‘Ordinary constitutional norms could and should be suspended in time of 




Arguably the most common-place constitutional crises arise from political 
leaders self-professing an extension of their powers, allegedly allowing them to 
derogate from the constitution of said state and international standards of human 
rights protection. We have previously examined the definition of this category of 
crises in detail, and thus I will be succinct in merely reiterating it here to aid 
understanding. In sum, exceptional circumstances, it is claimed, warrant the 
extension of extraconstitutional powers. In its most extreme form, such 
exceptionalism is capable of shifting a democracy to a dictatorship- parallels are 
often made to Caesar’s Ancient Rome and the notion of a ‘constitutional 
dictatorship,’
97
 alongside Lockean ‘prerogative powers’.
98
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I.  Ambiguity, Theatrics & the Search for Dissenting 
Voices 
 
‘Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are 
with us, or you are with the terrorists…This is not, however, just America’s 
fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s 




It is worthy of note that political leaders rarely explicitly state their 
deviation from the state’s constitution- the art of their theatrics often lay in the 
framing of their power, and in recent years no president has been so successful as 
former US President, George W. Bush in casting himself as the ultimate ‘protector’ 
in the play entitled ‘War on Terror’. Historically this title had often been handed to 
former US President, Abraham Lincoln.
100
 Through their actions we can identify 
that often, extraconstitutional powers are either kept secret or approaches justified 
through abstract and creative constitutional interpretation. In the same way as we 
are no longer able to locate an explicit declaration of war on a sovereign state, we 
are also often incapable of deciphering a clear declaration of a ‘state of exception’ 
or ‘state of emergency’- we are forced to merely interpret deviation from the 
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constitutional legal norm on a spectrum ranging from the former at one end, and a 
dictatorship and Lockean ‘prerogative powers’ at the other.
101
 Our tools in judging 
such deviation and the degree of exceptionalism are constitutional interpretation, the 
intentions of the political actors invoking said powers and their adherence to the 
overarching international standards of human rights protections which are so 
universal and so undisputed in their aims and applicability, that they are simply 
incapable of being blindly ignored without international accountability.  
In addition, within ‘state of exception’ situations, it is often difficult to decipher the 
warning signs that a ‘constitutional crisis’ in fact exists, and thus it is often 
impossible to identify when we need intervention and a fresh ‘outside’ perspective 
of what is happening ‘inside’. Faced with fabricated propaganda and political actors 
who do not explicitly state their extraconstitutional behaviour, how can we decipher 
when we do in fact need help? If we wait for dissenting voices to appear, will we 
listen to them? How many dissenting voices are sufficient? Where a nationalistic 
agenda is roused in a ‘state of exception’ the propaganda-machine is often reeling 
out fabricated hate and fear to the populace, and thus dissenting voices are often 
scarce, or downtrodden, and hidden from view. In such a space, characterised by 
fear and opinions based on fabricated propaganda, where and how can we uncover 
such dissent? 
If we leave the determination of the necessity or justifiable degree of constitutional 
deviation in a ‘state of exception’ to the domestic realm, will we fall victim to only 
gaining a full comprehension of our situation and the mistakes we have made, in 
retrospect? Thus, to avoid the excessive abuse we are capable of allowing during 
that interim period of exceptionalism, we must extend domestic jurisdiction to 
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analyse and decipher the extent of constitutional deviation to an outside body who 
are better-placed to balance an ‘emergency’ situation with the need for consistency 
in respecting and protecting domestic and international human rights norms. It is in 
this vein that I propose the need for an IConC.  
The difficulty in identifying the early-warning signs of a crisis ahead, can be best 
highlighted with the example of the US policy of the internment of Japanese-
Americans during the Second World War. In February 1942, the world witnessed 
‘the internment of 70,000 American citizens of Japanese descent who resided on the 
West Coast (along with 40,000 Japanese citizens who lived and worked there).’
102
 
Levinson and Balkin draw upon this example as proof of the need to locate 
‘respectable voices objecting to this display of national power’,
103
 in order to satisfy 
the prerequisites for such a policy to rouse a ‘constitutional crisis’. At the time of 
Japanese-American internment, numerous members of the ACLU (American Civil 
Liberties Union) did indeed object to such a move by the Executive,
104
 alongside 
three members of the US Supreme Court. However, the then Attorney General 
concurred, alongside the national stance of the ACLU, that the policy was 
acceptable under the exceptional circumstances of the Second World War- thus 
‘Roosevelt signed the relevant presidential orders in early 1942’.
105
 Subsequent 
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allegations of extraconstitutional powers have largely not been argued on this issue, 
although arguments for the clear violation of international human rights, of course, 
have been frequently-asserted. But Levinson and Balkin clearly convey in their 
analysis that this internment did not constitute a ‘constitutional crisis.’   
‘The Japanese internment was an extraordinary personal crisis for the victims of 
American policy and a rank injustice, but it did not amount to a constitutional crisis 
for the nation at large, at the time.’
106
 
Yet, in my mind, it seems that meeting this threshold of ‘respectable voices’ who 
dissented from the executive exercising such powers is a difficult one to satisfy- 
how can we ascertain how many voices are required? Furthermore, how are we 
judging ‘respectability’? In addition to this, even if we are to accept that the 
majority of ‘respectable voices’, whatever we do indeed interpret this to mean, hold 
that such powers are acceptable under the exceptional circumstances of war, are we 
neglecting to acknowledge how powerful the tools of propaganda and fear are in 
such circumstances? At a specific moment in time, unchecked by outside observers, 
a state’s policy may seem justifiable- but retrospectively, history has taught us that 
the global community’s judgement, when not clouded by fear or propaganda may 
judge more harshly the ignorance or blindness of those ‘inside’ the bubble. 
Although obviously, hindsight is a fine thing, we must be preventative in our 
endeavours and not merely reflective in our mistakes. Thus, I assert that such a 
situation of constitutional deviation should be judged, not by the number of 
‘respectable voices’ within the political space affected at that specific time, tainted 
by propaganda and fear, but instead an impartial and independent body which is 
better-placed to make an informed balancing of the interests of an exceptional state 
                                                             




of war, and the human rights of those concerned. This current legal vacuum is 
where I assert the need for an IConC.  
Furthermore, in the context of the US internment of Japanese-Americans during 
WW2, this conflict can be distinguished from present-day conflicts and their 
exceptionalism by the mere fact that it was a clear declaration of war, against 
clearly-identifiable enemies, and thus a ‘state of emergency’ could be arguably 
justified in this context, and arguably by extension, so too could the US policy of 
internment. Post-WW2, the characteristics of conflict have changed to such an 
extent that we can no longer draw parallels to warrant exceptionalism which had 
been justified under previous war-time regimes.  
In recent years, the backdrop of post-09/11 law and order has created the ideal 
foundations upon which to cultivate a ‘state of exception’, and a breeding ground 
for derogation from human rights norms and international law. From the outset of 
the ‘War on Terror’, constitutional interpretation became increasingly ambiguous 
and clouded by legal creativity, propaganda machines began spinning theatrics and 
provoking fear in order to rouse nationalistic sentiment and form a united front 
against an allegedly common enemy. In due course, dissenting voices were 
repressed and silenced, and the constitutional infrastructures of many states were 
torn apart. As political theatrics have taken centre stage, and legal accountability 
mechanisms have failed to fill the legal voids created by the master politicians, the 
people therein have largely proven reserved in their reactions to this changing 
dynamic. This is a dangerous waiting game if the international community is forced 
to wait at the side-lines for indicators of dissenting opinions within the affected state 
before it can voice the international stance. Can we simply entrust states to decipher 
for themselves the necessity and proportionality of their ‘state of exception’ and the 




 In the same way as a ‘state of exception’ can be viewed as an ailment of the state 
and/or its constitution- I prefer to frame it as a psychological condition, a state with 
an unsound mind and thus judgement. As a logical extension of this, how can we 
entrust the determination of constitutional deviation and ‘acceptable’ violations of 
international human rights norms to such an unsound and volatile body? It is in the 
best interests of all involved, to grant responsibility and jurisdiction to a sound, 
outside institution, upon which it can weigh these interests and render a judgement- 
namely, an IConC.  
 
II.  ‘The War on Terror’: The United States, Australia & 
France  
 
‘The rule of law and constitutionalism must be preserved. Moreover, anti-
terrorist legislation itself must include protections…Free citizens have a 
right to look to their legislators for proportionality and protection of the rule 
of law, not mere rhetoric and a bidding war in extreme measures. 
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A.  The United States of America: The After-Shocks of 
Terror & an Incapacitated Congress  
‘The George W. Bush administration has repeatedly suggested that it would 
be suicidal to require the President to obey either domestic or international 
laws that conflict with its own best judgments about how to conduct the 




The ground-breaking year of 2001 proved to be the catalyst for major 
change in state dynamics and how they interact on the global stage- the terrorist 
attacks on 11 September 2011 in the United States did most certainly shake the 
world to its core, and cannot be ignored in our analysis. In reaction to terrorism on 
US soil, ‘the Bush White House quickly [started] talking about the opportunities it 
presented: to wipe out terrorism, to curtail repressive regimes and even to resolve 
the Middle East issue’. 
109
 Indeed, with such an expansive and largely unrealistic 
mandate, President George W. Bush framed his objectives in such a way as to 
justify the extension of his powers. A ‘War on Terrorism’ was subsequently 
declared, a war with an unknown and largely unidentifiable enemy- a battle labelled 
as one between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, with the United States largely determining which 
category states, religious groups and individuals fell into. Thus, the spectre of 21
st
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century exceptionalism took hold of the international community, and in my mind, 
no state proved more reactionary in its response than the United States of America.  
The constitutional legal mechanisms of the US have proven surprisingly robust 
considering the fact that the country’s recent history has been frequently tainted by 
authoritarian political leaderships- this is not to say however, that the system is as it 
should be, or remains in its original form, this is far from the case. The system has 
proven to be overly-reactionary and not preventative in its function, with the 
legislature frequently incapacitated when it comes to preventing the passing of 
unconstitutional laws. The only remaining recourse for balancing executive powers 
has proven to be the judiciary, who have taken on this mandate of acting as the 
guardian of the US Constitution with vigour and dedication, despite being 
overworked.  It is commendable though, on the whole, that the constitutional 
structure has remained in place, and commands ongoing respect and 
acknowledgement from citizens and the government alike- although the latter may 
not do so voluntarily, and may instead wait for judicial intervention to ensure they 
afford it the respect it legally demands. The structure as a whole may still be 
standing, referring to our previous medical analogy, the body of the constitutional 
state remains intact, but the ailments are increasingly piercing and destabilising this 
core. As authoritarian politicians in the US have attempted to stretch the mandate 
and possibilities of the executive powers provided for in the Constitution, this has in 
turn threatened the protection of the constitutional human rights therein. With 
increasing ailments appearing, symptoms of trouble ahead have surfaced- thus, it 
has fallen on civil society and the judiciary to safeguard the constitutional law of the 
US.  
Not only does this highlight the need for a strong civil society and an independent 




the US, a political superpower on the world stage and largely immune from 
international criticism or scrutiny, any crisis in the domestic domain largely remains 
a domestic issue. In this way, the US has largely been confined to self-sufficiency 
and independent of outside involvement during times of crisis, much to the dismay 
of those opposing these authoritarian leaderships, and by extension, much to the 
relief of said leaders. It has consequently been left to civil society and the judiciary 
to act fearlessly and strive for normalcy, amidst the volatile terrain of 
exceptionalism, to repair the emerging ailments and salvage the core of US 
constitutional law.  
Far from proving preventative, the US constitutional checks and balances system is 
reactionary and in times of crisis, hugely overwhelmed, forcing some ailments to 
fall through the net and go unnoticed. Through identifying many of these ailments 
which have surfaced in the US constitutional legal sphere in the wake of the terror 
attacks of 09/11, we are able to decipher the most detrimental flaws in the ambit of 
US constitutional law, and propose where an IConC would be capable of providing 
checks and balances and strengthen US constitutional law.  
Many commentators saw the George W. Bush administration, which was in place 
both preceding and following the 09/11 attacks, as ‘the face of the wolf’, and they 
needed look no further than Carl Schmitt to correspondingly locate ‘the mind of the 
wolf’.
110
 Former President George W. Bush took Schmitt’s depiction of the 
‘sovereign [as] he who decides on the exception’,
111
 broadly and consequently took 
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quick action to enact anti-terror laws which proved exceptional both in their 
granting of vast executive power and in their ability to incapacitate human rights 
protections. It was largely in response to 09/11 and the policies of President Bush 
that Giorgio Agamben published his work, State of Exception (2005), ‘which turned 
to the Bush administration as an example of how Schmitt’s exception would 
inevitably expand to swallow law whole.’
112
 His work thus acted as a call to arms 
for all constitutionalists, to take note of this seismic shift in the US political and 
legal sphere. Although we have not seen a complete breakdown in the rule of law in 
the US, 16 years on from the events of 09/11, its erosion is apparent and its claims 
of exceptionalism have proved perpetual. Fundamentally, US citizens deserve a 
state of normalcy, free from fear and terror- and such a state is yet to naturally 
materialise.  
The initial step taken by the US in direct response to the 09/11 terror attacks was the 
passing of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Resolution on 18 September 
2001, which opened the floodgates to exceptional legislation in the name of 
counter-terrorism, stating therein that: 
‘The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organisations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harboured such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
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Despite the existence of international legal protections and frameworks in place 
which act as guidance during times of conflict, namely the Geneva Conventions 
1949 which will be explored in more detail later, the Bush administration largely 
deemed the scope of the ‘War on Terror’ to be outside of the scope of international 
humanitarian law: 
‘It is not, according to the Bush administration, that the United States lacks a 
commitment to international law but rather that international law is silent on this 
new frontier, and like the American Wild West, law and order must be brought to a 
lawless area through the efforts of latter-day frontiersman, in this case the United 
States and its partners.’
114
 
In this way, the administration conducted itself largely outside the legal protections 
of international law, detaining individuals and trying them in military courts, 
without adequate legal protections and a fair trial- labelled ‘unlawful combatants’ 
these post-09/11 ‘homo sacer’ were outside of domestic US legal protections, 
military law and international law. 
115
 To the Bush administration, individuals who 
committed terrorist attacks on US soil were not lawful combatants, and thus did not 
deserve prisoner of war status. Within this backdrop of a legal vacuum, the US 
utilised the detention facility of Guantanamo Bay, and prosecuted individuals 
through military commissions for their alleged terror offences.  
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The first legislative tool to aid the creation of President Bush’s ‘state of exception’ 
was the enactment of the aforementioned USA PATRIOT Act, effective on 26 
October 2001,
116
 having been rushed through Congress, and with only one senator 
voting against its passage in the US Senate, Democrat Feingold of Wisconsin. 
Importantly, many of the provisions therein had been debated before in Congress 
and had been found to contravene the rights of citizens, ‘but September 11 had 
swept away all previous objections.’
117
 This bill was 342 pages in length and altered 
more than 15 pre-existing laws.
118
 Upon signing the act into law, President George 
W. Bush remarked how the USA PATRIOT Act continues to: 
‘Uphold and respect the civil liberties guaranteed by our Constitution.’
119
 
Many legal commentators have rebutted this assertion, especially with regard to the 
extensive powers of surveillance that it granted the government, in clear 
contravention of the right to privacy of US citizens. The 4
th
 Amendment to the US 
constitution stipulates ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures’.
120
 Thus, in   normal 
circumstances, warrants need to be obtained by law-enforcement officers who wish 
to infringe this right, and these have to be in turn requested from judges who must 
hear the evidence for doing so and find ‘probable cause’ of criminal activity to grant 
the warrant. This was similarly the case for wiretaps and physical searches- all 
required such a process of finding ‘probable cause’ in order to ensure the protection 
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of the constitutional rights of US citizens. Even prior to the enactment of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, there were numerous exceptions to this need for ‘probable cause’, 
most notably for ‘pen-trap’ orders, where telephone providers would be asked to 
inform law-enforcement officers of the numbers dialled and the calls received by a 
certain phone. In such a case, it was accepted practice that proving ‘probable cause’ 
was not necessary; an order would be granted by a judge if such phone information 
was needed for an ongoing investigation. The reasoning given for this different 
standard was the fact that this information was far less intrusive to US citizens than 
that of a wire-tap or a physical search.
121
  
The PATRIOT Act, under S.215, however, allows for the FBI to request a search 
warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (which meets in secret and 
is comprised of government representatives), in order to search for ‘any tangible 
things’ to ‘protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities’- the higher standard of ‘probable cause’ was thus side-lined.
122
 This is 
capable of being used against any US citizen, whom the FBI believe to be 
‘associated’ with terrorist activities, and with regard to any ‘tangible’ property. This 
could include personal medical records, public library records, business documents 
etc. Most worryingly is that the act further serves as a gagging order, to prevent 
third parties who have handed-over this data from informing anyone. S.216 allows 
for an extension of the scope of pen-trap orders to also include emails and web-
browsing history.  
Most controversially of all is S.213 of the aforementioned act, rendered the ‘sneak-
and-peek’ provision, which allows for the FBI to conduct a secret search on a 
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citizen’s home or business premises in secret, delaying the notification of the search 
warrant. In order to obtain such permission from a judge, the FBI must merely 
prove that ‘providing immediate notification…may have an adverse result.’
123
 
 Since the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, legal challenges on the basis of 
contravening the US Constitution have flooded the courts. One example of such a 
resulting legal controversy concerned Title V of the USA PATRIOT Act, National 
Security Letters (NSL), which were administrative subpoenas used by the FBI and 
other agencies to demand data and records from an organisation. Controversially, 
NSLs allowed for no judicial review or oversight, the recipient of the order was 
‘gagged’ from acknowledging that the NSL had been ordered. Thus, the ACLU 
(The American Civil Liberties Union) brought a case against the US government, 




 Amendments to the US Constitution;
124
 this 




‘In response to criticism of the act, Congress may be having some second thoughts. 




Interestingly though, public opinion of the PATRIOT Act has remained largely in 
favour of its application, despite many of its clearly unconstitutional provisions.  
Indeed, in a Gallup Poll in August 2003, citizens were asked their opinions on the 
USA PATRIOT Act, they responded: 21% said the Act went ‘too far’, 55% said ‘it 
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is about right’ and 19% that ‘it does not go far enough’.
127
 Thus, if public opinion 
was largely in favour of constitutional limitations in the name of confronting 
terrorism, can we label it a ‘constitutional crisis’? Arguably, if the citizens therein 
have been largely indoctrinated by fear-inducing propaganda, then their judgments 
cannot be the yardstick by which we can judge whether a crisis has materialised or 
not.  
According to the ACLU, in a letter written to the US Senate which argued for the 
rejection of the USA PATRIOT Act, they stated:  
‘The USA PATRIOT Act gives the Attorney-General and federal law enforcement 
unnecessary and permanent new powers to violate civil liberties that go far beyond 
the stated goal of fighting international terrorism.’
128
 
Indeed, the ACLU has also published a report entitled ‘Unpatriot Acts’ which 
essentially warned that the freedoms of US citizens were in danger under the USA 
PATRIOT Act.
129
 The overarching question proving to be on everybody’s lips: 




In 2006 the USA PATRIOT Act was renewed, maintaining 14 of its 16 provisions 
and granting them permanent and largely protected legal status.
131
 In the wake of its 
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renewal, its provisions were used to justify the further collection of mass metadata 
on millions of American citizens by the NSA (National Security Agency), arguing 
that such mass collection was required to identify patterns that could uncover and 
prevent terror plots.
132
 Although in 2015 these provisions were somewhat reigned-in 
by Former President Barack Obama, with the passing of the Freedom Act 2015,
133
 
especially concerning the collection of mass metadata on US citizens which was 
deemed to have a tenuous link to combating terrorism- however, on the whole the 





 Amendments to the Constitution.  
Although subsequent legal challenges of anti-terror legislation have flooded the 
courts in the US, not all provisions have faced review and anti-terror legislation has 
on the whole remained protected. Specific examples of judicial activism are 
commendable and worthy of note- but we must ask ourselves why we are forced to 
rely on the courts as the last resort to uphold the Constitution? If we cannot locate 
checks and balances at the earlier stage of legislative scrutiny and review of bills 
and legislative proposals, then a fundamental arm of the checks and balances 
machinery is not functioning as it should- demonstrating a ‘crisis’ in the 
‘constitutional design’ of the US structure in practice.  
But how did the US find itself in such a position- with an initially fearful and 
reactionary Congress, who later appeared to be incapacitated, an executive which 
sought to increasingly expand its constitutional scope of powers, and a judiciary 
which picked up the pieces and tried to complete the jigsaw puzzle again? In a 2005 
article published by ‘The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies’, the 
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authors have argued that ambiguity in our understandings of ‘enemy’, ‘war’, ‘crime’ 
etc., proved so disconcerting that the executive response focused on ‘centralised 
command and control’.
134
 Wars have historically been between states, and outside 
the remit of criminal law. Yet, 09/11 challenged all of these presumptions- criminal 
acts committed on domestic soil by an enemy whom we could not easily identify or 
affiliate with a state. It has been argued that the executive responded proportionately 
in response to these new threats, in accordance with the ‘independent substantive 
power’ granted to the federal government under the Constitution, with regard to 
national security, as per Brown v United States (1814).
135
 Article II of the US 
Constitution does indeed vest in the President, general executive power, and under 
Article II, S.2 the role as ‘Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy’-
136
 but 
are such powers capable of being stretched whilst remaining constitutional, and 
within the confines of the overarching powers laid down in the Preamble? The 
aforementioned 2005 article summarises that:  
‘Preserving both liberty and security rather than sacrificing one or the other 
requires wise and, therefore non-panicked policy.’
137
 
It is debateable whether we witnessed this with the passing of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, whether the violation of constitutional rights of US citizens was necessary and 
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proportionate to the threat posed by terrorism, and whether the executive had the 
authority to make this determination.  
Another area of US constitutional law which has gained the attention of the 
international community is that of Guantanamo Bay, which was used to detain those 
individuals suspected of links to terrorist organisations- many detainees were held 
for indefinite periods and without being charged or sitting trial. Faced with such a 
clear violation of international human rights law, the international community and 
US judiciary struggled to place the victims within a legal structure of protection to 
afford them some degree of legal protection, without which the detainees were 
rendered largely ‘homo sacer’. Although, to Former President George. W Bush, 
detainees were not on US soil (instead based in a leased naval base in Cuba) and 
thus were not capable of being afforded US constitutional legal protections- these 
individuals were held to still be covered within the ambit of the Geneva 
Conventions relating to prisoners of war.  In the case of Hamdan v Rumsfeld 
(2006),
138
 the courts proved capable of providing a check on the authority of 
President Bush through the insistence of a limit to his ‘state of exception’. The 
Supreme Court in adjudicating whether Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions (1949) was applicable to detainees imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, 
and thus whether the human rights protections therein would be applicable to the 
detainee, held in favour of international law and the rights of non-citizens detained 
by the US authorities. The Bush administration had previously argued that ‘military 
necessity’ warranted Mr Hamdan’s trial by military commission, despite Congress 
refuting this- said argument was ultimately denied by the court: 
‘The Court’s insistence on a limit to military necessity was a declaration both that 
the state of exception has certain characteristics on the basis of which any given 
                                                             




declaration of exception can be judged as accurate or inaccurate, and that the 
courts are capable of making that judgment.’
139
 
The response of the Bush administration to this decision, can be seen most clearly in 
the statement of White House Counsellor Dan Bartlett, to The Washington Post: 
‘We strongly believe that terrorists picked up off the battlefield- who don’t 
represent a nation, revel in killing the innocent, and refuse to wear uniforms- do not 
qualify for protections under Geneva…Five members of the Supreme Court 
disagreed. As the President said, we will comply with the ruling.’
140
 
Pivotally, even where we can locate instances of extraconstitutional powers being 
exercised by President Bush, ‘when the courts pushed back, the administration 
always yielded’, and thus the constitutional order largely bounced back into 
shape.
141
 As a result of President Bush’s willingness to yield to the curbing of his 
executive power, we surely cannot argue that he wholly resembled Schmitt’s notion 
of a ‘sovereign exception’.  
Even if we are to accept this argument, it does not change the fact that under his 
administration, executive powers under Article II of the US Constitution were 
broadened to new depths and subjected to limited scrutiny until they were forced to 
testify in court. It was only at this last stage of the constitutional system of checks 
and balances that the mechanism sprung into shape and restored a degree of 
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‘normalcy’, albeit a fragmented one, as the legislation or policy would largely 
remain intact. It remains worrying how long it has often taken the courts to 
intervene, and how the initial abandonment of human rights protections and 
international law has been justified at the legislative stage through creative judicial 
interpretation and manipulation.  
It has thus been noted that the ‘design of the formal constitution’ of the United 
States sets itself up for deadlock between the Executive and Legislature, although 
arguably this would be a category (2) crisis if correct.
142
 Whittington describes it as 
‘operational gridlock’ when presidential nominations are delayed by the Senate or 
outright rejected, or when controversial bills struggle to make their way through 
Congress.
143
 Although in theory this is arguably merely a fully-functioning system 
of checks and balances, if the stalemate persists then it renders the system 
dysfunctional. This stalemate post-09/11 was not seemingly apparent between 
Congress and the Executive, perhaps because all branches were largely clouded by 
fear and a panic to react swiftly to an imminent threat.  
In this way, it has been argued that President Bush’s administration after 09/11 was 
willing to act right up to the very edges of the law, but not beyond it (once 
established by the courts that it is in fact beyond). Indeed, the extension of the scope 
of executive powers and their constitutionality were discussed in the case of Rasul v 
Bush (2004),
144
 where the Supreme Court questioned the legality of President 
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George W. Bush’s power to establish Guantanamo Bay and restrict the rights of 
habeas corpus of the detainees held there. The Court analysed the law which 
supposedly granted the President the power to do this, namely the aforementioned 
Authorisation for the Use of Military Force (2001). The Supreme Court held against 
the executive, and in favour of the protection of the human rights of non-citizen 
detainees and the rule of law, even in the face of security threats and exceptionalism. 
Justice Stephens stated, quoting his previous judgement in Padilla (2010): 
145
 
‘At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society. Even more 
important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their successors is 
the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of law. 
Unconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of investigating and preventing 
subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber…For if this nation is to 
remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants 
even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.’
146
 
Kenneth Roth, drawing upon the case of Padilla (2010), explains how the Bush 
administration used the rhetoric of war very effectively to grant itself the legitimacy 
to implement exceptionalism on a vast scale. By characterising the situation as one 
of ‘war’, it effectively allowed for the government to detain or kill suspects without 
due process of a trial. If a wartime setting was indeed accurate, then: 
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‘Padilla could have been gunned down as he stepped off his plane at O’Hare, and 
al-Marri as he left his home in Peoria. That, after all, is what it means to be a 
combatant in a time of war.’
147
 
The reason we did not see such actions was on account of the fact that the supposed 
‘War on Terror’ is a legal fiction- the label may be attached, but the implications of 
characterising it as a ‘war’ have not followed suit.  
Referring back to the activities at Guantanamo Bay, in 2016 Former President 
Obama transferred 15 detainees to the United Arab Emirates, with 31 detainees 
remaining in the detention facility in Cuba.
148
 Constitutional debates over whether 
the US Constitution or international law are capable of protecting them from human 
rights abuses, including inhuman and degrading treatment (protected by both the 8
th
 





 remain ongoing. Thus, Guantanamo Bay continues to provide an 
interesting example of how the US grapples with the tensions between national 
security and human rights, and this has:  
‘sparked many important constitutional debates: from procedural issues concerning 
the length of time detainees have been held without charge- over 14 years in some 
cases- and civil rights concerns for detainee treatment, to conflicts about the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches over…policy.’
150
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What remains clear is that Guantanamo Bay ‘remains a constitutional and political 
enigma’,
151
 ‘an archipelago of exception’,
152
 a perpetual space for the confinement 
of ’homo sacer’ detainees- arguably the facility embodies the perpetual state of 
terror and exceptionalism within which the US finds itself. However, the Supreme 
Court of the US has shown that, when challenged, it will ensure that such detention 
facilities do not prove to be a ‘legal blackhole’. 
153
 
However, how effective will such checks and balances prove under the 
administration of President Trump, the alleged ‘Schmittian nightmare’,
154
 who is 
blindly vaulting over the hurdles of law, normalcy and order. It was largely 
unsurprising to many, that he has proved ignorant of the details and fine-print of the 
US Constitution, but his disregard of ‘the document’s significance and power as the 




                                                             
151 Ibid.  
152 Weizman (2005) Cited in: Peter L. Hickman II, ‘The Lore of the Laws of War: Textual 
Constructions of Archetypal Identities in the War on Terrorism’ (Dissertation, Arizona State 
University, ProQuest, April 2014) p. 67.  
153 Michael Kirby, ‘Terrorism: The International Response of the Courts (The Institute for 
Advanced Study Branigin Lecture) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (Winter 2005) 
Vol. 12(1) p. 336. Available at: 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1299&context=ijgls Last 
accessed July 2017.  
154 Quinta Jurecic, ‘Transition 2016: Donald Trump’s State of Exception’ (14 December 
2016, Lawfare Blog) Available at: https://lawfareblog.com/donald-trumps-state-exception 
Last accessed July 2017.  
155 Orin Kerr, ‘Trump wants to protect Article XII of the Constitution’ (The Washington 
Post, 7 July 2016) Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/07/07/trump-wants-to-protect-article-xii-of-the-
constitution/?utm_term=.38d47dab7a03 Last accessed July 2017. Cited in: Quinta Jurecic, 
‘Transition 2016: Donald Trump’s State of Exception’ (14 December 2016, Lawfare Blog) 





Having relished in the stability and continuity of the President Obama 
administration, in terms of his commitment to human rights and freedoms, the 
subsequent inauguration of President Trump in 2017 shocked the world. In a 
political battle between the Democrat candidate, Hillary Clinton and Republican, 
Donald Trump- to much of the world’s surprise, the latter declared victory in the 
presidential election of 2016. It would be impossible to cover within this paper all 
of the legal issues which have resulted from this election, however, I will outline 
numerous constitutionally- contentious events in order to aid our contextual 
understanding. Firstly, allegations have surfaced over Russian involvement in, or 
hacking of, the US election to ensure victory for President Trump. On 10 April 
2017, a Russian computer programmer was arrested in Spain in accordance with a 
US international arrest warrant, on suspicion of involvement with said hacking.
156
  
It is also worthwhile to question the   possible reasoning behind such a shift in the 
political opinion of American voters from previously electing Democrat President 
Obama, to electing the far-right Republican President Trump. Many political 
commentators have highlighted the latter’s hard-line election campaign stance on 
security and combating terrorism as the reasoning behind such a change towards 
nationalistic sentiment. If it could be proven that US citizens actually desired 
electing a   Schmittian authoritarian leader, we would be forced to question whether 
his resulting extraconstitutional actions were in fact within the remit of the 
acceptable mandate granted to him by the electorate. In order to make such a 
determination, we would need to strip the state free from fear and propaganda, and 
objectively analyse whether the citizens did indeed intend to elect such a leader and 
grant him such broad executive powers?  
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In the image of President Trump, we again see ‘the face of the wolf’,
157
 although 
this time the face is more realistic and threatening than ever: the ultimate 
‘Schmittian revival’?
158
 I assert that what we are witnessing is a newfound fear of 
the latest ‘unknown’ in President Trump. But we must be wary not to confuse his 
ignorance of, and lack of regard for, the rule of law with him having the formal 
authority to actually fracture it beyond repair. After all, fear ultimately breeds fear.  
President Trump’s relationship with the judiciary has proven tense since his 
inauguration in early 2017, with the former often questioning the authority and 
legitimacy of US judges.
159
 Indeed, it has been remarked by Democrat Senator 
Patrick Leahy, who sits on the Senate Judiciary Committee that:  
‘The President’s hostility toward the rule of law is not just embarrassing, it is 
dangerous…he seems intent on precipitating a constitutional crisis’
160
 
Although Article III, S.2 of the US Constitution grants the Judiciary ‘the judicial 
power…[extending] to all cases, in law and equity arising under this Constitution, 
the laws of the United States and Treaties made…’,
161
 and thus a President cannot 
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bypass their scrutiny, the courts must wait for a case to be brought before them 
before they are able to judge. Thus, relying heavily on civil society to do so.  
But aside from the ordinary channels of enacting legislation, the President also 
holds a special power to pass Executive Orders, which historically have often been 
widely-used during times of war or national emergency. Although the US 
Constitution makes no explicit reference to granting the executive the power to 
enact Executive Orders, it has commonly been interpreted into the meaning of 
‘Executive Power’ in Article II, S.1, Clause 1, coupled with the interpretation of 
Article II, S.3, Clause 5- namely to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed’.
162
 President Trump’s administration has issued 25 Executive Orders, 




 These are legally-binding Executive 
Orders, capable of being scrutinised in accordance with judicial review, but which 
bypass the ordinary processes of legislative scrutiny and debate. Importantly, 
Executive Orders can only be enacted within the confines of the Constitution- but 
even the constitutional mandate upon which such a power is derived is largely 
ambiguous.   
President Trump’s most controversial Executive Order to date has been Executive 
Order 13769, titled ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 
United States’, which was signed into legal effect on 27 January 2017.
164
 The Order 
enforced a federal ban on the entry of individuals into the US, who had travelled 
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‘The Order imposes a 90-day suspension on entry into the United States by persons 
from 7 countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. It suspends 
for 120 days the US Refugee Admissions Program, the means by which refugees are 
identifiable and admitted to the United States, with the stated intention of adding 
additional vetting procedures, excluding citizens of certain nations…it suspends 
indefinitely the entrance of Syrian refugees and caps the number of all refugees to 
be admitted in 2017 at 50,000.’
166
 
In response to this measure, the judiciary mobilised swiftly in responding to the 
needs of people who had been detained in airports, returned to their country of 
origin etc., initially, a federal court granted an ‘emergency stay’ of the Order and 
later rendered it unconstitutional. The Order was claimed to be necessary in order to 
combat terrorism, but in specifying largely Muslim countries, ironically targeting 
those with whom the US ‘does not have a substantial economic relationship’,
167
 the 
legality of the Order was questioned on the basis of discrimination in targeting a 
religious group or nationality.
168
 On the basis of the US Constitution,
169
 it was 
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likewise argued that the Order proved to be religiously biased, in preferring 
Christians to Muslims. Although creative legislative wording rendered the Orders 
largely untouchable legally, when coupled with the political statements made by 
President Trump and interviews, campaign statements etc., we are able to see his 
clear motives behind such a travel ban. Having faced legal scrutiny in court, 
President Trump fired the acting Attorney General for declaring her doubts about 
the Order’s legality, and a new Executive Order was drawn up to serve as a 
replacement. But Executive Order 13769 has shocked lawyers and politicians across 
the world for being: 
‘Pointlessly cruel. In its form, it is amateurish: poorly-drafted, produced without 
consultation with the agencies charged with its enforcement and sprung upon them 
as a surprise. Even if it had been sensible, there were bound to be mistakes in 
implementation…a five-year-old American boy was handcuffed and detained for 
hours, separated from his family. White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer, 
ignoring the American citizenship, justified the detention afterwards on the grounds 
that five-year old boys might well be security threats.’
170
 
It is this disregard for the law, truth and justice which renders President Trump a 
volatile Schmittian-creation, capable of pushing the Constitution to its very limits- 
the only test remaining will be whether a civil society and judicial backlash will 
ensure that the executive remains subject to constraints.   
‘What we can be hopeful about is the response of the courts, which thus far have 
treated the challenges to the Executive Order with the seriousness they deserve, and 
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of the American people who have gone to airports to demonstrate their support for 
refugees. They show us a better understanding of America and its relation to the 
world, the understanding that hurting innocent people doesn’t make us safer and 
shouldn’t make us feel better.’
171
 
Ultimately, the rule of law and constitutional protections of human rights are 
difficult to dismantle within one presidential term, especially in a state where such 
principles are enshrined in written legal documents and have been firmly-
established and entrenched. This is not the question at hand, however, our primary 
concern is preventing the destructive effects of a ‘crisis’, no matter how marginal or 
transient, from materialising and threatening the human rights of those on US soil 
who are dependent on these protections. If we merely await the end of the 
presidential term without intervening, how many human rights and constitutional 
norms will face such an attack that they erode in the meantime?   
As an exercise in hypothetical thought experiments, let us imagine that the events of 
09/11 had shaken a different state, one with a less-entrenched constitutional 
mandate of human rights protections. Had that been the case, the ‘War on Terror’ 
might have been conducted with far less respect for constitutional law. Can we take 
this risk in the future and await the attack of a constitutionally-weaker state? On the 
other hand, the international rhetoric of the ‘War on Terror’ could have been quite 
unrecognisable and arguably preferable, had the attack of 09/11 taken place 
elsewhere. The heightened fear and widespread propaganda produced by a 
superpower would probably have been largely shaken-off had it instead been voiced 
by a less-powerful state, more willing to accept their victimhood. Thus, the ricochet 
effect of anti-terror sentiment may not have occurred and normalcy returned sooner- 
                                                             




for many states the reaction of a corresponding ‘state of exception’ would arguably 
not have materialised in the first place. This perhaps goes some way to demonstrate 
how the actions of a superpower affected the actions and policies of states and the 
international community as a whole, and largely continue to do so 16 years on. Thus, 
we must not allow their actions to appear unchecked and above the scrutiny of both 
their own domestic law and international law- it sets a dangerous precedent to other 
states. Pivotally, we must be proactive in preventing constitutional crises, 
irrespective of what form they take and where, and must not merely wait for a 
natural return to normalcy- this waiting game, as we saw previously in our rebuttal 
of Charlie Chaplin’s lamentations, is too costly to play.  
As previously remarked, 09/11 struck one of the most constitutionally-impenetrable 
states in the world; the United States is widely-deemed to be the bastion of 
democracy and constitutional rights protection. The US case study thus teaches us 
an important lesson- namely, that a constitutional legal doctrine, a coherent body of 
human rights protections is necessary for all states- as often it is the only tool 
remaining when in times of exceptionalism, tainted by chaos and disorder, a 
constitution is the only thing still standing. This perhaps goes some way to evidence 
our need for an enforceable international constitutional law, to act as the guardian of 
constitutional values, for those states who have failed to construct a domestic model 
of their own, or those states whose constitutional structure is failing.  
Unless authoritarianism in the US takes on a wholly new form and legal basis, the 
US Constitution and the protections therein will for the most part likely ensure a 
return to normalcy eventually. However, as previously asserted, we cannot settle for 
such a waiting game in the interim period; standing at the side-lines and watching 
the erosion of constitutional human rights is an unjustifiable approach, as is merely 




yoing. These are simply not solutions to the problems we are confronted with- they 
are the products of apathy. Instead, having located the deficiencies in the legislative 
process, we can thus decipher which void an international constitutional mechanism 
must fill.  Although we seemingly can rely on the US courts to provide eventual 
redress for the injustices of such unconstitutional legislation, these courts are often 
over-worked and flooded with claims during periods of exceptionalism- thus, we 
must be preventative in our mandate on the international level. If we are capable of 
establishing a system whereby proposed domestic legislation is reviewed by an 
international judicial body during exceptionalism, recommendations made and 
states forced to comply with their amendments, then surely this would lift a burden 
from the US courts and allow them the space to adjudicate only those cases which 
have fallen through a far smaller net.  
If the case study of the United States has taught us nothing more, let us remember 
the important functions of the judiciary and civil society in retaining the core of the 
constitutional structure. We must refrain from being fearful and we must heed no 
ground to authoritarianism in whatever form it takes. In May 2017, in the wake of 
President Trump’s firing of former FBI Director James Comey over the 
investigation of a former National Security Advisor, Michael Flynn- talks of 
possible impeachment have surfaced in Congress, for potentially obstructing this 
investigation.
172
 We must remember, as Quinta Jurecic so pithily states:  
‘The Wolf’s Bark is worse than his Bite’.
173
 
                                                             
172
 Mahita Gajanan, ‘Texas Democrat Calls for President ‘Trump’s Impeachment on House 
Floor’ (17 May 2017, TIME) Available at: http://time.com/4782225/al-green-congress-
donald-trump-impeachment/ Last accessed July 2017.  
173 Quinta Jurecic, ‘Transition 2016: Donald Trump’s State of Exception’ (14 December 
2016, Lawfare Blog) Available at: https://lawfareblog.com/donald-trumps-state-exception 




B.  Australia: Tackling ‘Hyper-Legislation’ 
‘Something is happening to Australia’s democracy…with little debate, and 
even less contestation, civil liberties and safeguards developed over 





  Amidst the backdrop of a nation which has strived for toleration and 
multiculturalism in its culture and recent history, former Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott stated in 2014 that ‘the delicate balance between freedom and security may 
have to shift.’
175
 This change in Australian political dynamics and priorities was 
perhaps most surprising because ‘domestic’ terrorism has arguably not posed a 
serious threat to the national security of Australia- 
176
 a total of 113 Australian 
citizens had been killed on account of terrorism between 1978 and 2014.
177
 
Commentators have drawn attention to the fact that the most dangerous place for 
Australians, in terms of terrorism, is actually Indonesia and not Australian soil. In 
2009 the Jakarta Bombing killed 2 Australians; 4 were killed in the Bali attack of 
2005 and 88 in the Juta bombings of 2002. In fact, ‘there has been no domestic 
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terrorism incident on our home soil since the Hilton bombing in 1978.’
178
 Despite 
these statistics and a clearly-low threat level to Australians on their home soil, then 
Prime Minister Abbott ‘[flipped] the switch to terror so easily.’
179
  
The first materialised threats to Australian citizens were seen in 2014 with both the 
‘Endeavour Hills Stabbings’ and the ‘Sydney Hostage Crisis’. The former 
concerned an 18-year-old man, who was shot and killed outside a police station 
after stabbing two police officers who were working on counter-terrorism 
operations- he was found to be carrying knives and an Islamic State flag.
180
 The 
latter incident occurred on 15 December 2014, when a Muslim Sheikh held 17 
people hostage inside a café in Sydney, resulting in the death of 2 hostages, the 
death of the perpetrator and a further 4 injured civilians.
181
 This hostage crisis 
proved contentious, as it was initially not classified as having terrorist links, despite 
hostages being asked to hold an ISIS flag in the café window, and thus counter-
terrorism task forces were not involved with the hostage situation until later in the 
incident. Many commentators have alluded to the idea that the perpetrator was 
actually acting in his own interests, and did not have a terrorist affiliation, negating 
assumptions that the attack had religious links, and drawing upon the mental state of 
the aforementioned to locate the intentions behind his actions.
182
 Although the 
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‘Endeavour Hills Stabbings’ could be said to easily come within the remit of 
‘terrorism’, it is arguable that the latter was moulded into conforming to the broad 
definition of ‘terrorism’ in order to justify a backlash of counter-terrorism measures 
by the government. It also provides a sound example of the difficulty in deciphering 
how we can understand crimes of ‘terrorism’, and how this new category of 
criminal act is capable of being interpreted. Since 2014, numerous terror plots have 
allegedly been discovered and prevented, alongside others which have unfortunately 
materialised into criminal attacks with casualties and victims. What remains 
surprising, however, is the sheer number of counter-terrorism measures which were 
promulgated by the government prior to these attacks taking place in 2014. It 
certainly seems as though the state prepared itself, in the wake of 09/11, for terrorist 
attacks, and as the state cracked down upon human rights and liberties, a fearful 
setting took hold and inevitably within such a setting of disenfranchisement and 
categorisation of citizens, terrorist attacks occurred.   
Prior to the aforementioned ‘terror’ attacks on Australian soil, the media was 
supplied with terror images and fabricated stories to instil fear in the Australian 
people, which allowed then, Prime Minister Abbott more room to manoeuvre a 
controversial Anti-Terror Bill through Parliament, which has since been enacted 
into law. The National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) (2014),
183
 
grants wider surveillance powers, criminalises the reporting of intelligence links in 
order to prevent whistle-blowing situations and even permits the use of force in 
interviews.  
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In response to the Bill, the Australian Human Rights Commission conducted an 
inquiry into the proposed legislation, alleging potential violations of Articles 17 
(Right to Privacy) and 19 (Freedom of Expression), of the ICCPR (International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966),
184
 and suggested recommendations. 
Despite such efforts, the Bill was passed into law on 1 October 2014, and 
subsequent anti-terror legislation has also been passed to date.
185
  
Importantly, such legislation pre-dates the aforementioned ‘terror’ attacks in 2014, 
and thus we are forced to posit the question of how necessary and proportionate the 
government’s response to 09/11 was in terms of the passing of ‘draconian anti-
terror laws’,
186
 which infringed upon the rights of all Australian citizens, without a 
substantiated threat.  
Indeed, Williams notes the significance of the sheer number of anti-terror laws 
which have been enacted since 09/11, as ‘the amount of legislative activity in this 
area…reflects the level of attention given by lawmakers and government agencies 
to the topic.’
187
 Interestingly, also, is the pace at which they were passed. Williams 
counted the number of anti-terror related laws and regulations which were enacted 
between 11 September 2001 and 11 September 2011 in Australia, according to his 
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criteria, and arrived at 54.
188
 However, this is not the most disconcerting revelation 
he came across- he also constructed an average enactment per year, and his findings 
were most worrisome. From 11 September 2001 until November 2007, the federal 
Parliament under the Howard coalition enacted 48 of the aforementioned laws, 
which amounted to 7.7 laws a year, and thus an anti-terror enactment every 6.7 
weeks.
189
 Under the succeeding administration of Rudd and Gillard from 24 
November 2007 until 11 September 2011, only 6 anti-terror laws were passed, 
giving an average enactment every 32.8 weeks.
190
 One such example of post-09/11 
legislation includes the passing of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) (2005),
191
 which 
was passed in direct response to the London terrorist bombings of July 2005: 
‘attention was drawn to the London attacks, as well as to earlier bombings in Spain, 
Bali and the United States, throughout the course of its enactment.’
192
 
Professor of Law at the University of Toronto, Kent Roach, likewise commented on 
Australia’s ‘hyper-legislation’ as surpassing the United Kingdom, Canada and the 
USA in terms of the sheer volume of anti-terrorism legislation.
193
 This surge in 
legislative enactment was coupled with ‘a rhetoric of urgency and exceptionalism 
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that enabled the laws’ speedy enactment.’
194
 For example, the aforementioned 2005 
Act was subjected to little scrutiny, as the bill was passed to Parliament on 3 
November 2005 with the attached memo that the Attorney General wanted the law 
to be enacted before Christmas. 
195
 Resultantly, ‘the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Legislation Committee conducted an inquiry into the Bill, however this inquiry 
allowed only a 6-day period of calling for submissions, 3 days of hearings and 10 
days to prepare the final report.’
196
 
Although the passing of anti-terror laws has slowed since, it is interesting to see 
how in the wake of 09/11, mass international hysteria, chaos and fear brought about 
a simultaneous mass enactment of anti-terror laws which normalised exceptionalism 
and eroded the human rights situation of Australia indefinitely.  
It has been alleged that the vast body of anti-terror legislation has granted the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) huge powers over Australian 
citizens, who are themselves not actually suspected of any particular crime- for 
example, such individuals are capable of being detained and questioned for up to 
seven days, control orders can also be invoked to keep someone under house arrest 
for up to one year and search powers of private property are largely boundless and 
require no warrant.
197
 Such practices ‘demonstrate the new legal reality after the 
events of 11 September 2001.’
198
 Indeed, anti-terror legislation has been 
promulgated hand-in-hand with an increasing number of control orders, which are 
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essentially civil orders which further restrict human rights and freedoms. In this way, 
‘anti-terror strategies are now being copied in other areas of the law.’
199
 Although it 
has been argued that Australian control orders were enacted to mirror those of the 
United Kingdom- the latter benefits from the balancing act provided by The Human 
Rights Act 1998, whilst the former has not devised such a system of protection.  
The translation of such anti-terror legislation into legal reality has brought about 37 
charges and 25 convictions of all men, whom were given heavy prison sentences for 
their crimes.
200
 These charges were notably not in respect of actual terror attacks, 
but instead offences in connection to potential terror attacks. With Australia’s 
preventative stance on anti-terror laws, they often criminalise activities which are at 
times loosely-connected with terrorist practices or training, without the need for the 
terrorist attack to have materialised or for clear evidence of criminal intent.   
In the trial of five individuals from Sydney, charged with terrorism offences in 
February 2010, Justice Whealy remarked:  
‘The broad purpose of the creation of offences of [this] kind…is to prevent the 
emergence of circumstances which may render more likely the carrying out of a 
serious terrorist act…the legislation is designed to bite early, long before the 
                                                             
199 Use of control order powers in the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act (2008), 
declared partly invalid by the High Court in South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1. 
Cited in George Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’, Melbourne 
University Law Review Vol. 35 (2011) p. 1138 Available at: 
http://www.mulr.com.au/issues/35_3/35_3_13.pdf Last accessed July 2017. 
200 Ibid. p. 1153.For a detailed exploration of the 37 men charged with federal terrorism 
offences, please see Nicola McGarrity, ‘“Testing” our Counter-Terrorism Laws: The 
Prosecution of Individuals for Terrorism Offences in Australia’ (2010) Vol. 34 Criminal 








The offences in the present case related to the purchasing of ammunition, chemicals 
and laboratory equipment, which when coupled with their possession of propaganda 
relating to extremism was deemed sufficient to evidence their supposed guilt of 
intending to carry out terrorist activities. Indeed, their ‘collective disdain for the 
Australian government and their intolerant animosity towards members of the 
community’ rendered it ‘inevitable’ that they would willingly take human life.
202
 It 
is such a predictive and presumptuous approach to intention and guilt in anti-terror 
laws, and mimicked by the courts, which defies the constitutional doctrine of the 
presumption of innocence.  
The case of Mohamed Haneef, an Indian doctor working in Australia, who was 
arrested in July 2007 and detained for 12 days before being charged for terror-
related offences, provides a case in point of Australia’s approach to terrorism.
203
 Mr 
Haneef was detained and charged on account of his link to a terror suspect, his 
second cousin, who had allegedly been involved in an attempted terrorist attack on 
Glasgow Airport in the United Kingdom. The basis for Mr Haneef’s involvement 
rested on the passing of his mobile phone SIM card to that suspect. Charges were 
later dropped, and an undisclosed amount of compensation paid to the accused from 
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 The Clarke Inquiry which followed found that there 
was ‘no evidence that [Haneef] was associated with or had foreknowledge of the 
terrorist events,’
205
 and that although there was sufficient suspicion to warrant the 
initial arrest, there was not a ‘reasonable ground’ for his detention beyond seven 
days. In response to this criticism and media speculation, the Australian government 
amended the relevant legislation, Crimes Act 1914,
206
 to stipulate more clearly the 
provisions regarding delays and timings.
207
 However, this detention of Mr Haneef 
without sufficient evidence nor suspicion, and with no checks on time constraints 
has raised human rights concerns for those accused of terror-related offences. The 
system of anti-terrorism measures in Australia appears to take the stance of an 
inverted constitutional doctrine- namely a presumption of guilt, before found 
innocent.  
Pivotally, what sets the Australian situation apart from the vast number of states 
implementing anti-terror laws post-09/11, is the fact that Australia does not have a 
national bill or charter of rights, and thus this renders it: 
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‘Impossible to challenge under Australia’s constitution the country’s anti-terror 
laws for their impact on free speech and other liberties. Limits in Australia depend 
on political leaders’ judgements.’
208
 
Professor Williams explores Australian anti-terror legislation in his 2011 article, 
drawing on the differences between WW1 and WW2 legal measures in comparison 
to those enacted post-09/11. He notes that the former had a ‘more definite duration’ 
and ‘cease[d] to operate after the conflict ended’, whereas the latter post-09/11 
situation is tainted by a ‘character of permanence’.
209
 Although some other states 
benefit from at least some reassurance, in their anti-terror laws including a ‘sunset 
clause’, which allows them to draw to a close after a certain period of time has 
elapsed, most have a mandate which is wholly indefinite, as we see with 
Australia.
210
 As such, we cannot merely turn a blind-eye to the implications of such 
a long-term influence on all matters of precedent, expectations and political 
practices. It largely normalises the prioritisation of security over human rights 
protection and this is a slippery-slope. Indeed, from the outset, anti-terror legislation 
was framed as temporary in nature, to grapple with a temporary threat- but ‘it is 
now clear that Australia’s anti-terror laws can no longer be cast as a transient, short-
term legal response.’
211
 The infinite nature of this exceptionalism is perhaps best 
expressed in the 2010 statement by the Australian government in stating:  
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‘[the] threat of terrorism to Australia is real and enduring. It has become a 
persistent and permanent feature of Australia’s security environment.’
212
 
Although Australia has not gone so far in its anti-terror legislation as to utilise such 
language as ‘Patriot Act’, ‘the media have noticed the Orwellian character of some 
of the titles, such as the New South Wales Freedom of Information (Terrorism and 
Criminal Intelligence) Act of 2003.’
213
 The example of Australia, who appear to 
have become caught-up in the ‘War on Terror’, conveys how the whole system of 
checks and balances between the branches of government are, in such crisis 
situations, rendered utterly ineffective- even the courts, intended to act as ‘the last 
line of defence for human rights’ are often paralysed: 
‘In contemporary democracy, in the matter of anti-terrorist legislation, the usual 
protections and balances may not always be available either in the legislative 
process or in executive enforcement. Nations that are minor players in the global 
“war on terrorism” sometimes come under international pressure that they cannot 
resist to adopt counterpart laws. Necessarily, the courts have only a limited role. 
Their duty is to give effect to any laws that are constitutionally valid.’
214
 
In the case of R v Lodhi (2006) for example,
215
 the constitutionality of the National 
Security Information (Criminal and Civil proceedings) Act 2004 was argued, 
because it rendered those accused of having committed terrorist offences to being 
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sentenced ‘through a process incompatible with the exercise of judicial power.’
216
 In 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Justice Whealy held that the legislation 
was not inconsistent with judicial power; on appeal this decision was upheld, noting 
that the legislation merely ‘tilted the balance’ towards national security, but this did 
not render it invalid.
217
 It could indeed be argued that the domestic constitutional 
framework facilitates the way for exceptional anti-terror legislation, instead of 
providing a robust checking function. This was further accepted by the Australian 
courts in the case of Thomas v Mowbray (2007),
218
 where the government’s use of 
control orders was challenged on constitutional grounds, in line with Ch III of the 
Constitution.
219
 The High Court decided that the government had legitimate power 
to enact laws ‘with respect to the defence of the nation.’
220
 Although subsequent 
caselaw has invalidated numerous control order provisions, the basis for doing so 
has not focused on the restriction on liberties or the infringement of constitutional 
values, but instead on the scope of judicial power.
221
  
‘Following Thomas v Mowbray, control orders presented an attractive, and 
apparently constitutionally permissible, means of cracking down on feared groups 
within the community before crimes had necessarily been committed…[these] High 
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Where the domestic institutions are largely paralysed by anti-terror legislation 
enacted by a legitimate government and protected under the tests of judicial review, 
the only recourse for human rights protections is often international law.  
‘In the absence of a national scheme of human rights protection, such as a national 
human rights Act, the possibilities for legal challenge to any of Australia’s anti-
terror laws are very slight.’
223
 
If domestic courts are able to make reference to international law on human rights, 
then this may provide a sufficient ground for challenging unconstitutional anti-
terror legislation.
224
 Thus, we can see that under our existing system of international 
law, international human rights law is already the last resort and ultimate protector, 
where the constitutional system has broken down in a state and the checks and 
balances system has been incapacitated. However, this comes with the caveats that 
said state must have granted the relevant international bodies the jurisdiction to 
intervene, and claimants are often restricted in their access to international judicial 
bodies on account of the procedural requirement to exhaust all domestic legal 
remedies.  
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Former Prime Minister, Keven Rudd, in a national security statement in 2008 stated 
it most accurately in asserting that:  
‘Our national security interests must also be pursued in an accountable way which 
meets the government’s responsibility to protect Australia, its people and its 
interests while preserving our civil liberties and the rule of law. This balance 
represents a continuing challenge for all modern democracies seeking to prepare 
for the complex national security challenges of the future. It is a balance that must 
remain a conscious part of the national security policy process. We must not silently 
allow any incremental erosion of our fundamental freedoms.’
225
 
Despite stipulating such formal commitments to balancing security with human 
rights protections, it certainly appears as though Australia, alongside many states, 
have indeed lost their way somewhat and offered a ‘piecemeal review’ of anti-terror 
measures.
226
 Australia provides the most striking example, therefore, of what 
Professor Kent Roach coins as the ‘hyper-inflation’ of anti-terror laws. 
227
 Although 
this is worrying in itself, when coupled with the rapid pace of enactment and lack of 
transparency in the process of scrutinising and passing bills, it has led to unchecked 
and undebated legislation being passed at such a speed that civil society is unable to 
keep abreast of its effect. ‘The relentless legislative output’ is thus highly corrosive 
to democratic structures, as checks and balances fall by the wayside, as do the rights 
and freedoms of citizens, often without them even realising.
228
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This is further exacerbated by the absence of a Human Rights Act or Bill of Rights 
in Australia, and a Constitution which is largely silent on rights-protections and thus 
leaves citizens’ rights open to manipulation,
229
 with their only possible recourse 
proving to be international human rights treaties and their judicial mechanisms for 
redress. However, even this avenue for accountability is limited in its capacity, as 
international treaties are required to be incorporated into domestic law in order to be 
given legal effect- consequently, Australia’s sovereignty under exceptionalism 




‘The rule of law, the late great English jurist Tom Bingham wrote in 2010, is what 
separates a democratic society from a capricious authoritarian state. He argued 
that there is a “strong temptation” on the part of governments dealing with 
terrorism “to cross the boundary which separates the lawful from the unlawful”. 
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C.  France & The Bandwagon Effect: ‘Je Suis Charlie’..et 
toi? 
 
 To serve as proof that no corner of our globe has been untouched and 
untainted by the effects of terrorism, let us turn to a European example. A country 
which has a proud history of constitutional law, firmly entrenched human rights and 
democratic values, alongside a deeply-felt respect for the rule of law. Even within 
such a setting, the threat of terrorism has brought about a return to nationalistic 
sentiment and isolationism. Thus, we turn to the sphere of constitutional law and its 
interaction with international law, in relation to the French reaction to the ‘War on 
Terror’.  
The current Constitution, formally titled, The Constitution of the Fifth Republic was 
adopted in 1958 and was largely the result of the work of Charles De Gaulle.
232
 The 
Preamble explicitly refers to the texts of The Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen (1789),
233
 and the preamble to the 1946 Constitution.
234
 In the case of 
the Constitutional Council in 1971, 
235
 it was declared that the Constitution referred 
to not only its own contents but also the ‘Constitutional Block’ which included the 
aforementioned texts. It is largely the responsibility of the Constitutional Council 
(Conseil Constitutionnel) established in 1958, to uphold the principles and rules of 
said Constitution. Its primary purpose is to rule on whether potential bills are 
constitutional or not, after being voted on by Parliament and prior to being granted 
legal effect by their signature into law by the President of the Republic of France. 
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Since 2010, individuals whom are party to a lawsuit, have also been granted 
standing to ask the Council to review the legality of the legislation relevant to their 
case, and rule on whether said legislation is constitutional or not.  
With such a backdrop, it seems highly unlikely that a constitutional crisis could in 
fact occur in such a setting of constitutional protections, checks and balances and a 
deeply-entrenched respect and regard for the rule of law and human rights 
protections. So, we must ask ourselves, why it is necessary to scrutinise the 
constitutional legal controversies facing France.  
On 7 January 2015, a car drove up to the offices of the satirical magazine, Charlie 
Hebdo, in Paris and two masked gunmen, Cherif and Said Kouachi (French 
Muslims of Algerian descent) shot and killed 12 people and wounded a further 
11.
236
 The two perpetrators, who self-identified as Islamists and were affiliated with 
Al-Qaeda in Yemen, were joined by a third gunman who carried out simultaneous 
shootings and a hostage-taking at a market store. All had pledged allegiance to the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The former attack on the Office of Charlie 
Hebdo was largely deemed to be in response to their publication of numerous 
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed. In the wake of this attack, then President 
Francois Hollande instantly labelled it a ‘terrorist attack of the most extreme 
barbarity.’
237
 The gravity of the attacks shook the world, and support for France 
ricocheted across the world, as states and peoples wished to offer their condolences 
and display their solidarity in the face of terrorism. As an act of defiance against 
terrorist acts, Charlie Hebdo announced the continuation of its publication and the 
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increase in its printed copies for that next upcoming issue, the revenue of which 
would go to the families of the victims.  
The legacy of the attack on Charlie Hebdo was the conflict between freedom of 
expression and speech and the freedom of religion. Following the attacks, as a sign 
of solidarity, the French community and large parts of the international community 
coined the phrase ‘Je Suis Charlie’, or ‘I am Charlie’. The phrase reverberated as a 
battle-cry in favour of the freedom of expression, and proved boundless as it spread 
across social media. It soon became an iconic image, ‘hashtagged’ and written on 
placards to be held-high at internationally-held vigils.  
France has a deeply-entrenched respect for the freedom of expression as a 
fundamental human right, codified in The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen (1789),
238
 and incorporated into the French Constitution, Articles 10 and 
11.
239
 Therefore, this attack on one of its central constitutional values struck the 
very heart of France. Indeed, Article 11 stipulates: 
‘The free communication of ideas and of opinions is one of the most precious rights 
of man. Any citizen may therefore speak, write and publish freely, except what is 
tantamount to the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by law.’
240
 
The ‘us’ vs ‘them’ dichotomy created by those supporting freedom of religion and 
protection of the sanctity of their religion above all other rights, against the 
proponents of freedom of expression and speech proved most turbulent. Civil unrest 
was witnessed in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks across the world- in Niger, 
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10 people died and more were injured as a result of protests held against the 
publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad by Charlie Hebdo. 
241
 Muslim 
youths set churches alight and attacked police stations in the capital city, Niamey.  
Although the President of Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou condemned this 
behaviour and asserted that the perpetrators clearly had ‘understood nothing of 
Islam’, he did share the disdain felt by Muslims who had been offended by the 
Charlie Hebdo cartoons of the Prophet.
242
 With the front cover of the next issue of 
the publication showing yet another image of the Prophet, this again sparked violent 
protests across many states- including Algeria, Niger and Pakistan.  
A month later, on 14 February 2015, a gunman in Copenhagen, Denmark fired a 
gun at an event in favour of free speech which was being hosted by a Swedish artist 
who had similarly allegedly defamed the Prophet Mohammed, by placing His head 
on a dog’s body. 
243
 In response to this attack, Former President of France, Francois 
Hollande again remarked:  
‘Denmark and France are the same nations, feeling the same sadness but all the 
same will to resist, fight and defeat terrorism…they hit the same targets, they hit 
what we are, what we represent, the values of freedom, the rule of law, that all 
citizens, whatever their religion, should be able to enjoy.’
244
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But if we remove ourselves from the bandwagon of fear and propaganda for a 
moment, we could perhaps see that Muslims have a valid legal argument, and that 
the question of conflicting rights is one which needs to be posited without being 
clouded by emotions. Ultimately, ‘where should the line be drawn between what is 
acceptable criticism and what speech constitutes “incitement to religious hatred” 
and is therefore punishable?’
245
 Under international law, the right to receive and 
impart information includes that which ‘offends, shocks or disturbs’, in accordance 
with the ICCPR, Article 19 (2),
246




In the context of the Charlie Hebdo publication in particular, it is clear to see that 
their cartoons might prove insulting to many groups and individuals, but those 
producing it were merely exercising their right to express their views. Thus, a 
balancing exercise must result from this conflict.  
‘The cartoons, though depictions of religious figures, usually had a political 
undertone, which grants them further protection. In this instance, the scales of 
justice should give greater weight to that freedom of expression which is so 
fundamental in today’s society.’
248
 
Interestingly, the creators of Charlie Hebdo did not identify the ‘them’ camp in the 
debate as being proponents of religious freedom, but instead as terrorists who instil 
fear and hatred. Their religious depictions were not singling-out one particular 
religion for ridicule- but took the same approach with numerous other religions. In 
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such a way, why should the Office of Charlie Hebdo refrain from targeting Islam 
out of fear of terrorist reprisals? One of the cartoonists had previously stated:  
‘When we attack the Catholic hard right…nobody talks about it in the papers. It’s 
as if Charlie Hebdo has official authorisation to attack the Catholic hard right. But 




Pivotally, the laws relating to press freedom and freedom of expression are 
‘considered one of France’s foundational laws’, and thus The Law on Freedom of 
the Press (1881) is worthy of note (Sur la Liberte de la Presse 1881). 
250
 This 
legislation was amended in 1972 to prohibit hate speech intending to: ‘provoke 
discrimination, hate, or violence towards a person or a group of people because of 
their origin or because they belong or do not belong to a certain ethnic group, nation, 
race or religion.’
251
 The adjudication of such cases have regularly arisen in the 
French courts, indeed Charlie Hebdo had been sued approximately 50 times from 
1992 until 2014 by predominantly religious groups. The newspaper had won most 
of their cases, but had lost in others, mainly on the basis of personal defamation as 
opposed to hate speech. 
252
 The central question posited in these court cases: do the 
publications of Charlie Hebdo constitute hate speech? One of the most controversial 
lawsuits resulted from a Charlie Hebdo publication in 2006 which displayed an 
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image of the Prophet Muhammad guarding the gates of heaven, with a caption to a 
queue of suicide bombers, stating: ‘Stop! Stop! We have run out of virgins!’
253
 A 
group of Islamic groups sued the magazine for inciting hatred, but a Paris court 
ruled that this could not be deemed ‘hate speech’. Said court instead reiterated the 
importance of free speech in a democratic society, which included views which may 
offend others. The overarching message of this court ruling was:  
‘If you don’t like the cartoon, don’t buy the magazine’.
254
 
However, this firm commitment to freedom of speech has left the French 
government open to criticisms of hypocrisy. On the same day as Charlie Hebdo sold 
its first issue post-attack, featuring the cover image of the Prophet Muhammad, 
police arrested a comedian and activist Dieudonne M’bala M’bala, renowned for his 
controversial statements in defiance of the French establishment, for posting on 
Facebook, ‘Je me sens Charlie Coulibaly’ (Coulibaly was the perpetrator of the 
concurrent terror attacks on the market store the same day as the Charlie Hebdo 
attacks).
255
 This post was alleged to be an ‘incitement of terrorism’, a crime which 
is now included into the 1881 Law.  
‘The juxtaposition of the two events- the celebration of a magazine that routinely 
publishes cartoons considered blasphemous and offensive by many of the world’s 
Muslims and the muscular prosecution of a relentlessly provocative black 
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This apparent double-standard in locating freedom of speech can find its roots in a 
long-standing commitment of the government to advocate for individuals, above 
churches and their doctrines- irrespective of which religious mandate they hold. 
Such issues have similarly arisen with individuals who deny the holocaust, which is 
formally a crime under a law passed in 1990. The aforementioned Dieudonne has 
fought for his freedom of speech in denying the holocaust indirectly by inviting a 
famous holocaust-denier, Robert Faurisson, to speak at his comic performances. 
However, in 2013, the French parliament further extended the scope of the 1990 law 
by including ‘indirect incitement’, which thus included Dieudonne’s invitation of 
Faurisson.
257
 The inherent ambiguities in interpreting France’s constitutional values 
have rendered the government vulnerable to allegations of favouritism and 
hypocrisy, thus undermining their legitimacy.  
This seemingly anti-Muslim rhetoric has proven to be deeply etched into the fabric 
of French society, even beyond the Charlie Hebdo attacks. In 2004, Parliament 
enacted the ‘veil’ law which banned Muslim girls attending public schools from 
wearing headscarves. In 2010, Parliament moved one step further and banned full-
face covering veils in public places.
258
 These laws were viewed by many as an 
attack on the Muslim identity of many French citizens. However, many have instead 
argued that what we are witnessing in France is not an anti-Muslim sentiment, but 
merely an anti-religious tendency of the state.
259
 There is not only a clear separation 
between the church and the state in France, but also an underlying hostility towards 
religion.   
Resulting from the Charlie Hebdo attacks, and the enactment of legislation to 
restrict Muslim identity and religious freedom, France’s response has been a retreat 
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into nationalism and isolationist rhetoric in recent years. Exacerbated further by a 
media which fails to grant air-time to minority or religious communities in France, 
reels of propaganda in favour of non-religious voices results, and stereotypes and 
generalisations flourish.   
In 2017, this increasing nationalism in France reached new heights in the events 
surrounding the French Presidential election. The two dominant candidates battling 
for the position of the French Presidency could not have been more divergent in 
their policies and views- namely Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron. The latter 
proved victorious, with his liberal and progressive policies- the stage has thus been 
set for greater interaction with the international community and a return to human 
rights and constitutional protections. The Presidential vote indicated the support 
from the French population in favour of greater integration and tolerance, and a 
rejection of nationalistic and isolationist policies. Thus, it seems that the French 
people have chosen a future of greater understanding of, and interaction with the 
international community. President Macron had previously denounced the Muslim 
headscarf ban,
260
 and has stood in defiance of the indefinite nature of France’s ‘state 
of emergency’ in the wake of 09/11- the future for France’s constitutional 
protections appears bright, but any future terror attacks could destabilise the 
situation once more. The rhetoric of ‘Je Suis Charlie’ showcases the contagious 
effects of terror attacks and ‘fear’, and serves as a vital reminder to refrain from 
counteracting one form of ‘terror’ with another ‘legitimised terror’ invoked by the 
state in its counter-terror measures.  
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‘The right response is not ever more repressive legislation and the choice is not one 
between security and the rule of law…If we give up the rule of law, we’re headed 




D.  The International Riposte 
‘The legal supervision of states of emergency is of primary importance, as grave 
human rights violations often occur in this context and states may use the power of 




 In the wake of the 09/11 terror attacks on the United States of America, the 
United Nations foresaw an inevitable shift in security concerns and therefore 
domestic legislation on terrorism. An inevitable by-product of this would prove to 
be the widespread violation and neglect of human rights laws and norms which had 
taken decades of hard work to make their way to the forefront of domestic politics 
in many states. The extent to which human rights would be disregarded in favour of 
anti-terror protections and legislation was, I assert, not wholly foreseeable. Had it 
been, perhaps the stance of the United Nations would have been quite different. 
                                                             
261 Mark Deen, ‘France’s Indefinite State of Emergency is a Mistake’ (Bloomberg, 12 
October 2016) Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-11/france-s-
indefinite-state-of-emergency-is-a-mistake-macron-says Last accessed July 2017.  
262 Venice Commission on Science and Technique of Democracy, ‘No 12: Emergency 
Powers’ (1995); Venice Commission on Science and Technique of Democracy, ‘No 17: 
Human Rights and the Functioning of the Democratic Institutions in Emergency Situations’ 
(1996) Cited in: Scott Sheeran, ‘Reconceptualising States of Emergency under International 
Human Rights Law: Theory, Legal Doctrine and Politics’ Michigan Journal of International 
Law Vol. 34(3) (2013) p. 518. Available at:  
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=mjil  Last 




Following the events of 09/11, the United Nations Security Council passed 
Resolution 1373 on 28 September 2001,
263
 which asserted the need for states to pass 
legislation to ensure that accountability flowed from terrorist crimes:  
‘[to ensure that] terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in 
domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness 
of such terrorist acts.’
264
 
In response to this, fearful states promulgated reams of anti-terror legislation 
intended to confront this threat; importantly, huge amounts of this legislation went 
largely unchecked, undebated and pushed through political processes with haste and 
urgency.  It was this initial indicator that terrorist crimes went outside the remit of 
ordinary criminal law that essentially warranted their exceptionalism, and put a 
focus on preventative legislation which encroached heavily upon individual liberties.  
What we can draw from the aforementioned case studies is that often the law is only 
one part of the equation- it provides both an alleged solution to counter terrorism, 
alongside newfound problems. As Williams asserts: 
‘Anti-terror laws have a role to play in the prevention of terrorist attacks. However, 
enacting such laws comes with significant costs.’
265
 
The more corrosive of the effects of such legal measures, evidenced internationally, 
is the ostracism and alienation felt by certain communities, whom we have been 
indoctrinated into fearing and suspecting. At first, such suspicion was confined to 
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the sphere of media speculation and sensationalism, but as this digressed into the 
courtrooms, we have witnessed a complete inversion of the ‘presumption of 
innocence’. The targeting of certain groups and individuals ‘is the dynamic that 
terrorists rely upon’ as terrorism ‘requires nations to overreact in their attempts to 
prevent future attacks’, in order to continue the cycle of fear which feeds reactions 
and then subsequent attacks.
266
 In this way, anti-terror laws do not provide the 
solution, especially when promulgated at such a pace and with such a lack of 
scrutiny. The ultimate solution is to confront terrorism collectively as one united 
alliance, prioritise countering-extremism in both terrorist activities and counter-
terrorist reactions- this can only be done through international channels and within 
the parameters of international human rights norms. Former Secretary-General 
Kofi-Annan, most eloquently stated in 2005:  
‘Human rights law makes ample provision for strong counter-terrorist action, even 
in the most exceptional circumstances. But compromising human rights cannot 
serve the struggle against terrorism. On the contrary, it facilitates achievement of 
the terrorist’s objective- by ceding to him the moral high ground, and provoking 
tension, hatred and mistrust of government among precisely those parts of the 
population where he is more likely to find recruits.’
267
 
With regard to the overarching growth of ‘states of exception’, their potential to 
threaten the key tenets of international human rights law and international 
institutions is worrying. Indeed, the depth of crises and the proliferation of ‘states of 
exception’ in the international community has largely ensured the permeation of this 
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exceptionalism into the international sphere. Resultantly, this rhetoric is now 
commonplace in international law and is incapacitating its existing mechanisms. 
Fractured by widespread derogation by states from international human rights 
protections, coupled with largely erratic compliance, interaction and dialogue with 
international law- the future of international human rights law under the overarching 
theme of state exceptionalism appears uncertain. Ironically, such exceptionalism 
within the domestic domain of states, often justified on the basis of a ‘threat to the 
life of a nation’ is arguably threatening the very life of international human rights 
law, both in terms of its body (structure and mechanisms) and its organs 
(substantive mandate and norms).  
State exceptionalism is exacerbated further by the fact that international precedent 
on situations of state ‘emergency’ or ‘exception’ are far from convergent and 
coherent, ‘what now constitutes a public emergency is ubiquitous.’
268
 It certainly 
seems as though the international community is largely ill-equipped to understand 
‘states of exception’ and thus fails to protect human rights when such situations 
arise. Originating from 19
th
 century Western Europe, the notion has long-proven to 
be a label which can easily be attached to a government in order to ‘provide instant 
legitimacy to the greater limitation of human rights by government.’
269
 International 
law largely foresaw the inevitability of such games of power within the political 
domains of domestic states, and thus attempted to find a place for ‘states of 
exception’ within the legal structure, to avoid states merely retreating or 
withdrawing from human rights treaties during periods of exceptionalism or 
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emergencies. In trying to bring exceptionalism within the confines of international 
human rights law, the latter has largely offered indirect consent to, and endorsement 
of, state violations of human rights. The possibility of derogation from rights which 
we have claimed are interdependent, interconnected, universal etc., insults the very 
essence of the spirit and culture of international human rights law. Although 
derogatory clauses were initially used as a means for states in crises to temporarily 
suspend certain legal obligations- the perpetual nature of the crises we see taking 
hold of states renders this temporality null and void. Derogation, as with ‘states of 
exception’ have largely become ‘the rule’.  
‘The two legal questions that constitute the heart of the derogation regimes are first, 
whether a situation constitutes a “public emergency which threatens the life of the 




This is further reinforced by Human Rights Committee General Comment No 29 on 
‘States of Emergency’ (2001), which states that:  
‘Before a state moves to invoke Article 4, two fundamental conditions must be met: 
the situation must amount to a public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation, and the state party must have officially proclaimed a state of emergency.’
271
 
With a derogatory mechanism in place for international human rights law under 
these provisions- ‘in practice [states] have co-opted and distorted the derogation 
regime.’
272
 To determine the extent of exceptionalism and thus the extent to which 
we are allowing for such derogation, let us turn to the Special Rapporteur for States 
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of Emergency, who has researched this extensively, and published a final report in 
1997. The findings therein held that approximately 95 states, almost half of the total 
number of states in the international community, had been in a ‘state of emergency’, 
be it formally declared or not, between the short period of 1985 and 1997. 
273
  
The clear void between the provisions on derogation within treaty law, and the 
international interpretation and application of said provisions seems inevitable- if 
you grant states the power to determine when they can withdraw their consent on 
certain human rights protections, creative interpretation and justifications will 
preclude respect for said provisions when it is convenient for states to do so. During 
the time that the UN Commission on Human Rights was drafting the ICCPR and 
ICESCR, there was recognition that the derogation provisions ‘might produce 
complicated problems of interpretation and give rise to considerable abuse.’
274
 
Considering the foreseeability of such an issue, we must ask ourselves why a more 
preventative solution was not located, and a way of recognising exceptionalism and 
emergency situations without incapacitating international law and its mechanisms 
realised.  
This determination of whether a ‘state of exception’ has been justifiably evidenced 
by a state is often left to the determination of states themselves or regional treaty 
bodies. For example, The European Court of Human Rights is capable of making 
such a finding, wherein it balances the limitations placed on human rights with ‘the 
threat to the life of a nation’ on the basis of a doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’.
275
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This legal test, in the context of the ECtHR has proven to have a low threshold- in 
one case in the United Kingdom in 2009, it was accepted that a ‘state of emergency’ 
existed on account of a threat of terrorism, despite no actual attack having taken 
place.
276
 These flexible provisions ultimately allow for exceptionalism in many 
situations and ‘has provided a veneer of legality to specious claims by governments 
and has undermined the normativity of the law.’
277
 
Professor Sheeran, in his 2013 work on the interplay between ‘States of Emergency’ 
and international human rights protections, identifies that although many academic 
attempts have been made to address these flaws they have ‘tended to be highly 
formalistic...calling essentially for more and stricter rules’- Sheeran deems this 
unrealistic for the realm of international human rights law.
278
 He asserts that 
renewed interest in the topic has resulted post-09/11, as new dynamics of ‘states of 
exception’ have emerged, and proven once-more that our treaties and mechanisms 
for protecting human rights fail to take into account many political and theoretical 
nuances. I would instead assert that these mechanisms and laws fail to take into 
account human nature, as we increasingly see a world comprised of states whose 
leaders prioritise power, money, legitimacy and self-interest above and before 
human rights. As Sheeran explains, our mechanisms are largely based on a rule of 
law model, which largely fails to take into account the realities of politics, the 
‘character traits’ of states, or nuances in their behaviour.
279
 We are increasingly 
witnessing a retreat back to state sovereignty by authoritarian states, and with this 
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shift away from the rule of law, our existing mechanisms are in real danger of 
extinction.  
Professor Sheeran’s solution lay in redefining the question of whether a ‘state of 
emergency’ has emerged or not as a political question, and no longer a legal one.
280
 
This seems to me to be more in-keeping with the realistic behaviour of states and is 
capable of taking account of the increasingly perpetual nature of exceptionalism and 
the inability to decipher not only when it has started, but also when it has come to 
an end. Thus, we must strive to reconcile the seemingly incompatible conflict 
between the collective interests of a state, with the individual interests of its citizens. 
Derogation provisions merely justify state actions in deciding to prioritise the 
former and suspend the latter, but are framed as the balancing of the two. 
McGoldrick asserts that:  
‘the idea of limitations is based on the recognition that most human rights are not 




Indeed, if we look to any of our international human rights treaties, we can locate 
derogation and limitation clauses which largely cripple the power and enforceability 
of the norms and protections therein. For example, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) includes a general limitations clause in Article 29.
282
 How are 
we capable of preaching the universality of human rights, if we endorse a 
dichotomy of normalcy v exceptionalism, wherein human rights demand total 
respect and compliance during the former, but can be limited and suspended under 
the latter? Furthermore, as we evidenced in this section, it is actually during the 
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latter periods of exceptionalism that we need these human rights protections the 
most, and yet we have rendered our laws powerless to do so. Although the 
overarching aim of a state in exceptionalism is to return to normalcy, whereupon 
human right provisions will resume- these definitions are far too broad to hold states 
to account to them.
283
 It is my assertion that irrespective of whether a state deems 
itself to be in a situation of normalcy or exceptionalism, the rule of law, must be 
consistently maintained and protected. For some human rights advocates, this is 
referred to as ‘the principle of legality’.
284
 In my mind, suspending the rule of law 
during times of crises is counter-intuitive, as it is for precisely these situations that 
the rule of law was constructed in the first place, and precisely the by-products of 
exceptionalism under authoritarian regimes which it is fully-equipped to confront 
and remedy. In times of crisis, why would we incapacitate our greatest tool to 
ensure human rights protections?  
Ultimately, a ‘state of exception’ label denotes a state’s disengagement from 
international human rights law, and grants it the legitimacy of doing so. In this way, 
we indirectly legitimise the human rights abuses committed during periods of 
exceptionalism. This key idea of ‘institutionalising the emergency’ has been 
summarised by the UN Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency, Mr Despouy, 
in stating: 
                                                             
283 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 29: States of Emergency’ UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2002), para 1-2, quoted: ‘The restoration of a state of normalcy 
where full respect for the Covenant can again be secured must be the predominant objective 
of a state party derogating from the covenant.’ Available at: 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrc29.html Last accessed July 2017.  
284 Scott Sheeran, ‘Reconceptualising States of Emergency under International Human 
Rights Law: Theory, Legal Doctrine and Politics’ Michigan Journal of International Law 
Vol. 34(3) (2013) pp. 501-502. 494. Available at:  
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=mjil  Last 




‘[The] normal legal order subsists although, parallel to it, a special, a para-
constitutional legal order begins to take shape…allowing the authorities to invoke, 
according to the needs of the moment, either the normal legal system or the special 
system, although in practice is clearly relinquished in favour of the latter.’
285
 
One specific area in which the international community and international legal 
mechanisms has struggled in particular, is with the legal distinctions relating to 
‘war’; predominantly, for our purposes, the distinction between ‘combatant’ and 
‘non-combatant’, and interpretations of ‘armed conflict’ and ‘self-defence’. The 
Geneva Conventions have laid down the different legal categories of combatants 
during times of conflict, and the relevant protections which should be afforded to 
them, in line with international humanitarian law. Furthermore, the United Nations 
Charter lays down the legal basis for states to use armed force- force may be used 
by a state when permission is given from the UN Security Council, or the grounds 
of ‘self-defence’ can be invoked by a state who has suffered an ‘armed attack’ and 
this bypasses the Security Council.
286
 After 09/11, the USA argued that the attacks 
on US soil satisfied the requisites to be deemed an ‘armed attack’ and thus self-
defence could be invoked. Although this legal reasoning appears sound, the scope 
of the US application of this self-defence has proved expansive: 
‘This position does not allow the United States wide latitude in its employment of 
force, however. As an act of self-defence, the use of force by the United States can 
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only be directed at those who participated in the attack and those who pose a 
continuing threat to the United States.’
287
 
How this ‘self-defence’ translated into a ‘War on Terror’ remains legally 
problematic. The 1949 Geneva Conventions do offer two possible understandings of 
‘armed conflict’ for our purposes- namely Article 2, as a conflict existing between 
2+ Geneva Convention High Contracting Parties, where a war has been declared 
between the parties.
288
 Such situations are usually reserved for inter-state conflicts, 
and thus provide the legal basis for conventional war. The second category, as per 
Article 3, describes armed conflicts which are ‘not of an international character, 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties’.
289
 Pivotally, those 
‘armed conflict’ which come within the scope of Article 3 largely lay outside the 
scope of the Geneva Conventions- although they ‘must treat persons not taking an 
active part in conflict, including sick, wounded, surrendering and detained fighters, 
humanely. Specifically, murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture are 
prohibited.’
290
 The most fundamental difference between Articles 2 and 3 lay in the 
fact that ‘lawful combatants’ involved in Article 2 ‘conventional wars’ are afforded 
prisoner of war status, which in its simplest form protects combatants from being 
tried for their conduct by the opposing state. Article 3 combatants do not provide for 
such protections- as such ‘insurgents, revolutionaries, and other unconventional 
forces do not necessarily enjoy this same protection from prosecution’.
291
 As 
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terrorist groups are not High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions, they 
thus cannot come within the remit of Article 2, conventional warfare, and thus are 
forced to come in line with Article 3. States have worked around these legal 
distinctions in the wake of 09/11, in order to extend their jurisdiction into other 
states, and combat terrorist threats. 
‘So called “extraterritorial law enforcement” using military force to fight terrorists 
operating on the soil of another country has gained some limited international legal 
recognition particularly since 2001. With the host government’s consent, another 
state can use military force as a tool of counter terrorism, outside its borders, in 
what is technically a law enforcement action.’
292
 
It is debatable whether a ‘War on Terror’ is capable of coming within the remit of 
Article 3, or whether the terrorist groups are ‘not sufficiently organised’ and the 
attacks ‘not lengthy in nature’ and thus can only be characterised in terms of 
criminal law.
293
 With the ambiguity of the common enemy of ‘international 
terrorism’, concerning neither an Article 2 High Contracting Party, nor an Article 3 
non-international conflict, the ‘War on Terror’ largely fell into a legal grey area, in 
the international terrain. The ambiguity of the conflict in general and its nature has 
rendered those involved largely unprotected.  
Hindered further by a problematic distinction between ‘combatant’ and ‘civilian’, 
states have struggled to decipher who is indeed affiliated with terrorist groups, and 
thus which category individuals fall into. Article 43 of the Additional Protocol I to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines ‘combatants’ as: ‘members of the armed 
forces of a Party to a conflict are combatants…they have the right to participate 
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 Membership to terrorist groups is likewise an ambiguous 
interpretation, and thus who falls inside and outside the scope of prisoner of war 
protections, and who can hide behind the mask of ‘civilian’ protections has become 
blurred.  
International humanitarian law is largely considered to be of universal applicability. 
However, what has become clear is that although states have attempted to create 
legal vacuums to counteract terrorism, the international legal stance in its simplest 
form remains clear:  
‘every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is 
either a prisoner of war and, and as such, covered by the Third Convention, a 
civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical 
personnel or the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no 
intermediate status: nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.’
295
 
Fundamentally, although exceptionalism may be commonly-depicted as a legal 
vacuum, wherein law is rendered null and void, in many cases these exceptional 
spaces are actually facilitated and legitimised by an abundance of law. The need to 
legitimise and justify actions during exceptional periods showcases how states do in 
fact rely upon law and legitimacy in order to implement their policies. It is this 
fiction that a legal vacuum exists which strengthens their exceptional mandate. 
However, in reality, there is a continuing need to legitimise all decisions and 
measures, even if states do not wish for people to be aware of this. At the crux, 
therefore, is the pursuit of legitimacy. We must grant the international legal sphere 
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the tools to pierce the façade of exceptional, seemingly lawless spaces through 




















Chapter 4: Category (3) Crises: ‘Struggles for Power 




 ‘The Constitution is designed to keep political disagreements- including 
disagreements about the Constitution’s proper interpretation- within the 
bounds of normal politics. In type (3) crises, the Constitution fails at this task, 
and one or more of the parties moves outside the ordinary boundaries of 




According to the aforementioned Balkin and Levinson, a category (3) crisis 
prevails in a situation of overhaul- times of revolution and protest. All of the 
relevant actors may indeed allege that their actions and powers are in-keeping with 
the constitution of said state, but these various actors ultimately disagree about what 
the constitution grants each actor in terms of power. It is effectively a power 
struggle over the interpretation of the constitutional arrangements of a state. With 
no side admitting defeat, a stalemate ensues and the constitutional crisis emerges, as 
the battle often takes to the streets, instead of the courtroom.  
‘In type (3) crises, each side may claim that their opponents are violating the 
Constitution or are wrongly preventing lawful action under it…each side may 
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accuse the other of tormenting a type (1) crises, while simultaneously claiming 
impeccable legal pedigree for its own actions.’
298
 
Referring back to Moncef Marzouki’s proposed mandate for an IConC, he 
identified two areas which could be confronted by an international constitutional 
institution, arising from a category (3) crisis. Namely, in situations where 
unconstitutional actions by the executive spark revolutions and protest, which are 
capable of proving violent and illegal in themselves, and also where corrupt or 
illegal elections have taken place in order to secure the continuation of an 
authoritarian executive which would otherwise not freely and democratically gain 
the popular vote. In such circumstances, struggles for power ensue. With regard to 
the former, as we will witness in our analysis, ‘people power’ is often a powerful 
tool in confronting unconstitutional executive power and resuming ‘normalcy’. Yet, 
in the latter, illegitimate or illegal elections prove more burdensome to combat as 
they are often plagued by secrecy and corruption, which renders it difficult, if not 
impossible to evidence. Resultantly, regulation and oversight by an international 
institution could bolster and support ‘people power’ by investigating the legitimacy 
of an election.  
 
I.  People Power and Protest 
 
‘Mass demonstrations, coupled with credible threats to take to the streets 
and commit mass civil disobedience…might also be signs of a type (3) 
constitutional crisis.’ 
                                                             




A.  Iceland’s ‘Pots and Pans’ Revolution 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, the ‘pots and pans’ 
revolution, or ‘kitchenware revolution’ was sparked in Iceland, a nation with a 
small population of 311,000 people. 
299
 The government’s reaction to this economic 
crisis was to nationalise the nation’s 3 main banks, which led to a plummeting stock 
market crash, and a concurrent crash in the people’s trust of the government. Civil 
society mobilised and organised themselves into weekly demonstrations, which 
were held outside of the parliament building, and after 5 months, eventually the 
demands of the people were met and resignations seen from the government, the 
head of the Central Bank and the Director of the Financial Supervisory Authority.
300
  
Before long, the newly-emerged coalition government had created investigatory 
bodies with the authority to prosecute bankers and government officials, and this 
resulted in the prosecution of numerous of Iceland’s top bankers under the crimes of 
insider trading etc., these individuals served up to 5 years in prison. 
301
 The court 
which adjudicated the case of the previous Prime Minister, Geir Haarde, was more 
lenient and found him guilty of ‘neglecting to hold special meetings to address a 
crisis that many could see coming.’
302
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The Icelandic people determined whether to nationalise banks, prosecute bankers, 
impose controls on moving capital abroad and held 2 referenda on the question of 
whether or not Iceland should pay back foreign debtors. In 2015, the IMF praised 
Iceland as ‘one of the top economic performers in Europe over the past few years in 
terms of economic growth’-
303
 so we can safely say that the approach of the 
Icelandic people worked in stabilising their own economy, and mapping their own 
path out of a crisis situation. Having firmly established their power in bringing 
about economic reforms, the people fearlessly shifted their attention towards 
striving for democratic reforms, quoting the logic:  




Thus, in 2010, Parliament created a process through which citizens were able to 
collectively participate in writing the Icelandic Constitution. This project brought 
about a peoples’ assembly of 950 randomly-selected citizens who outlined the key 
foundational principles of said constitution, coupled with experts of constitutional 
law being asked to write a guidance booklet. A group of 25 elected citizens were 
then given the momentous task of drawing up the new constitutional document- a 
project which took 4 months to complete. 
305
 The document was published at all 
stages of the drafting process, to allow for the comments and feedback from citizens 
throughout the process. In this way, a constant dialogue was in place to ensure that 
the constitutional document reflected the will of the people throughout. In the 
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national referendum which followed in 2012, 67% of citizens voted in favour of 
using this document as the basis for a new constitution.  
Although, such active engagement of civil society in the construction of their 
constitution in Iceland is commendable, and paints a clear picture of the power of an 
active and engaged civil society in a state, in the wake of a category (3) crisis- this 
constitutional document is yet to be passed by Parliament. But the exercise itself 
and the precedent it establishes is a powerful one in terms of constitutional 
protections, and the checks that are capable of being maintained by civil society in 
times of crisis: 
‘Iceland’s Constitution-making process has been tremendously innovative and 
participatory…it would also be at the cutting edge of ensuring public participation 
in ongoing governance, a feature that we argue has contributed to constitutional 
endurance in other countries.’
306
 
In 2016, we saw the Icelandic people again take to the streets over the refusal of the 
Prime Minister, Gunnlaugsson, to step down from his position after it was leaked 
that he had failed to disclose assets and allegations of corruption were rife.
307
 As a 
result, a new government was appointed and the voices and will of the people 
reigned supreme once more. 
308
 Though this showcases a positive response to a 
constitutional crisis by civil society in Iceland, if aided by an international 
institution, their carefully-crafted constitution might have been implemented.   
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B.  The Republic of Korea: The Relentless Flickers of 
Candlelight  
‘Just as there can be emergency without a constitutional crisis, constitutional crises 
can occur in contexts that no one would identify as emergencies…when a governor 




 Following mass demonstrations outside of the Blue House, the residence of 
Former President Park Geun-hye, on a weekly basis in Seoul over the course of 
months, her eventual impeachment resulted in early 2017. Catalysed by an initial 
scandal which shocked the South Korean people in 2016, with regard to the Former 
President’s relationship with Choi Sooon-sil, who had been investigated on 
suspicion of exerting undue influence on Park Geun-hye,
310
 the people had 
demanded that she step-down as President. Despite public apologies being made, 
she refused to resign from her position. In late November 2016, at the height of the 
protest figures, it has been estimated that 1.5 million people attended protests in 
Seoul, alongside a further 400,000 in other regions of the country.
311
 The police 
forces, largely comprised of young males undertaking their mandatory military 
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service, were enlisted to defend the Blue House against protestors and prevent any 
potential violence.  
During this period of protests, President Park Geun-hye’s approval rating dropped 
to 5%, amidst constant pressure from citizens to step down.
312
 The Constitution in 
South Korea protects sitting presidents from being prosecuted, and her presidential 
term had a remaining 15 months before it was to expire. With Prosecutors directly 
linking her to the corruption scandal, it raised the possibility of her impeachment 
through constitutional channels.  
In December 2016, a bill was passed in the National Assembly of South Korea to 
impeach Park Geun-hye, with 234 votes in favour, to 56. Such a result was a sure 
indicator of the loss of confidence that had resulted from the scandal, even among 
her own conservative Saenuri Party. The bill required a minimum of 200 votes in 
favour of initiating impeachment proceedings in order for the issue to be passed to 
the Constitutional Court to rule on the issue and render a decision.
313
 The fate of her 
presidency was thus in the hands of the 9 constitutional court judges, all of whom 
she had elected to the court bench, and many believed would be unlikely to decide 
to impeach her. The impeachment decision was passed down and Park Geun-hye 
did indeed leave office.
314
 In the May 2017 presidential election which followed, the 
people overwhelmingly elected a former human rights lawyer, who firmly opposed 
her leadership, namely Moon Jae-in.
315
 Prior to his election, he notably served the 
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warning to the judges in the constitutional court, ‘that overturning an impeachment 
vote would be a betrayal of the South Korean people.’
316
 This election result 
showcases the swing in popular opinion back to liberal and democratic values, after 
a period of political disarray- President Moon Jae-in epitomises a newfound unity in 
the South Korean people.  
‘The scandal has further exposed the unhealthy ties between establishment 
politicians and the country’s conglomerates. That arrangement was largely 
tolerated while the chaebol spearheaded rapid growth in the South Korean 
economy- Asia’s fourth-biggest- but the rising income gap, youth unemployment 
and high-profile problems affecting Samsung and other major companies, means 
voters’ patience is wearing dangerously thin.’
317
 
Not only will this impeachment and the struggle of the South Korean people to 
bring about the demise of a figure who was once widely trusted and respected by 
the citizens, on account of her father, President Park Chung-hee, and his legacy, go 
down in history, it will also be remembered in how it angered the people to such a 
degree that they took to the streets in defiance, weekly, armed with their flames of 
solidarity.   
In April 2017, prosecutors formally charged Park Geun-hye on grounds of 
corruption, which could potentially give her a life sentence in jail. The charges 
included abuse of power, extortion, bribery and leaking state secrets.
318
 This former 
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President, who many claim has fallen from grace, both in terms of legitimacy and in 
the hearts and minds of many South Korean citizens, was motorcaded out of the 
Blue House in March 2017, she broke her longstanding silence, in stating:  
‘I feel sorry that I could not finish the mandate given to me as president…it will 
take time, but I believe the truth will be revealed.’
319
 
Mapping the statistics of those who participated in the protests from October to 
December 2017, the figures are quite startling in how quickly the movement 
mobilised. With the initial protest seeing figures of approximately 30,000 people on 
29 October 2016, by 3 December 2016 the numbers of protestors had risen to 
2,320,000-
320
 myself being one of them.  
Most poignantly of all, the impeachment scandal showcases the emancipation of the 
South Korean people and tells the tale of voices which have long been quiet and 
subservient in the political domain, arguably since the pro-democracy movements in 
the 1980’s- their voices reverberated with grace, strength and a steadfast 
commitment to peaceful protests in the interests of democracy, justice and the rule 
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C.  The Republic of Tunisia & The Arab Spring(s) 
‘Political actors believe that their opponents are taking dangerous and 
illegal steps that endanger the constitutional foundations of the republic or 
that threaten to bring about fundamental and unjustified changes. Therefore, 
these steps justify- and generally produce- extraordinary forms of struggle 





Often, we can observe how a category (1) crisis is capable of spiralling into 
a category (3) crisis- arguably it is just such a sequence of events which catalysed 
‘The Arab Spring[s]’. Where authoritarian leaders and dictatorships have brought 
about widespread human rights violations, with alleged ‘exceptionalism’ argued as 
the justification for doing so, the people revolt, and in so doing, spark a 
constitutional crisis in a different form. 
‘The Middle East and North Africa was engulfed in an unprecedented outburst of 
popular protests and demand for reform. It began in Tunisia and spread within 
weeks to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria.’
322
 
On 17 December 2010, the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi catalysed 
widespread protests amongst the frequently divided Tunisian people: 
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unemployment was high; there was widespread corruption, restrictions on human 
rights (especially freedom of speech), poor living conditions and food inflation. 
This one event brought about an unimaginable ricochet of social disorder and 
political unrest, which would transcend state borders, political and religious 
loyalties. The result, for Tunisia at least, was the removal of Former President Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011, just 28 days after the death of Bouazizi. The 
deeply-felt frustration with the economic policies of Tunisia, the repression of its 
citizens and their human rights and an ongoing distrust of the political elite brought 
about social unrest on a dramatic scale. For many Tunisians,  
‘the fabric of Ben Ali’s authoritarianism [had] frayed. Once it became clear that 
the Islamists no longer posed a serious threat, many Tunisians became less willing 
to accept the government’s heavy-handedness.’
323
 
Considering the origins of Former President of Tunisia, Moncef Marzouki, with 
regard to the dictatorship which took hold of Tunisia under President Ben Ali, it 
seems inevitable that in order to fully understand his proposal for an IConC and the 
backdrop within which it was constructed, we must first understand Tunisia and its 
own experience of ‘crises’. It is worthy of note that the Arab Spring which has 
brought about a vast restructuring of power in the Middle East was, as previously 
stated, catalysed by events in Tunisia.
324
 In a conversation with Moncef Marzouki in 
2013, Presider Christopher Dickey (Paris Bureau Chief and Middle East Regional 
Editor, Newsweek) remarked:  
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‘The Arab Spring looks- well, looks like hell in a lot of countries. I had the feeling 
that sometimes when I look at what happened in Tunisia, it’s a little bit 
like…Slovenia in the Balkans, they broke away from Yugoslavia, came away more 
or less safe and sound, and everything else fell apart and went to hell.’
325
 
Moncef Marzouki went on to explain, however, that Tunisia remains far from safe 
from further crises, given the fact that its neighbours include Egypt and Libya- both 
of which in recent years have witnessed their fair share of human rights violations 
and ‘constitutional crises’. In a world of interconnected states, it certainly seems as 
though no problem is merely domestic in nature anymore- this is perhaps the by-
product of globalisation. Globalisation has brought both advantages and difficulties. 
In such a way, he draws upon the interaction between Syria and Tunisia, and the 
impact that a crisis in the former has had on the latter: 
‘Syria is becoming an internal problem [to Tunisia], because we have a lot of young 
people going to Syria, more than 500 jihadis, Tunisian, 500 Tunisian jihadis are in 
Syria and we’re very afraid that, when they come back to Tunisia, it will be the 
same thing that happened with Algeria…in the 80’s, a lot of Algerians went to 




Even Tunisia, which was heavily westernised under Former President, Habib 
Bourguiba, which has been at the forefront of fighting for women’s rights etc., its 
fate post-revolution is still far from ‘safe’ or clear. Post-revolution in Tunisia, then 
President Moncef Marzouki pledged loyalty to finding ‘consensus’, a commitment 
to dialogue between the government and the people; although he admits that it takes 
time for this to be realised, the reality, if they fail to reach this consensus, is a crisis 
                                                             





akin to the one we saw ensnare Egypt. He highlights the power of having a strong 
civil society, an educated and professional populace, without which the state would 
be ‘helpless’ and vulnerable to crises in facing its threats.
327
  
In drawing up the most recent Constitution in Tunisia in 2013, the process was 
fraught with numerous political assassinations in an attempt to stall the process and 
in so doing Tunisia’s transition toward a fully-fledged democracy. Moncef 
Marzouki has explained how in Tunisia, political assassinations were the only way 
in which individuals could stall the system, as a coup would not be possible on 
account of the ‘specificity of our military’.
328
  
He draws an interesting parallel which perhaps goes some way to explain why we 
saw a shift from crises caused by Al-Qaeda to those caused by civil society in the 
Arab Springs in numerous Arab states. In conveying how the onset of the Arab 
Spring meant that Al-Qaeda’s primary mandate of overcoming dictatorships was 
replaced by largely democrats who aimed to overthrow the same dictatorships, but 
through civil society and with no religious label attached to themselves- it rendered 
Al-Qaeda’s purpose largely futile, so they changed it.
329
 Resultantly, Al-Qaeda in 
recent years has fought to halt or stall political processes and with this has come a 
resurgence of an extremist Islamist movement. It is such a change in dynamics that 
has brought about the crises we have seen in the Syrian Arab Republic. 
Importantly though, after a revolution a counter-revolution usually results, arguably 
a by-product of a transitioning state- and thus one crisis is usually followed by 
another, albeit it in a different form. He explains how in the context of Tunisia, the 
revolution and the fleeing of the dictator Ben Ali did not result in every citizen 







accepting the new regime.
330
 Many citizens had indeed been content with the 
previous regime, and upon witnessing the crisis in Egypt would probably have 
aimed to recreate that crisis in Tunisia- but as we have previously stated, failing 
states fail in their own way, crises cannot be reproduced uniformly in different 
states. Moncef Marzouki reiterates how we should not be referring to the crises we 
see in many Arab states as an ‘Arab Spring’- individual crises warrant a multiplicity 
in crises, thus a more accurate definition would be ‘Arab Springs’.
331
  
The side-effect of a counter-revolution has meant, in the context of Tunisia, that 
many of the rights and freedoms which the current regime fought hard for, are now 
being used against them by their predecessors. In a traditional and conservative 
society such as Tunisia, it is often difficult to balance the protection of human rights, 
political stability and religious sentiment and law. One could write an entire paper 
on the compatibility of human rights in non-secular states, where a religious law, for 
example Shari’ah, sometimes conflicts with, or even contravenes human rights.
332
 
Though such a discussion is wholly relevant to the arguments herein, for fear of the 
over-expansion of my paper, I will refrain from analysing too deeply here.  
The compromise established between Islam and the Tunisian coalition government 
was to refrain from inputting ‘Shari’ah’ into the Constitution after the revolution- as 
it was deemed potentially harmful to the stance therein on women’s rights and 
human rights as a whole. But ensuring the construction of a secular constitution was 
of course problematic; Moncef Marzouki distinguishes between a Muslim country 
and having a secular constitution in explaining that the former is an issue of identity, 
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and the latter relates to something more universal.
333
 If we translate this to the 
international domain, we can identify how we are capable of having individual state 
identities, religions, cultures etc., but our constitutions should be universal in nature, 
as they are inherently ‘universal values’. It is this central idea of the uniformity of 
constitutional human rights protections which we advocate for later in this paper.  
Most poignantly, Moncef Marzouki highlights the tools which have been used in 
Tunisia to aid their progression toward democracy and a greater protection for 
human rights- these tools are capable of being translated into the international 
sphere and assisting our realisation of an IConC. In this way, he suggests that 
writing a constitution is not in itself the only remedy to a ‘crisis’ situation- ‘writing 
the constitution is not…what will guarantee this…it’s a strong statement’.
334
 
Alongside this, ‘we need a strong civil society and we need strong organisation…in 
Tunisia, we were very lucky to have that’.
335
 Although his statement was in 
reference to Tunisia’s progress, it is wholly capable of being transposed into our 
construction of an International Constitutional Court.  
Although Tunisia’s transition to a largely democratic state has proven a resounding 
success, considering it was sparked by one local event, the self-immolation of a 
fruit-stall trader. For many other Arab states, whose histories had been similarly 
tainted by authoritarian leaders and repressive policies and restrictions on human 
rights, crisis (1) situations, the people had: 
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‘Hoped that this “Arab Spring” would bring in new governments that would deliver 
political reform and social justice. But the reality is more war and violence, and a 
crackdown on people who dare to speak out for a fairer, more open society.’
336
 
Perhaps this serves as proof that all failing states, fail in their own way; one uniform 
approach translated across diverse states will not prove effective in the long-run. 
This has largely been the difficulty found by the international community in dealing 
with the issues raised by the Arab Spring[s], and should be borne in mind as we 
pursue a new international legal framework.  
 
II.  Silenced Voices & Illegitimate Elections 
 
 At the very crux of executive power is the central understanding that said 
power is derived from the electorate and popular opinion, and is inherently 
legitimised by them. Resultantly, an unconstitutional election strikes at the very 
essence of democracy and legitimacy, often leading to the prolonging of an 
authoritarian regime and their unconstitutional policies.  We increasingly can 
witness the desperate attempts made by authoritarian leaders to maintain their grasp 
of power by using: incentives to bribe voters, fear or intimidation tactics to ensure 
that voters cast their ballot in a certain way either prior to the election or at the 
polling station, the rigging or hacking of election results and figures and the 
suppression of opposition parties to ensure choice is limited.  
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A.  Legitimising Illegitimacy: International 
Authoritarianism in Haiti 
‘It is impossible to build a legitimate government on a rotten foundation.’337 
 
It is worthy of note that the notion of the international community 
regulating national elections according to international constitutional law is 
contentious, as it potentially compromises the sovereignty of states, especially if the 
people therein have not consented to such intervention. Such intervention has been 
witnessed in recent years with the increasing guardianship of Haiti, including 
overseeing its elections. In the presidential election of November 2010, only ¼  of 
Haitians voted, largely on account of the most popular political party, Fanmi 
Lavalas, being excluded from the ballot paper.
338
 Resultantly, the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) decided to pursue a run-off election between the top 2 
presidential candidates. Even though the international organisation may have 
believed it was coming to the aid of a developing and troubled state, there were 
many inherent issues with the legitimacy of Haiti’s election to begin with, and thus 
recognising its result seems unjustifiable. Instead of going to the root of the issue 
and trying to build better mechanisms in order to strengthen Haiti’s democratic 
electoral process, legitimising an illegitimate electoral result merely weakens 
Haiti’s position even more.  Alongside the exclusion of a popular political party in 
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 ‘our recount of the vote also showed that even among the votes 
cast, there was a sizeable proportion of votes- about 12.7%- that were never 
received by the Provisional Electoral Council or were quarantined by it,’ clerical 
errors were rife on tally sheets, ‘ballot box stuffing and fraud’ commonplace and 
many were unable to vote because they did not appear on the electoral register.
340
 
‘Clearly an election that was so severely flawed and plagued by 
irregularities cannot be considered legitimate.’
341
 
Through the international community choosing to legitimise the illegitimate, this 
fundamentally undermines the Haitian people’s right to vote and provides a volatile 
foundation upon which said government can govern, leaving the situation open to 
possible protest, or even revolution. The 2010 election was not merely formally 
endorsed internationally, despite its flaws, it was in fact funded by international 
donors who supplied $12.5 million (72% of the election cost).
342
 Importantly, this 
was not the first occasion where international intervention crippled national 
elections in Haiti. The democratically-elected President, Jean Bertrand Aristide, 
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elected in 2004, was overthrown by a coup aided by the US and exiled in clear 
violation of both Haitian constitutional law and international law.
343
 
‘Washington and its allies, including the people who are currently making decisions 
about Haiti at the OAS, are pushing these illegitimate elections for the same reason 
that they overthrew Aristide, and will not let him back into his own country…these 
people want to determine who rules Haiti, without allowing the majority of Haitians 
themselves to decide. There will be resistance to this, as to the dictatorships and 
foreign occupations of the past.’
344 
In 2015, the electoral crisis in Haiti once again marred the legitimacy of 
government and the sovereignty and stability of Haiti as a whole, with new 
allegations of ‘ballot tampering, illegal voting and other abuses’, alongside a 26% 
voter turnout. 
345
 Instead of accepting the illegitimacy of yet another election, 
independent inquiries should be undertaken to understand where the democratic 
electoral process in Haiti is continually going awry. Since the 2010 Haitian 
earthquake, the Haitian people have struggled to rebuild their political institutions; 
there is a growing distrust and apathy toward international intervention and 
oversight, as it certainly appears as though the stability and best interests of the 
Haitian people are not at the forefront of the minds and intentions of those acting on 
their behalf. In 2015, with a disbanded parliament, and a leader who was ruling by 
decree, the political situation of Haiti was dysfunctional to say the very least.  
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If an IConC was to be constructed with a mandate which included oversight of 
elections and their legitimacy, perhaps the plight of Haiti, and their shackled 
existence to the authoritarian wishes of their puppeteers might be finally resolved. 
The case of Haiti is an important one, as it showcases how international oversight 
can, if maliciously pursued, be harmful to democratic processes and undermine state 
sovereignty and electoral legitimacy. An IConC would be equipped to denounce 
illegitimate elections, guide electoral processes and offer assistance where needed.  
‘Anyone who cares about democracy in a country whose fate is so closely tied to the 
wandering and sometimes malign attentions of the United States and the rest of the 




B.  The Russian Federation: ‘The Rubber Stamp’ of 
Electoral Legitimacy  
 
 Amidst a state which entrusts centralised power to a Presidential figure in 
the political sphere, the importance of a constitution which ensures democratic 
accountability and legitimate elections could not be over-stated. The most 
prominent example in recent years has proven to be Russia. Is the re-election of 
President Putin a result of evidenced popular support from the Russian electorate, or 
the result of an authoritarian constitution and policies which allow for, and formally 
legitimises, his continued grasp on power?  
‘Under the influence of Vladimir Putin, the Russian political system has become 
highly centralised, with particular emphasis on the ‘power vertical’, a top-down 
                                                             




approach that serves the interests of the power elite. The security services are 
arguably more powerful than they were under the communist system…the television 
mass media are effectively controlled by the government…journalists are 
intimidated from carrying out any serious investigative reporting.’
347
 
Although constitutional guarantees are claimed to exist to ensure that free and fair 
elections do take place formally, as per the 1993 Constitution,
 348
 the reality is an 
engineered mechanism which ensures that power remains in the hands of 
authoritarian figures with similar agendas, albeit different labels. Legislation has 
been consistently enacted to raise the hurdles even higher for smaller parties who 
wish to enter the political sphere and contest the dominant leadership. For example, 
in the 2008 presidential election, only 4 candidates were able to register with the 
Central Election Commission, one of the potential candidates was refused 
registration because he could not rent a venue for a political meeting, which had 
become a prerequisite for registration.
349
  
Another example of the suppression of opposition groups centres on the registration 
of former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who was the leader of the People’s 
Democratic Union. Although at first registered, the Central Election Commission 
later withdrew his registration for candidacy, claiming that a large number of 
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signatures of support for his party were deemed to be ‘forged’-
350
  however, his 
attempts to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court were curtailed.  
‘Since Vladimir Putin became President there has been increasing international 
criticism of the conduct of Russian elections…various international human rights 
organisations were very critical about elections that took place in 2007 and 2008. 
On 28 February 2008 Amnesty International published a report in which it 
expressed its concerns relating to the exercise of the rights of freedoms of 
expression, association and assembly in the Russian Federation.’
351
 
The electoral system as it currently stands in Russia is tainted by corruption and a 
powerful elite which retain control of the political sphere, shifting hands 
occasionally to ‘rubber-stamp’ the legitimacy requirement of elections, but failing 
to provide substantive safeguards to ensure free and fair elections. Challenges to 
power structures are largely futile, resulting in an apathetic populace who have lost 
trust in the electoral process, and are increasingly accepting of the authoritarian 
regime which refuses to loosen its grip and continues a relentless and effective 
information campaign to portray strength and solidarity. An alternative avenue for 
international oversight of Russia’s elections is necessary to counter this and 
encourage their path toward democracy and greater-legitimacy and integration on 
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C.  Existing International Oversight 
 
 In the wake of the Cold War in particular, international organisations have 
recognised the importance of developing strong and effective democratic 
foundations in domestic settings. The need for legitimate and democratically-
elected governments has been widely-acknowledged to be foundational in 
international law, and yet many countries have flailed in their progress. An entire 
community of international election observers has been created to promote these 
foundations, and yet their powers are often criticised for being weak and the 
overarching standards which they assert, rendered vague. The work of the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE-ODIHR) has stood at the forefront of European 
efforts to promote and advance democratic processes.  In 2005, the Declaration of 
Principles for International Election Observation and the Code of Conduct for 
Election Observers were advanced by the UN.
352
 These documents provide 
guidance on what constitutes a credible election, but are largely silent on defining 
‘genuine democratic elections’ and remains broad in its guidance.
353
 International 
legal commentators have highlighted how the mandate and function of the existing 
mechanisms can be further supported, moving forward, by public international law: 
‘Developing common standards based on transparent and objective criteria rooted 
in Public International Law would help observer groups maintain high professional 
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standards of impartiality, integrity and transparency, and should strengthen their 
ability to play key roles in supporting genuine democratization.’
354
 
Through drawing up standards based on the existing commitments already made by 
states in their treaty-obligations, we could be capable of tailoring international 
standards on elections and building democratic institutions, which are cemented in 
international legal obligations. Grounded in Article 25 of the ICCPR,
355
 which 
governs the electoral process, alongside other provisions concerning freedom of 
expression, assembly and association, could provide the basis for a foundational 
understanding of democratic elections, and would undoubtedly aid and strengthen 
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Chapter 5: Mapping Convergences in Domestic Crises: 
Locating the Roots of ‘Democratic Decay’ 
 





 As we have witnessed through our analysis of Levinson and Balkin’s 
category (1) and (3) crises, many of the constitutional crises which we can identify 
in states after 09/11, are largely a new form of, what Professor Huq and Ginsburg 
call, ‘democratic decay’.
357
 Huq and Ginsburg draw upon two competing 
understandings and models which lead to ‘democratic decay’: ‘authoritarian 
reversion and constitutional retrogression.’
358
 Whilst the former largely conveys a 
swift and total breakdown in, and of, democratic mechanisms, structures and 
institutions; the latter, retrogression, conveys:  
‘a more subtle, incremental erosion that happens simultaneously to three 
institutional predicates of democracy: competitive elections; rights of political 
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II.  A Descent into ‘Democratic Decay’? 
 
Professors Huq and Ginsburg argue in their 2017 article, entitled, ‘How to 
Lose a Constitutional Democracy’, that we are witnessing a decline in the former 
(‘authoritarian reversion’), and a surge in the appearance of the latter in states 
(‘constitutional retrogression’). Over the years since 09/11, the United States has 
over time whittled away at the very backbone of US Constitutional law and key 
tenets which provide the foundations of the US legal system and rule of law. 
Though our analysis has shown that the system of checks and balances has largely 
prevented the descent into an ‘authoritarian reversion’, it remains far from intact. 
The reasoning given for why the former has not gripped many states in the midst of 
a constitutional crisis is because often the constitutional structures have been 
designed to prevent a fully-fledged collapse of the system in a short time- but it is 
wholly powerless to the threat of retrogression sporadically and often beyond the 
reach of detectability. As Huq and Ginsburg assert, ‘the constitutional safeguards 
against retrogression are weak.’
360
 
For many commentators, the example of the US 2016 election which resulted in the 
Presidency of Donald Trump showcased, ‘the way that hitherto stable norms of 
American liberal democracy under the rule of law suddenly seemed fragile and 
contested’, we are witnesses to the ‘democratic backsliding’ which has gripped our 
21
st
 century states, especially our hegemon, the United States.
361
  
‘Liberal democracy, in short, is subject today to a plural array of corroding 
crosscurrents arising both from specific partisan formations and actors, and from 
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cultural, socioeconomic or geopolitical dynamics of a structural nature. Against 
these corrosive currents stands the Constitution. It is conventional wisdom that the 
checks and balances of the federal government, a robust civil society and media, as 




Having said that, these bulwarks are disintegrating before our very eyes. Although 
we often identify states which fall into category (1) constitutional crises- those 
related to exceptionalism and ‘states of emergency’, to come under the label of 
‘authoritarian reversion’, they are in reality more so examples of ‘retrogression’. 
However, ‘retrogression’ is still an incremental change to be feared and avoided, 
and will ultimately lead to the same departure from the rule of law and 
constitutional protections and mechanisms- but it is subtle in its approach and 
consequently often fails to appear on our radars. Though often political leaders aim 
to draw up a fearful populace, and thus employ scare-tactics to seemingly be 
pursuing a road to ‘authoritarian reversion’, sometimes this is merely media 
speculation and sensationalism. What we instead see is many states claiming or 
seemingly pursuing such an authoritarian path, but the mere fact that its 
materialisation is neither ‘quick’ nor ‘complete’ renders such assertions of 
widespread ‘authoritarian reversion’ inaccurate.
363
  
In a study conducted by Gero Erdmann in 2011, analysing 30 years of experience, 
he found that 53 states had witnessed ‘democratic backsliding’, but only 5 had 
resulted in a fully-fledged shift from democracy to authoritarianism in said state.
364
 
Notably, 4 of these complete shifts had occurred prior to 1989, and thus it certainly 
                                                             
362Ibid. p. 5.  
363 Ibid. p. 14.  
364 Gero Erdmann, ‘Decline of Democracy: Loss of Quality, Hybridisation and Breakdown 




appears as though what we are interpreting as ‘authoritarian reversion’ is in fact 
more so ‘retrogression’. It is only through acknowledging the differences, and the 
importance of preventing said ‘retrogressions’ in states that we are capable of 
cultivating a solution, which an IConC can spearhead and model itself upon.  
 
III.  Bridging Domestic ‘Constitutional Retrogression’ with 
Existing International Legal Mechanisms or an International 
Constitutional Court? 
 
 Irrespective of the labels we ascribe to states which have experienced a 
constitutional crisis to some degree, we must be proactive in our response on the 
international stage- using any soft law tools available to us, strengthening and/or 
reforming our existing structures and analysing whether an additional institution is 
required, alongside equipping ourselves with a better understanding of the inherent 
nature of states. States may self-identify as semi-democracies, hybrid regimes, 
electoral authoritarian regimes etc., but regardless, the impact on human rights 
protections during times of exceptionalism has consistently proven to be detrimental 
as a common denominator across all states, irrespective of their labels.  
Pivotally, if what we are increasingly witnessing is a surge in ‘constitutional 
retrogression’ in the domestic sphere, then it seems a logical deduction that the 
solution to such a retrogression needs to be constitutional in nature. We need to 
ensure that there is a system in place on the international stage that has a 
constitutional mandate and can protect against the subtle and incremental erosion of 




human rights protections can be recognised and enforced. If we can establish that 
the international human rights mechanisms are proving ineffective in successfully 
fulfilling their promises and preventing ‘democratic decay’ and the resulting 
detachment from human rights protections, then perhaps in order to combat the 
limitations of these existing international mechanisms, we need to creatively 
consider a constitutional solution.  
Levinson and Balkin identify the ‘institutional predicates of democracy’ as: 
competitive elections, rights of political speech and association and the adjudicative 
and administrative rule of law.
365
 We have examined in turn the importance of free 
and fair elections in Chapter 4, both in terms of the power of people and protest 
(especially concerning freedom of speech and association), with regard to Iceland, 
The Republic of Korea and The Republic of Tunisia, alongside the negative impacts 
of illegitimate elections through our analysis of The Russian Federation and Haiti. 
We can also draw parallels on the predicates of free speech and association, with the 
examples given in Chapter 3 of our analysis, as often a by-product of combating 
terrorism and protecting national security has seen the erosion of these freedoms, 
alongside a gradual overarching departure from the rule of law during periods of 
exceptionalism. As such, these are the underlying bases which must be strengthened 
on the international stage in order to ensure future compliance with existing 
international mechanisms.  
We will turn to examining in Chapter 6 if the existing legal mechanisms are proving 
effective, or whether a void has emerged between the domestic reality and the 
international standards. Having already analysed the international responses to 
domestic crises in Chapters 3 and 4, we can already predict that the international 
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mechanisms are struggling to fulfil their mandate. In Chapter 7 we will then strive 
to theoretically construct an international institution with a constitutional mandate, 
founded upon the aforementioned ‘predicates of democracy’ in order to lay the 
initial foundations for combating domestic ‘constitutional retrogression’ and 
‘democratic decay’.  
It is only in such a way that we will be capable of stabilising the downward 
detachment of states from human rights obligations and protections, and empower 
our existing international legal mechanisms to fulfil their purpose. Ultimately, we 
cannot merely sit idle and wait for a return to normalcy, which may itself never 
materialise if the exception has indeed become the rule; we cannot live under 
Chaplin’s illusion that ‘the hate of men will pass.’
366
 After all, according to Huq and 
Ginsburg: 
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Chapter 6: Exceptionalism in International Law: The 
International Paradigm  
  
‘For in the end laws are just words on a page- 
 words that are sometimes malleable, opaque,  
as dependent on context and trust  
as they are in a story or poem or promise to someone,  
words whose meanings are subject to erosion,  
sometimes collapsing in the blink of an eye.’ 




I.  Regulating Exceptionalism within the Norm: The 
Monist Model 
 
As previously described, when states are confronted with an emergency 
which ‘threatens the life of the nation’, they are permitted to sometimes deviate 
from international human rights treaties, alongside their own domestic constitutions 
in order to tackle such a threat. In this way, human rights protections are often 
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suspended in favour of security concerns; such deviations are largely under-
regulated and beyond the protection of adequate checks and balances. In recent 
years, coupled with the manipulation of such derogation and limitation clauses in 
international law, the ambiguity of such terms as ‘threatens the life of a nation’ and 
‘states of exception’, and their infinite nature- human rights protections and 
constitutional law have fallen by the wayside, perpetually suspended above and 
beyond the grasp of failing, exceptional states.  
In this way, the international human rights legal landscape has been crafted around 
the central notion of a monist model of law and regulation, with the exception 
remaining within the mandate of the norm. As the exception becomes increasingly 
normalised in international law, the result it seems, if the model remains monist, is a 
complete usurpation of the norm by the exception.  
If we are to merely accept and cater to the inputting of ‘exceptionalism’ within 
international frameworks which were designed for normalcy, this legitimises 
exceptionalism as a justification for deviating from human rights and constitutional 
protections which the international community claim to be universal and 
interdependent in nature. We must instead stand firm on our commitment to human 
rights, and ensure that exceptionalism does not dilute normalcy and become the 21
st
 
century ‘norm’. In sum, there is no space for exceptionalism within the normal 
terrain of international human rights protections. After all, exceptionalism, by 
definition, is a suspension of the norm and thus cannot be within it- it is entirely 
separate. Without a notion of ‘normalcy’, ‘exceptionalism’ holds no meaning. We 












[INTERNATIONAL MONIST MODEL] 
In my mind, the confinement of the exception within the norm in international law, 
the monist model, is not representative of the domestic reality or the conceptual 
basis upon which exceptionalism is rooted. Put simply, the domestic setting 
provides for a dualist model, with periods of normalcy maintaining distinct and 
separate legal spaces from that of exceptional or emergency situations.  Thus, the 
dualist model in the domestic sphere is unable to mould to the international 
framework of monism in the protection of human rights. Although some 
commentators may argue that a dualist model in international human rights law 
could tarnish the claims to universality and interdependence, it is in my view that a 
more realistic system of protections, one for periods of normalcy and another for 
exceptionalism could more effectively address the changing legal landscape of 
states and their commitment to human rights.  
Ultimately, the dualist state model requires a corresponding model on the 
international level. The proposed IConC would provide just this, an avenue through 
which the domestic exception could be capable of being regulated, without 










[DOMESTIC DUALIST MODEL] 
 
Although the initial response to such a quandary might be to suggest merely 
revoking the power of states to invoke derogation clauses to human rights treaties, 
as conceding to the ‘inevitability of exceptional state measures in times of 
emergency’ undermines the entire premise of international human rights law. 
369
 
Fundamentally, the system of derogation ‘creates a space between fundamental 
rights and the rule of law’-
370
 in this way a state can remain within the confines of 
what is strictly deemed to be legal, whilst contravening human rights norms.  
If we revoked the possibility of derogation or limitation clauses, providing no other 
avenue for confronting exceptional situations, then although this would strengthen 
the international community’s claims that human rights are indeed universal and 
non-derogable, it would fail to address the inevitability of exceptionalism and 
would be attacked on grounds of both state sovereignty and the right to self-defence. 
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This would in turn create a legal vacuum for exceptionalism on the international 
level.  
International law has proven most effective when it moulds itself to the malleable 
terrain of states; we can no longer fool ourselves into believing that state attitudes 
towards human rights protections are the same as those attitudes held post-WW2. 
Therefore, the international frameworks and mechanisms which are in place require 
reform and development to ensure they remain current and well-suited to the nature 
of states and their behaviour, and capable of combating the issues which confront 
the international community. On this basis, I propose a dualist international legal 
system for human rights protections, with the exception regulated and prevented 
through the work of an IConC.  
According to Hickman, what we have at present in terms of the relationship model 
between states and the international community is ‘a double-layered constitutional 
system’:
371
 a dualist model whereby international law is capable of dealing with 
human rights protections during periods of normalcy, but exceptionalism and crises 
are dealt with in the domestic setting with limited outside-regulation. If we evaluate 
this dualism we can see the danger of such a situation, with the legal void which is 




[INTERNATIONAL LEVEL]        [DOMESTIC LEVEL] 
[DOMESTIC-INTERNATIONAL DUALIST MODEL] 
                                                             





Therefore, not only do we have a dualist model on the domestic level, 
distinguishing between times of normalcy and exceptionalism, but we also can 
decipher dualism within the international-domestic relationship, wherein the former 
presides during times of normalcy, and the latter, periods of exceptionalism. How 
can we consequently expect the monist frameworks of international human rights 
law to conform to the domestic reality?  
 In my mind, the mistake made by the crafters of international law lay in attempting 
to build international human rights law on a monist model, attempting to place the 
exception within the norm. If we return to the very root of exceptionalism and 
authoritarianism- the model of Roman dictatorships, we can identify that 
exceptionalism under such dictatorships was always based on a dualist 
understanding of the norm being distinct from the exception. This does not imply 
that either are beyond regulation or oversight, quite the contrary. Roman 
dictatorships were balanced by a regulator who had the power to identify the 
exception and pivotally this regulatory body was distinct from the dictator itself 
(‘hetero-investiture’).  It is this void which an IConC is capable of bridging, 
mirroring a regulated dualist model which provides safeguards at all levels to 









A.  Proposing a Dualist Model: Learning Lessons from 
Roman Exceptionalism 
‘International terrorism represents a form of emergency so unlike any Roman 
circumstance that it is necessary to re-examine the Roman model to see if it retains 




Professors John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino have analysed this 
interplay between monism and dualism in the context of the law on exceptionalism, 
drawing predominantly on the example of Roman law on exceptionalism and 
dictatorships.
373
 Their work is invaluable in establishing not only the inevitability of 
a failing monist structure in international human rights law, but also setting the 
foundations upon which we are capable of constructing a dualist model, utilising the 
example of Roman law.  
At the crux of the understanding of exceptionalism within the Roman context, was 
the aim of emergency derogation being an eventual return to the norm and previous 
state of being, emergency powers were far from permanent, nor were they unlimited. 
Perhaps the most prominent of advocates for the Roman dictatorships came from 
Machiavelli in stating: 
‘As is seen ensued in Rome where in so much passage of time no dictator did 
anything that was not good for the Republic…a dictator was made for a (limited) 
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time and not in perpetuity, and only to remove the cause for which he was created; 
and his authority extended only in being able to decide by himself the ways of 
meeting that urgent peril…but he could do nothing to diminish (the power) of the 
state…so that taking together the short time of the dictatorship and the limited 
authority that he had, and the roman people uncorrupted, it was impossible that he 
should exceed his limits and harm the city: but from experience it is seen that it (the 
City) always benefited by him.’
374
 
However, our present-day domestic exceptionalism largely fails to conform to 
Machiavelli’s understanding and depiction of the Roman example, with the two 
central tenets to his notion of exceptionalism which ensured that a dictatorship was 
limited, largely absent from our 21
st
 century examples, namely the need for a short 
duration and a limited authority. Our current interpretation of exceptionalism is 
perpetual in nature and arguably limitless, in comparison to the Roman counterparts. 
Whereas our current constitutional systems grant special emergency powers to an 
elected President or leader from within inside the government, the distinct feature of 
the Roman model was that this ‘dictator’ figure was chosen from outside of the 
government- an inherently dualist system, wherein the exception was held in a 
separate legal and political space from the norm, including the figure who presided 
over said exceptional period.  
According to the Roman model, during periods of emergency, the Senate body 
suspended its own operations and permitted a dictator figure to assume the 
constitutional duties on their behalf for a 6-month term, who was elected by the 
Consul body. In this way, a ‘hetero-investiture’ structure can be identified with a 
clear separation between the body declaring an emergency (Senate) and the 
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individual who exercised the authority to confront it.
375
 It is precisely in this way 
that many contemporary states are failing to safeguard against perpetual 
exceptionalism- for the most part, states have no clear distinction between the body 
who declare an emergency, and the body or individual who is granted the authority 
to deal with it. It is fundamentally this Roman dualist, ‘hetero-investiture’ model 
which is required on the international level. This would ensure that even if the 
domestic setting uses one body to not only declare an emergency but also grants the 
authority to confront it, we are able to add an extra check to this system and mould 
a ‘hetero-investiture’ model on the international level. With an IConC, this 
regulatory system would provide this check on a centralised concentration of power 
on the domestic level.  
Therefore, the Roman example teaches us an important lesson on the importance of 
having a strong separation between power structures during times of exceptionalism. 
If states are to deviate from the norm, then certain balances and checks should be in 
place, without a ‘hetero-investiture’ model it is unsurprising that our contemporary 
exceptional states are largely perpetual and limitless in their power. Through adding 
a regulator to the sphere of exceptionalism on the international level, an IConC, we 
would be better-equipped to confront exceptionalism, and ensure a return to 
normalcy.  
As Professors Ferejohn and Pasquino assert, there is a fine line between state 
‘derogation’ from the norm and an ‘abrogation’ of the norm.
376
 I assert that 
increasingly we are seeing not merely derogations from the norms of international 
human rights law, but actually their gradual abrogation. We increasingly see that 
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exceptionalism is not being used to ensure a return, and ultimately protection of, 
human rights- but instead to justify a gradual decline and weakening of their 
mandate and power. According to the aforementioned academics, and I myself 
concur: 
‘it may be necessary to create legal boundaries around emergencies to substitute 




II.  Limitations of Existing International Legal Mechanisms 
to Adequately Address Exceptionalism & Emancipate the 
Homo Sacer 
 
‘[There is] strong global consensus on the need to ensure the continued relevance 




During periods of exceptionalism and neglect of human rights and the rule 
of law, often the only avenue left for redress are those available through 
international channels, as the domestic domain becomes increasingly incapacitated 
by varying degrees of authoritarianism. Thus, we must analyse the pitfalls of the 
international architecture which have allowed for the proliferation of 
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authoritarianism or constitutional crises and thus the neglect of human rights 
protections. What are their powers, mechanisms and most importantly, how 
effective have they proven to be?  
One way in which the international community has attempted to entrench human 
rights in the domestic setting is through the use of treaties and their subsidiary 
bodies. When a state ratifies a human rights treaty, they commit themselves to 
guaranteeing the rights therein within their jurisdiction. The foundational precepts 
upon which many human rights treaties were based can be identified in the initial 
text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
379
 which stipulated a 
commitment to: 
‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations.’
380
 
Laying down basic notions of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
which should be enjoyed by all, the UDHR (1948) is widely deemed to be the 
foundation upon which human rights treaties have been crafted. In this way, the 
UDHR (1948), alongside the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) (1966) and its 2 Optional Protocols,
381
 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966),
382
 are often collectively 
coined the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’.
383
 The codification of these 
foundational human rights norms have taken a variety of forms and thus hold 
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differing levels of recognition and enforceability. Strengthened further by regional 
mechanisms of human rights protection, human rights norms have thus been 
expanded across many areas, which has in turn reinforced their recognition and 
strengthened their mandate. Undoubtedly, international human rights instruments, 
declarations, guidelines and principles form the backbone of this intricate carefully-
crafted system of protections. 
We must remind ourselves after all that the central purpose of the United Nations, 
as per the United Nations Charter (1945) is: 
‘To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, 
and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.’
384
 
It is upon this basis, with the need to ‘establish conditions’ in order to ensure that 
states respect and remain committed to their obligations under international human 
rights law, that we critique whether these conditions are already in place, and the 
extent to which they are proving effective when confronted with state claims to 
exceptionalism.  
Although the body of international human rights mechanisms and treaties have 
proliferated in recent years, broadening their scope and carefully-crafting 
specialised treaties, we will focus herein on the foundational treaties upon which 
others have built: namely the ICCPR, ICESCR, The UN Charter and the UDHR, 
alongside the overarching UN mechanisms. The proposed IConC would draw upon 
these foundational instruments as the source of its mandate, establishing itself as a 
                                                             




new ‘condition’ through which ‘faith in fundamental human rights’ can be once 
again, ‘reaffirmed’.  
 
A.  Navigating Difficult Terrain: Universalism and 
Exceptionalism  





 International law historically consisted of contracts between states, 
alongside general customs and norms, with additional multilateral treaties between 
states on particularities of military conflict etc. But with the 20
th
 century came the 
creation of the United Nations, which crafted treaties on ‘issues of global concern, 
including the laws of war, human rights, protection of the environment’ etc., with 
‘the expectation…that the treaty obligations would be the same for all states.’
386
 
Thus, a foundational recognition that the laws surrounding international human 
rights protections were inherently universal, was established.  
‘Once a global problem is identified, it is understood that an international solution 
binding all states should be sought…states may continue to negotiate bilateral and 
regional agreements to address narrow cross-border and regional problems, but 
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Consequently, the notion of universalism in international law was cemented. But 
somewhere along the way these obligations became diluted by reservations, 
derogations and limitations- resultantly, the existing international legal mechanisms 
began to wane and tire under new pressures.  
The issue becomes to what extent the international community can continue to 
enforce and argue for the universality of human rights, if states are largely granted 
the power to derogate at will, often without justification or a time limit. If we are to 
claim that all human rights are interconnected and interdependent, how can we 
reconcile this with state derogations and reservations from key human rights treaties? 
It is this interplay between the pursuit of the universal application of the norm in 
international human rights law, coupled with the increasingly exceptional claims of 
states, that has brought about the 21
st
 century plight of international human rights 
law, hindered further by under-reporting, unenforceability and overworked and 
under-funded international institutions.  
In the analysis which ensues, we will draw upon the differing ways in which during 
periods of domestic exceptionalism, states derogate, limit or make reservations to 
their binding international legal obligations to limit their human rights obligations in 
the name of security or the safety of their nation or peoples. Furthermore, we will 
identify the pitfalls of the International Court of Justice and other international legal 
mechanisms in terms of reporting, accountability and enforceability. 
Ultimately, we will return to our starting position post-WW2, with the enactment of 
the UDHR (1948) and the UN Charter (1945), to refocus our attention on the void 
which has emerged between these two foundational instruments and the struggling 
mechanisms we see before us today. This void, in my mind, and the current 
limitations of international law, could be bridged and reinforced through the 




treaties which succeeded to them. Thus, the proposal for an International 
Constitutional Court takes centre stage of our analysis.  
 
III.  Key International Human Rights Treaties and Bodies 
 
A.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) (1966) & The Human Rights Committee  
 
Generally-speaking, treaty bodies largely perform the function of reviewing 
the implementation of ‘states of emergency’ where said states have ratified the 
relevant treaties in question. In providing this watchdog function, if the international 
bodies become concerned with a state’s practice, they can apply international 
pressure and discredit the regime through international publicity in order to push for 
greater compliance with human rights protections. Many treaties provide for 
safeguards to ensure derogation and limitation clauses are not abused by states, and 
exceptionalism normalised; the extent to which these bodies have proven effective 
in confronting such situations is debatable.  
Let us begin with a discussion of the stance and methods of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), in confronting 
exceptionalism in international law. Article 4(1) of the ICCPR stipulates:  
‘In times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the State parties to the present Covenant 




to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with their obligations under international law and 
do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin.’
388
 
This provision was added to the draft of the ICCPR in 1947, resulting from a 
suggestion made to the Drafting Committee by the United Kingdom who advocated 
for possible derogation from all obligations therein, ‘to the extent strictly limited by 
the exigencies of the situation’.
389
 The Netherlands, foreseeing that broad 
derogations could hinder the success of the (then) Commission, instead asserted the 
need for a clearly-defined derogation clause, whilst the USA and USSR argued 
against any form of derogatory provision.
390
 Interestingly, during the drafting phase 
of the ICCPR France argued that: 
‘derogation from the Covenant must be subject to a specified procedure and that 




It is just such a mandate and function that I assert that an International 
Constitutional Court is capable of filling in our subsequent analysis- a regulatory as 
well as a judicial role. Ultimately, during the drafting period, the ground-breaking 
nature of promulgating an international human rights treaty which obliged states to 
protect human rights within its jurisdiction was sufficient enough to warrant a 
largely broad scope for derogation, albeit with certain safeguards: ‘exceptional 
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threat, official proclamation, non-derogability of certain rights, strict necessity, 




Although formal legal safeguards were thus codified, the substantive protection 
against the abuse of derogation has proven difficult to enforce. The requirement for 
states to report to the UN Human Rights Committee on the bases upon which they 
are derogating from ICCPR rights, and to what extent, has proven insufficient for 
example.  The explanations by states are often vague and/or delayed: 
‘Uruguay, for example, provided a notification to the Covenant’s depositary 
effectively 3 years after it was obligated to do so, and when questioned by the 
Committee concerning the lack of information provided (such as from which 
articles the state sought to derogate), the government stated that the emergency was 




As a result of such ambiguity, it renders the Committee largely incapable of 
monitoring ongoing state practice during periods of exceptionalism. We could 
likewise witness a failure to inform or justify derogation in the case of the United 
States: 
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‘[they] did not submit a notification of derogation from the Covenant after 09/11 
“despite the official national proclamation of an emergency and the imposition of a 
wide range of legislative and executive policies derogating in practice from the 
rights protected under the Covenant”.’
394
 
The inclusion of provisions permitting derogation from the ICCPR (1966) were 
included by the treaty drafters after a great deal of debate, and with the caveat of the 
formal safeguards provided for in Article 4(1). Following suit, derogation clauses 
were likewise inserted into The American Convention on Human Rights (Article 
27),
395
  and The European Convention on Human Rights (Article 15).
396
  
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
(1966) provides for a general limitation, closely mirroring Article 29 of the UDHR 
(1948) which stipulates: 
‘In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the 




Similarly, Article 4 of the ICESCR (1966) states: 
‘The State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by 
law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and 
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The ICESCR (1966) is further hindered in the face of state exceptionalism by the 
stipulation made in Article 2(1) regarding the ‘progressive realisation’ of the rights 
therein.
399
 Underlying all limitation and derogation clauses, however, is a common 
reference to a continual ‘respect of the legally protected substance of a right,’
400
 
which in theory should protect the provisions from severe deviation.   
In light of increasing derogation from the ICCPR, and non-compliance with Article 
4(1), in 2001 the Human Rights Committee granted itself the mandate to monitor 
practices, irrespective of whether the state in question has notified the Committee of 
its intention to derogate or not, under General Comment 29.
401
 The Committee 
reiterated two conditions to be met by states wishing to derogate from the ICCPR, 
namely: (1) must amount to a ‘public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation’, and (2) the State must have officially declared an emergency.
402
 The 
Committee further reiterated that:  
‘Emergency legislation cannot therefore remain in force for so long that it becomes 
institutionalised so that it is the rule rather than the exception.’
403
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Another issue which the Human Rights Committee is forced to grapple with is the 
continued violation of non-derogable rights, for example the right to life (Article 6, 
ICCPR), freedom from torture or degrading treatment (Article 7, ICCPR), and 
freedom from slavery (Article 8, ICCPR). The non-derogable rights are stipulated in 
Article 4(2) of the ICCPR.
404
 
‘In spite of their non-derogable nature, these rights tend in many cases to be the 
most frequently violated in emergency situations, thereby rendering a return to 
normalcy more difficult. In such situations, the role of judges, prosecutors and 
lawyers in contributing to the effective protection of the individual becomes more 
crucial than ever, and their respective responsibilities must be exercised with full 
independence and impartiality lest the individual be left without legal protection.’
405
 
Arguably the most prominent non-derogable right which is commonly violated by 
states during exceptionalism, which has proven especially poignant in light of the 
‘War on Terror’, is Article 7 of the ICCPR, concerning freedom from torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment. 
406
 From our prior analysis, we have witnessed how 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment have been commonly used post-09/11 as 
a method of countering terrorism.  
Although the Committee has entrusted itself with the mandate of assessing the strict 
necessity of derogatory action by states, it is largely limited in doing so. When it 
does provide recommendations to states, it does so through the periodic reporting 
mechanism, but this is also wholly reliant on state engagement with that platform of 
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accountability. The Committee has done so with regard to the perpetual status of 
emergencies in Israel, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
407
 Although ‘the Committee 
is clearly concerned about the territorial, temporal and material extent of any 
emergency measures taken by state parties’, it is largely ill-equipped to counter or 
challenge the will of the states concerned.
408
  
In line with Article 40 of the ICCPR,
409
 states must submit periodic reports to the 
UN Human Rights Committee for review of their human rights obligations.
410
 
However, such reporting is done in excess of every 5 years, and within this time a 
serious decline in a state’s human rights situation is capable of materialising. The 
infrequency of the reporting process is thus a limitation of many treaty bodies, with 
the ICCPR being no exception to this. However, Article 40 of the ICCPR does 
allow for the option of requesting further reports from states, at the discretion of the 
Human Rights Committee, although this has not been invoked in cases of ‘state of 
emergency’ reporting to date.  
Individual complaints mechanisms for numerous treaty bodies have proved to be 
vital in monitoring the human rights situation of states during periods of 
exceptionalism, for example, the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR provides for 
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 Upon this basis, numerous individual complaints have been 
brought to the attention of the UN Human Rights Committee, with regard to ‘states 
of emergency’. Although this is an important mechanism, the difficulty in enforcing 
its decisions renders the process largely futile, unless soft powers can be invoked to 
sway state compliance.  
‘Furthermore, even if there is access to an individual complaints mechanism, the 
consideration by the treaty body relies on a case being brought, rather than on an 




Although formally, inter-state complaints are capable of being invoked by states, in 
accordance with the ICCPR they have rarely been invoked. The rare examples of 
inter-state complaints have arisen in the regional context, using the European 
system of human rights protection, but are largely too controversial, I believe, to be 
used on the international level: ‘the diplomatic ramifications of one state putting 
another one “in the dock” for human rights issues’ renders this mechanism largely 
ineffective.
413
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has the competence to 
adjudicate on inter-state cases, but importantly, states must consent to the 
jurisdiction of the court, and therefore, also its decisions. Pivotally, there is no 
mechanism in place which can ensure this consent is given, nor are there any 
measures to ensure compliance with a decision, even if the consent hurdle has been 
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 Therefore, the extent to which the ICCPR and its accompanying Human 
Rights Committee remain limited in their capacity to confront exceptionalism by 
states, hindered by limitations, derogations and the unenforceability of reporting 
procedures and recommendations. These models provide a perfect example of the 
limitations we face in the international community when we attempt to construct 
models of international law wherein the exception is placed within the norm.  
‘It is a good lesson to keep in mind that at no time in history has too much justice 
and respect for individual rights and freedoms been harmful to national and 




B.  The UN Human Rights Council & Special Procedures 
 
Special Procedures, which come under the ambit of the UN Human Rights 
Council, have often been used to both investigate and better understand 
exceptionalism and the proliferation of ‘states of emergency’, in order for the 
international community to better gauge how best to plot a progressive strategy 
forward. In this way, special rapporteurs have been mandated with investigating 
abuse under authoritarian regimes, and working groups established to analyse 
findings etc. 
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From 1985-1997, a Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency was created by the 
UN Human Rights Commission. A list was consequently drawn up every year of 
states under a ‘state of emergency’, their state reports analysed to determine their 
level of compliance with human rights obligations and recommendations made as to 
potential legislation and measures which should be taken by said state to better-
ensure compliance during their period of exceptionalism. Following this, the 
Special Rapporteur began to annually denounce countries alleging to be under 
‘states of emergency’, by drawing up a list of all those guilty of such, even those 
who were not party to treaties.  
‘The publication of an annual list was a very important tool for transparency under 
the auspices of the United Nations.’
416
 
In much the same way, I have likewise attempted to draw attention to the need for 
transparency and the soft law tools of legitimacy in the field of international human 
rights law, in order to open up the floor to criticism from other states, and thus 
progress towards greater compliance and accountability. As ever, the 
aforementioned Special Rapporteur was limited in his capacity on account of the 
lack of financial resources available to such UN mechanisms- but I think it is 
worthy of note that such fact-finding missions are vital in preventing a fully-fledged 
world in a constitutional crisis, a role which could be transposed to an IConC in the 
future.  
Generally-speaking, the UN Human Rights Council, an inter-governmental body 
which is comprised of 47 states, elected by the UN General Assembly, is entrusted 
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with the mandate of protecting human rights globally. Often thematically divided, 
the UNHRC oversees the implementation of human rights by states, making 
recommendations if violations can be deciphered. Common criticisms of the body 
include its unenforceability and its alleged increasing politicisation and regional 
bias. The UNHRC’s powers include the assessment of UN member states’ human 
rights records through Universal Periodic Review (UPR), an Advisory Committee 
which serves as the ‘think-tank’ for thematic issues,
417
 a Complaints Procedure 
which allows for individual and organisation-brought complaints on alleged human 
rights violation before the Council, alongside the aforementioned Special 
Procedures.  
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), reporting to the 
UNHRC, is a member of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 
which oversees the interplay between human rights and terrorism. The Counter-
Terrorism Committee, an arm of the aforementioned, reported to the UN Security 
Council 4 ((a)-(d)) areas which required more attention, largely mirroring our 
previous analysis, namely: 
‘(a) The question of legality, including vague definitions of acts of terrorism that 
have led to the prosecution of individuals for the legitimate, non-violent exercise of 
the rights to freedom of expression, association etc.’ 
‘(b) The need to respect and protect non-derogable rights…national, ethnic, racial 
or religious profiling raises concerns with regard to the non-derogable principles of 
equality and non-discrimination…also, the question of torture and ill-treatment. 
These discriminatory and stigmatizing measures affect the rights of communities 
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and may lead to further marginalization and possibly radicalization within those 
communities.’ 
‘(c) The expansion of surveillance powers and capacities of law enforcement 
agencies and the need to adequately protect the right to privacy.’ 




The most prominent concerns of this Committee were surrounding accountability 
and reparations, in light of widespread state use of torture, arbitrary detention, 
disappearances and summary executions to combat terrorism.
419
 Such violations 
have often failed to be investigated, perpetrators left unpunished and victims offered 
little or no reparation, contrary to Article 2 of the ICCPR (1966). Alongside this, 
accountability has proven problematic in the context of counter-terrorist strategies 
taken by intelligence and military services, as we will examine later in the context 
of state secret privileges: 
‘Covert actions raise particular challenges for accountability. Since they are 
secretive types of action, where information is classified, it is difficult for the 
legislator and the judiciary to be aware of them. It should be recalled that all 
measures taken by law enforcement agencies must be lawful under national and 
international law, and compatible with state’s human rights obligations. This means 
that all activities undertaken by intelligence agencies, including intelligence-
gathering, covert surveillance activities, searches and data collection must be 
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The international legal community has proven proactive in confronting the 
inevitable impact of terrorism on human rights, and in preventing the 
exceptionalism which terrorism has roused from jeopardising the respect, 
recognition and protection of human rights by states.  A vast and intricate body of 
mechanisms have tailored guidelines, treaty interpretations, Special Rapporteurs for 
fact-finding missions and Independent Experts and Taskforces to better understand 
the interplay between security, terrorism and human rights protection. The 
overarching concerns which have been identified are the consistent derogation by 
states from non-derogable human rights, the widespread impunity and lack of 
accountability for human rights violations relating to counter-terrorism measures, 
and limited reparations for victims of counter-terrorism measures. At the crux, we 
can identify a gradual departure   from using accountability mechanisms during 
periods of exceptionalism, an issue which the international community is struggling 
to grapple with in any substantial way.  
The ultimate price, if this predicament is ignored by the international community, 
might prove to be irreparable. We increasingly are witnessing the central back-bone 
of the UN system being compromised and weakened, this in turn will compromise 
the fundamental values which run to the heart of international law- the pursuit of 
justice, international peace and security, the rule of law and the universal protection 
of human rights.  
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IV.  Struggles of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
Protecting Human Rights Against Domestic Exceptionalism 
 
A.  An Outline of the ICJ: Mandate and Jurisdiction  
 
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), serves as the primary judicial 
organ of the United Nations and was created in 1945 through the ICJ Statute, which 
forms part of the UN Charter (1945). Its mandate is to: 
‘Settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States 
and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United 
Nations organs and specialized agencies.’
421
 
During the initial post-WW2 drafting of the ICJ’s role and function with regard to 
the implementation and oversight of international law, it was recognised from the 
outset that the court had ‘advisory jurisdiction’ and states would not be forced into 
accepting said jurisdiction, nor would the ICJ become involved in purely political 
matters.
422
 In this way, the ICJ has a ‘dual jurisdiction’- deciding legal disputes 
which have been submitted by states (‘contentious jurisdiction’), and offering non-
binding advisory opinions on controversial legal questions, which have been 
requested by UN Organs or agencies (‘advisory jurisdiction’). With regard to 
‘Contentious Jurisdiction’, ‘the Court can only deal with a dispute when the states 
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concerned have recognised its jurisdiction’.
423
 This consent doctrine goes to the 
very heart of international law; states can only be bound by obligations they have 
freely consented to being held accountable for.  
Although the ICJ had a busy workload from its establishment to the late 1960’s, 
states became increasingly disengaged from it from the 1970’s. However, in recent 
years, a judicially-active ICJ has once again come to the fore of the international 
community. 
‘Countries have now found greater use of it; ironically about a third of recent cases 




B.  Common Criticisms of the ICJ: The Theoretical 
Paradigm 
 
Dr Keith Suter, in his analysis of the ICJ has located 6 possible limitations, 
4 of which we will draw upon in turn. Firstly, he identifies that ‘there is a lack of a 
common global philosophy underpinning respect for one system of international 
law,’
425
 he argues that more often than not, governments will act on the basis of 
their own self-interest and not the global common good, and thus a general court for 
the international community remains a largely optimistic vision rather than a reality. 
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Although generally speaking, we may struggle to locate convergence in 
international opinion on all matters of international law, if we narrow this down to 
the common characteristics and foundations found in the UN Charter (1945) and the 
UDHR (1948), then arguably consensus might not be so difficult to find between 
states with regard to our proposed IConC and a foundational international 
constitutional law.  
Secondly, is the issue of state sovereignty with regard to the granting of jurisdiction 
to the ICJ- although 191 countries are indeed ICJ members, this does not 
necessarily imply that they have consented to their jurisdiction. Only around 65 
members of the UN community have in fact accepted ICJ jurisdiction. 
426
  
‘Only about a third of UN members accept compulsory jurisdiction based on Article 




However, in contentious inter-state claims, both state parties must have consented to 
ICJ jurisdiction- one of the most controversial refusals to grant this consent has 
been found in the stance of the United States, which we will later examine.  In my 
mind, the reason why state consent to ICJ jurisdiction is relatively low is on account 
of the broad and sweeping mandate which it holds, and therefore the vast powers it 
is capable of exercising if jurisdiction is granted. If we are able to limit the scope of 
judicial institutions into specialised areas of law, they prove more effective and 
states tend to feel that their sovereignty has not been compromised to such a great 
extent. For example, if we draw upon the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) or the ICC, we can see that specialised judiciaries are arguably more 
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effective than a broad all-encompassing institution- far from fragmenting the sphere 
of international law, they strengthen the body as a whole.  
Thirdly, only states are capable of holding international legal personality, and thus 
only inter-state complaints can be brought before the ICJ, indigenous or ethnic 
groups do not hold sufficient legal standing.  
‘This limitation reflects the State-centred view of international law prevailing when 
the statute of the ICJ’s predecessor was drawn up after World War I.’
428
 
The ICC attempted to bridge this legal standing void, by allowing for the 
investigation and prosecution of individuals who are allegedly guilty of 
international crimes, but otherwise, the focus of the international community 
remains largely centred upon inter-state relationships. The proposed IConC would 
refrain from concentrating merely on inter-state claims, but instead empower civil 
society into initiating an investigation or claim, and thus legal standing would be 
granted in a broad sense so as to bolster oversight capabilities.  
A common criticism of the ICJ, fourthly, is that of a lack of enforceability of 
decisions made. Due to the absence of an international policing structure, there is no 
system for the enforcement of ICJ judgements. If a decision is ignored by a state 
then the matter is capable of being sent to the UN Security Council for further 
review, however this is in itself hindered by the veto powers of the 5 permanent 
Security Council members who can ultimately stall any such attempt to enforce a 
judgement.  
‘For example, in the 1980’s Nicaragua took the United States to the ICJ over the 
mining of its harbours. When the US realised that the case was going badly, it 
                                                             




walked out of the ICJ and then vetoed attempts by the UN Security Council to 
enforce the ICJ decision.’
429
 
Dr Suter ultimately advocates for a strengthening of international law and the ICJ: 
‘International law in general and the ICJ in particular need to be brought in from the 
cold.’
430
 It seems to me that through utilising specialised judicial institutions we are 
better able to confront the vast array of international legal issues which face a 
globalised world- this compartmentalising of international law is far from 
counterproductive, it has in fact allowed for great progress with regard to  ITLOS 
and the ICC. It is with this in mind, that I assert that the granting of jurisdiction to 
an IConC on matters of international constitutional law, framed around the 
foundational ideas in the UN Charter (1945) and UDHR (1948), could prove more 
effective than a sweeping all-encompassing ICJ.  
 
C.  The ICJ in Practice: Grappling with Domestic 
Exceptionalism?  
‘The Court has…served as a sort of Constitutional court for the United 
Nations. Several Advisory Opinions have established key principles 
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 Despite the theoretical constraints on its jurisdiction and enforceability, it 
has been argued by some scholars that the International Court of Justice has in fact 
been at the forefront of advancing human rights in recent years, and arguably has 
carved out for itself a constitutional mandate for the UN community. If we can 
indeed decipher a pre-existing constitutional mandate within the ICJ itself, then a 
construction of an IConC could be founded upon the translation of this to a separate 
institution.    
Crook points to the ‘Conditions of Admission of State to Membership in United 
Nations’, regarding Article 4 of the UN Charter, in its advisory opinion of 28 May 
1948, to evidence this constitutional role. 
432
 The case and resulting advisory 
opinion given by the ICJ centred on the vetoes which had been imposed by 
numerous permanent members of the Security Council in response to 12 states’ 
applications for admission to the UN. In interpreting Article 4 of the UN Charter, 
the ICJ offered clarity on the prerequisites required of states in order to gain 
admission to the UN. The central issue being whether existing UN member states, 
in being asked to consent to the admission of a certain state, may go beyond the 
conditions laid down in Article 4, or whether this list is indeed exhaustive.
433
 The 
ICJ offered this understanding of Article 4: 
‘These conditions are exhaustive, and are not merely stated by way of information 




This interpretation of the UN Charter not only confirms the constitutional nature of 
said document, but also reinforces the practicality and potential, of and for, an 
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international court having a constitutional mandate. Although the ICJ has arguably 
made headway with regard to advancing human rights in the context of domestic 
exceptionalism, with a broad all-encompassing mandate across all areas of 
international law, it seems inevitable that the international court is incapable of 
grappling with the sheer magnitude of the issues within international human rights 
law in any ground-breaking way. Constrained by its resources, it seems foreseeable 
that if we continue to grant the ICJ a constitutional mandate, then progress in 
protecting international constitutional law and human rights may often be forced to 
the background, or perhaps not afforded the time and attention these issues require. 
Crook explains this most clearly in stating: 
‘There have been a few ICJ (and PCIJ) decisions significantly contributing to 
human rights law, but historically they have been a small part of the docket. To give 
an unscientific illustration, if you look at the indexes of the five recent volumes of 
the ICJ reports covering 1994-1997 sitting in my bookcase, you’ll see very few 
references to “human rights”. Those you do see are concentrated in dissenting or 
separate opinions of a few judges. Thus, human rights issues have been an 
intermittent and not especially important part of the Court’s work.’
435
 
Admittedly, where the ICJ has been confronted with multifaceted international legal 
issues, they have indeed taken into account human rights considerations, as they did 
in the case of Paraguay and Germany against the United States, relating to capital 
punishment convictions. 
436
 Although these cases concerned consular relations, they 
remain important precedent of the ICJ in how they have grappled with often 
vitriolic conflicts between the international and domestic terrains of law when 
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human rights are at stake. In ruling in favour of Germany in the case of LaGrand, 
the ICJ granted supremacy to international law over US domestic law; the US had 
attempted to limit their international responsibilities relating to consular assistance 




‘Indeed, even in the LaGrand case, the Court seemed a bit reluctant to extend the 
sphere of human rights. Jurisdiction over one of Germany’s claims required a 
finding that the Convention conferred individual rights on the LaGrand brothers as 
a matter of international law. This led to a lively debate whether the right to 
consular notification was a human right. The Court declined to decide this question. 
It found that the Convention by its terms conferred individual rights on the brothers, 




Thus, we can arguably see a general reluctance to view the cases before them 
through the lens of human rights analyses; but this seems an inevitable by-product 
of the fact that the mandate of the ICJ is not exclusively one of upholding and 
protecting human rights- their role is inherently a balancing function between all 
areas of international law and politics.  
It is far easier to locate instances wherein the ICJ has struggled to apply human 
rights considerations and concerns to the cases brought before it. One such example 
can be seen in the 1996 advisory opinion on ‘The Threat or Use of Nuclear 
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‘It was vigorously argued that the use of nuclear weapons would unlawfully violate 
the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of law under Article 6…the Court did not 
buy it. It agreed that Article 6 of the Covenant applied in wartime, but found that 
what is “arbitrary” must be determined through the applicable “lex specialis”- the 
law of armed conflict.’
440
 
Although these cases are not wholly located in the remit of exceptional domestic 
settings, this is a useful exercise in examining exactly how far the ICJ has been 
willing to go in the sphere of applying and prioritising human rights when 
confronted with these issues. What remains clear is that in the bulk of its caseload, it 
has far from granted primacy to human rights concerns, often preferring a balancing 
act between conflicting legal values and stances. Crook points towards the 
composition of the ICJ judges panel to explain perhaps why this may be the case, 
and why human rights expertise may indeed be lacking. Although the obvious 
exceptions of Judges Buergenthal, Higgins and Kooijmans indeed do spring to 
mind- for the most-part knowledge of, and experience in, international human rights 
law is far from the reality for most judges who are sitting (or have sat) on the ICJ.
441
  
On the other hand, some legal scholars have advanced the opinion that the ICJ has 
proven proactive in confronting human rights issues, in fact aided by the 
interdisciplinary nature of their mandate and work- its broad mandate acting as a 
blessing in disguise:  
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‘Thus, the court has had an abundant opportunity to contribute an important 
jurisprudence to the international law of human rights in such diverse fields as: 
genocide, race discrimination, self-determination, immunities of experts, consular 




On balance, it is my view that we are faced with an international court which has 
notably attempted to carve out a constitutional role for itself, and has largely proven 
successful in doing so, but has failed to respond appropriately to human rights 
claims brought before it. Hindered by a broad and all-encompassing mandate, 
personnel who may not be experienced or well-versed in the ambit of international 
human rights law, and limited jurisdiction, it certainly seems as though the ICJ has 
not equipped itself with the necessary tools to confront the increasingly tumultuous 
situation of human rights abuses seen by states.  
 
D.  The Case of the Hegemon: The United States and the 
ICJ 
‘Since 1946, the United States has had an uneasy relationship with the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ or World Court). On the one hand, the 
United States embraces the rule of law within its own society and, in 
principle, within the international system of states...on the other hand, the 
United States has never been willing to submit itself to the plenary authority 
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of the Court, and has typically reacted negatively to decisions by the Court 




 The United States notably withdrew their consent to the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction in 1986, having refused to participate in the proceedings 
brought against them in the case of Nicaragua in 1984, relating to the use of force 
and violating the sovereignty of another state.
444 At the heart of the discrepancy 
between the US’s official position and their often rather different actions, as 
advocated by Professor Sean Murphy, is their attitude towards sovereignty more 
generally, and their innate exceptionalism in international relations with other states. 
Professor Murphy most clearly demonstrates this in stating that: 
‘The United States operates on the basis of conflicting principles with respect to 
whether states should be treated as equal sovereigns or as units characterised by 
inescapable power differentials. While the United States historically has articulated 
a desire for cooperation with other states as co-equal sovereigns- and, indeed, has 
been in the vanguard in many respects in the promotion and development of 
international law and institutions built around the concept of sovereign equality- 
the United States has innate historical and cultural characteristics that push it 
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toward an attitude of “exceptionalism” in its foreign policy, claiming itself entitled, 
formally and informally, to be treated differently from other states.’
445
 
This is further exacerbated by the conflict between US domestic law and the status 
of international law which may challenge its application and enforceability. The 
interplay between the domestic and the international spheres of law, exacerbated 
further by the hegemonic rhetoric and double standards concerning sovereignty, 
have rendered the United States a troublesome state when it comes to their 
interaction with the ICJ. The result of these discrepancies and conflicts between the 
hegemon and the ICJ has arguably hindered the reputation, legitimacy and 
enforceability of the ICJ.  
At the outset, with the creation of the ICJ’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), the United States stood at the forefront of advocating 
for its construction. Indeed, as early as 1907, at The Hague Peace Conference, the 
US had argued for the creation of a similarly-mandated court for the international 
stage. 
446
 Although at the fore of its establishment, the US has long distanced itself 
from its application.  
‘Throughout the life of the PCIJ from 1922 to 1945 – during which time the court 
issues 27 advisory opinions and 32 judgments- the United States never participated 
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When the US joined the United Nations, it by extension became a party to the ICJ 
Statute, in line with Article 93 of the UN Charter.
448
 Despite having argued for its 
creation, albeit in a different form, for decades, out of a total of 105 contentious 
cases which were brought to the ICJ between 1964 and 2004, the United States was 
involved as a party on 21 occasions (10 as applicant). Pivotally, ‘no other state has 
appeared before the Court so frequently.’ 
449
 
Perhaps most poignantly, if we look to the stance of the US with regard to the ICJ’s 
Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Wall, we can decipher this US exceptionalism most 
markedly. In December 2003, the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion 
from the ICJ on ‘the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall 
being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory.’
450
 The Resolution by the GA which brought about this request was 
received interestingly by the international community: 90 votes in favour, 74 
abstentions and 8 oppositions (one of which was from the US). 
451
 The US stance on 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was one of diplomacy, spearheaded by certain 
superpower states, of which it was of course one.  
‘The United States opposed submitting this matter to the World Court because 
doing so could intrude upon the unique ability of the major powers to influence and 
shape the peace process.’
452
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However, the US did not frame their legal analysis in such a way, they instead 
argued that the ICJ did not have jurisdiction to decide on the dispute, as the relevant 
parties to the dispute had not consented to said jurisdiction.
453
 It furthermore 
advanced the position that one of the parties to the dispute had not even been 
formally recognised by the UN as a sovereign state.  The ICJ, determined that 
answering these questions would not jeopardise any peace process and gave the 
opinion that Israel was indeed violating international law by building a barrier 
between themselves and the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Although the ICJ 
granted itself the jurisdiction to proceed with the case and giving a resulting 
advisory opinion, its recognition and reception from the international community 
and Israel in particular, was somewhat overshadowed by the position of the US.  
On the whole, however, despite the ICJ largely mirroring the views of states which 
the US often disagrees with- this has in turn strengthened its position and 
recognition amongst these states, even if that has been done at the expense of 
alienating the hegemon.
454
 Although it is my belief that strengthening the ICJ with a 
more constitutional mandate would prove futile, we should not be discouraged by 
the lack of US involvement in international courts, most notably the ICJ, as the 
success of the institution is not wholly contingent on the hegemon. Furthermore, if 
history has taught us anything, we can be sure of the natural ebb and flow in who 
this hegemon is- our international structures must not be too-easily influenced and 
tailored to one state in particular for precisely this reason. Hegemony may fluctuate, 
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but international law and its mechanisms must prove to withstand the test of time, 
we merely must empower them to do so.  
 
V.  Diagnosing the Flaws in International Legal 
Mechanisms 
 
Generally, I must concur with Fitzpatrick (2003), who asserts that one of 
the fatal flaws in the international legal mechanisms relating to human rights 
protections under exceptionalism is the fact that there is no permanent mechanism 
or body in place which monitors derogations specifically at the point at which they 
arise. The monitoring is largely sporadic and due to resource and funding 
limitations, is incapable of being sufficiently thorough and in-depth for all the states 
which require it.
455
 It was similarly the stance of the aforementioned UN Special 
Rapporteur that:  
‘there be permanent monitoring of states of emergencies and derogations, including 
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To summarise, the international legal sphere is limited in its capacity to act as a 
watchdog over states during periods of exceptionalism, authoritarianism or ‘states 
of emergency’, on account of the consent and sovereignty doctrines which run to 
the very heart of international law and all its institutions and mechanisms. We 
ultimately cannot question it without fracturing the structure of our international 
community, but equally we cannot merely accept that a lack of consent from states 
equates to a legal vacuum within which state actions remain largely unchecked.  
International law has proven itself to be largely ill-equipped to deal with these 
conflicts between sovereignty and human rights protections, where the former 
grants states the ultimate power to deviate from the latter at will:  
‘The United Nations Charter is based on a fundamental contradiction, which has 
prevented the emergence of a global community founded on moral values: it 
preaches the development of international law, but guarantees a definition of 
sovereignty that prevents any progress on that law. Attempts to impose 
international law on a sovereign state are timid, made in full knowledge that the 
sovereign will have the last word. This has led to a worldwide culture of impunity, 
based on the principle of immunity.’
457
 
Likewise, we are limited in our ability to question the overarching concept of the 
sovereignty of states, in much the same way- sovereign states have the authority to 
determine when they face a ‘threat to the life of their nation’, as it remains a 
fundamental right of states to defend themselves from outside-interference. Thus, it 
is for states to determine when they are under threat, usually on account of war, and 
interfering with their right to make this determination would be an over-extension 
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of the mandate and jurisdiction of the international community. Thus, although we 
cannot be wholly preventative in halting a state’s demise into authoritarianism, 
exceptionalism or other constitutional crises- the international community must 
equip itself to react to it, set parameters within which it must act and impose model 
standards which must be complied with in terms of human rights protections. Only 
then can we refrain from the hypocrisy of legitimising ‘states of emergency’ and 
exceptionalism, and thus add to their perpetual nature, on the international stage.  
We must not provide a framework to allow for states to deviate from universal 
human rights protections and the rule of law, instead we must construct creative 
ways to ensure greater compliance, and not merely attempt to place exceptionalism 
within our systems and mechanisms which have been designed for ‘states of 
normalcy’.  
As the former United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay 
has commonly-asserted, human rights treaty bodies are in a situation of crisis 
themselves, largely unsustainable in their current form, she has thus called for a 
strengthening of the existing system. Although her focus largely lay in the under-
reporting of state parties, and general neglect of their international human rights 
obligations- her analysis and concerns can be easily transferred and applied to our 
analysis of human rights protections under exceptionalism, as there are strands of 
commonality between the two, namely non-compliance, under-reporting, increasing 
derogation and limitation with tenuous claims to justification, if at all. Pillay’s 
understanding of the current predicament of international human rights law and her 
recommendation to states and the international community as a whole, largely 
mirrors my own and reinforces my proposal for an IConC, as an effort to strengthen 




‘We stand at a critical juncture. To appreciate it fully, let us take a step back in time 
to recall the foresight and courage of the drafters of the treaties who established 
this extraordinary system of legally binding commitments by States undertaken 
voluntarily in the interest of their own people. The treaties codify universal values 
and establish procedures to enable every human being to live a life of dignity, by 
accepting them, States voluntarily open themselves to a periodic public review by 
bodies of independent experts. But by resigning ourselves to the “inevitability” of 
non-compliance and inadequate resources, the system was left to suffer a long 
history of benign neglect to the point where, today, it stands on the verge of 
drowning in its growing workload…we cannot let this be.’
458
 
Pivotally, through expanding human rights treaties in specifically-mandated treaties 
and norms, we have largely fragmented the key tenets of the UN Charter (1945) and 
UDHR (1948), which were the starting-point and back-bone of all the international 
human rights instruments which succeeded them. To reinforce said back-bone and 
move forward with human rights protections, both generally and for our purposes, 
during periods of exceptionalism, we must ‘take a step back’ to where we started, 
and create an institution which reinforces these foundations, in order to stabilise the 
organs which have been constructed upon it- namely, through the construction of an 
International Constitutional Court.  
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A.  Failure of International Law to Pierce the Shield of 
Secrecy in Terrorism Cases 
‘The shadowy world of secrets and lies associated with intelligence agencies 
has always coexisted uneasily alongside the rule of law, individual freedoms, 




 As we have witnessed in our previous analysis of exceptionalism in the 
domestic realm, one of the most contentious examples of this can be seen in the 
wake of 09/11, with regard to counter-terrorist strategies. The international 
community has attempted to hold governments accountable for their actions and 
policies which contravene international human rights laws, but with increasing 
secrecy, and increased references made to privileges and immunities, this is the new 
terrain that international law must work within.
460
 As such, these new dynamics, in 
this instance within the context of terrorism cases, is worthy of our attention.  
In April 2002, Binyam Mohamed was arrested in Pakistan, whilst attempting to 
return to his legal residence, the United Kingdom. He was subsequently passed to 
the United States FBI and CIA where he was interrogated without receiving access 
to a lawyer, for 4 months. Following this, he then was flown to Morocco where he 
was further incarcerated for 18 months and subject to torture and further 
interrogation by Moroccan intelligence services. 
461
 In 2004, the CIA then 
transported him to a secret US detention facility in Afghanistan, coined ‘The Dark 
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Prison’, for several months before eventually being transferred to Guantanamo Bay. 
During his time in US custody: 
‘’he was kept in “near permanent darkness” and subjected to loud noise, such as 
the recorded screams of women and children, 24 hours a day. Mohamed was fed 
sparingly and irregularly and in 4 months he lost between 40 and 60 pounds.’
462
 
In 2005, a Military Commission in the US formally charged Mohamed with 
conspiracy on account of Al Qaeda allegedly training him to detonate bombs in the 
US. A confession was alleged to have been made, but Mohamed claimed that this 
had been obtained by way of torture. To prove the accuracy of his claim he needed 
the support of the British security forces, who had questioned him whilst 
imprisoned in Afghanistan, and who he believed, had sufficient evidence to prove 
that he had been tortured. However, the British government refused to hand-over 
these documents on the basis of ‘public interest immunity’.
463
 Although he was 
released back to the UK in 2009,  
‘Binyam Mohamed’s litigation in the UK and US demonstrates the tension between 
national security interests and international law, as well as the transnational nature 
of counterterrorism operations and accountability efforts.’
464
 
As a result of the inevitability of the conflict between national security and 
international standards of human rights protections, international law has struggled 
to grapple with this interplay in the wake of 09/11 national security policies, as we 
have witnessed in our previous discussion. Legal doctrines often exist in the 
domestic domain to protect states against potential suits arising against them 
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following particular practices or actions invoked in the name of national security, 
but often contrary to human rights obligations. In the UK, as we saw in the case of 
Mohamed, this took the form of the ‘public interest immunity’ doctrine.  
‘The danger, of course, is that states use these secrecy doctrines to establish 




Resultantly, those who fall victim to counter-terrorist legislation and policies often 
fall outside the remit of international legal protections on account of such privileges 
and immunities. In the case of Mohamed, the documents were eventually released 
on account of the inauguration of President Obama in the US, and thus the changes 
made to intelligence-sharing agreements between the US and UK. Having disclosed 
the documents, evidence had thus surfaced regarding the methods of torture used 
against Mohamed during the period of US incarceration. 
466
 
‘‘The transnational implications of US pressure regarding the state secrets 
privilege may be that even if other nations’ courts use a narrower standard for the 
privilege, those standards may be undermined if the US government uses its 
considerable clout to pressure governments to claim state secrets in cases where US 
government actions are implicated.’
467
 
What is especially interesting in such cases as these is the reference made to 
international law, or perhaps the lack of recognition of such. In the numerous 
rulings in the case of Mohamed in the US, judges did not refer to international law 
once. As such, the treatment of national security and state secrets in the US context 
is clearly deemed to be of higher importance and ultimately elevated above the 
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ambit of international law and in line with this, international legal obligations. This 
US tendency to block litigation on the basis of state secrecy was catalysed in the 
case of Totten v US (1875),
468
 wherein the family of a spy brought a suit against the 
US for failure to pay in exchange for the services the spy rendered. The Court threw 
out the claim, as it would ‘inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law 
itself regards as confidential.’
469
 Later the Supreme Court of the US would rule to 
bar all cases if: 
‘the subject matter of the action…[was] a matter of state secret’.
470
 
If we look to the international legal domain and see whether we do indeed have 
provisions to protect against such injustices, we can indeed decipher formal legal 
protections in place. For example, the ICCPR requires that states provide effective 
remedies for violations, and state secrets or special doctrines cannot be invoked to 
negate this right to an effective remedy.  
‘As the Covenant’s implementing body, the Human Rights Committee, has held that 
even if a state “may introduce adjustments to the practical functioning of its 
procedures governing judicial or other remedies” during a state of emergency, it 




In Rodriguez v Uruguay, the Human Rights Committee ruled that Uruguay’s 
amnesty law was a violation of the ICCPR, on account of its conflict with granting 
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an effective remedy for ICCPR violations.
472
 Secrecy doctrines may indeed be used 
by states, but have to be proportionate to the public interest concern at play and be 
the least restrictive as possible. The Convention Against Torture (CAT) goes even 
further in its scope to ensure that states investigate torture allegations and punish 
perpetrators.
473
 The overarching precedent advanced by the international community 
is thus: 
‘The use of secrecy doctrines cannot, therefore, eliminate the right of the victim, his 
or her family, or society to know the truth about human rights violations.’
474
 
The prohibition on torture is absolute and thus non-derogable, according to the 
Convention against Torture (CAT) and ICCPR, alongside being deemed a jus 
cogens peremptory norm by the international community. It is therefore most 
worrisome that out of the more than 120 US federal decisions on state secret 
privileges, not one considered the discrepancy between these privileges and 
violations of international law. 
475
 Although US law provides for redress for victims 
of torture etc., formally, these avenues are closed in cases where state secret 
privileges have been invoked.  Although some scholars, namely Jack Snyder and 
Leslie Vinjamuri, have argued for the need for amnesty laws in states transitioning 
from authoritarian rule or civil conflict, the dominant discourse appears to be the 
acceptance that human rights accountability should be prioritised.
476
 Having clearly 
identified the dangers of the blanket application of state secret privileges, ultimately: 
                                                             
472
 Communication No 322/1988, Submitted by Hugo Rodriguez. (adopted 9 August 1994) 
UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 51st Session. Cited in Ibid. p. 74.  
473
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), adopted 10 December 1984, GA Res 39/46. Cited in Ibid. p. 75.  
474 Ibid. p. 76.  
475
 Ibid. p. 79.  
476
 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in 








Importantly, in this interplay between national security and human rights 
protections, we can decipher a ‘shield’ of denial by states. As advanced by Cohen, 
he explains how violations are justified through: 
‘asserting the righteousness of a cause, claiming emergency necessity, blaming and 




The most concerning for many legal scholars is this tendency to dehumanise certain 
persons, framed as the ‘homo sacer’, in order to evade human rights obligations. 
According to Sanders (2011) and Cohen (1996), this method of framing deviations 
and abuse through the lens of ‘plausible legality’, acts as a legal loop-hole through 
which responsibility can be evaded.  
‘Plausible legality is a form of what Cohen calls “interpretive denial”. It reframes 
meanings, employs euphemisms and legalisms, fudges lines of responsibility, and 
claims abuses are isolated incidents.’
479
 
Some abuses are so blatant and universally-condemned that states must employ 
exceptional legal interpretation and lines of defence in order to justify their actions. 
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Thus, states construct a façade of legality, bound together in carefully-constructed 
legal rhetoric.  
‘It attempts to legalise the exception without publicly suspending the existing order. 
It aspires to reconcile the normally irreconcilable – to permit the impermissible 
without fully admitting the move.’
480
 
This façade is at the crux of the inherent incompatibility between the existing model 
of international human rights standards and models, and the practice of exceptional 
states and governments; the mechanisms of international human rights law are 
largely susceptible to this ‘interpretive denial’ by states. Thus, we require an 
institution which is equipped and empowered to evaluate and concretise the 
meanings which have been so broadly manipulated in the interests of states, by 
states. The overarching destabilising factor seems to be related to an inherent 
questioning of legitimacy in the ambit of international human rights law, and thus a 
void has emerged within which states and governments reinterpret the human rights 
standards and obligations in their favour in order to ‘save face’ formally, and yet 
prevent the international judicialization of their domestic system of human rights.  
Let us first look to briefly reiterate the legal loopholes which have materialised in 
recent years, and then assess how we can strengthen the international human rights 
judiciary, in order to legitimise these weakening models and standards.  
‘As Lichtblau notes, according to the architects of post-09/11 policy, “the rule of 
law still had to be followed…but just what those rules really meant was often 
malleable, subject to twisting, flexing and reinterpreting so long as the tactics were 
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justified to stop another attack”. In so doing, plausible legality hides rather than 




B. Navigating Legal Loopholes: ‘Plausible Legality’ in Action 
  
In the wake of 09/11, it is interesting to look at how the United States, in 
particular, confronted this interplay between the domestic security policies and 
international human rights standards, especially with regard to legislative drafting 
and uncovering and thus manipulating, legal loopholes. Considering the fact that the 
way in which the US responded to terrorist threats acted largely as the standard 
reaction, which other states subsequently mirrored, it seems inevitable that the US 
remains the centre of our analysis on exceptionalism in the context of legislative 
interpretation. At the forefront of this analysis, therefore, are the actions and 
decisions of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the US Department of Justice. 
Arguably the most profound can be demonstrated in the 2002 decision by the 
aforementioned, often referred to as the ‘torture memos’, the first of which argued 
that the definition of torture, must be akin: 
‘in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, 
impairment of bodily function, or even death.’
482
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The legal argument propounded by the US government lawyers was that there may 
indeed be treatment of persons required to prevent terrorist acts, which may produce 
pain and suffering, but which on balance do not contravene domestic US law 
concerning cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. However, the standard of torture, 
as advanced by CAT is clear in stating that ‘torture’: 
‘means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 




Importantly, the CAT standards on interpreting what constitutes torture were 
implemented by Sections 2340-2340A of Title 18 of the US Code.
484
 But the 
translation of international standards on torture were reinterpreted by US 
government legal advisors to require such a severity of pain inflicted, that the 
threshold upon which CAT could be invoked was raised to a largely unobtainable 
level for most cases. By delimiting the scope of application of the CAT, the US was 
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well-placed to violate international human rights on the grounds that the cruel 
treatment used did not amount to the necessary intensity to warrant a violation, 
aided by the inherent ambiguity of such a term as ‘necessary intensity.’
485
 
Ultimately, the benchmark could not be met unless the treatment amounted to death 
or permanent physical damage- thus, not taking into account the vast array of 
possible instances of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, instead limiting the 
application of human rights law to the furthest end of the spectrum of possible 
abuses, and even then, with caveats and defences available. Resultantly, such 
practices as confining someone in a box, sleep deprivation or waterboarding were 
deemed to be outside of the remit of the US understanding of ‘torture’ practices.  
Taking for example, waterboarding, it was argued that the simulation of drowning 
did not reach such a severity that it constituted ‘physical pain’: 
‘The waterboard is simply a controlled acute episode, lacking the connotation of a 
protracted period of time generally given to suffering.’
486
 
Therefore, although waterboarding itself constitutes a threat of death, as it is akin to 
drowning, the US lawyers would not interpret it as meeting the necessary threshold 
of ‘severity’ in terms of pain. In 2007, waterboarding was removed from the official 
list of US interrogation practices, but whether its usage continued is unclear. What 
is clear to see, however, is that the US legislative advisors crafted international 
human rights law on torture in such a way as to ensure it could be used if necessary, 
                                                             
485 Ibid. p. 1.  
486
 Jay Bybee, ‘Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central 
Intelligence Agency: Interrogation of Al Qaeda Operative’ (US Department of Justice, 
Office of Legal Counsel, 1 August 2002) p.10 Available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-bybee2002.pdf Last 




without undermining its legality or setting itself up for potential accountability for 
abuse.  
Accompanying such legislative reinterpretation of international standards, the US 
position on torture was similarly manipulated through arguing that even the 
watered-down version of Section 2340A was not deemed to be applicable to enemy 
combatants, due to the inherent conflict with the President’s Commander-in-Chief 
powers. 
‘We find that in the circumstances of the current war against Al Qaeda and its allies, 
prosecution under Section 2340A may be barred because enforcement of the statute 




Such an example of creative legal interpretation by the US serves as evidence of the 
recognition that although the US largely deviated from the international standards 
on torture, for example, they still felt the need to maintain some degree of 
legitimacy and mitigate the possibility of being held accountable for their potential 
violations.  
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The result is something that Sanders describes as ‘shallow legality’- it largely 
served to brandish the lawyers who drafted the provisions with the same potential 
guilt as those committing the torture abuses. Through blurring the potential for legal 
responsibility, a broad immunity was crafted, utilising the façade of judicial 
competence and reverence to ‘cloak the policy with a veneer of legality’.
489
 For the 
most-part, many of these examples of ‘plausible legality’ remain classified 
documents, and are therefore outside the remit of external judicial interpretation and 
analysis, and thus exacerbate the efforts of international human rights lawyers to 
enforce standards. This ‘golden shield’, as Sanders describes it, is seemingly 
impenetrable:
490
 how can we protect ourselves and the ‘homo sacer’ from the 
resulting abuses and construct a sword capable of combating the effects of 
‘plausible legality’? 
 
C. Legitimising the International Human Rights Judiciary 
 
 Having witnessed the deference states sometimes equip themselves with in 
order to deviate from international standards of human rights protection, we must 
ask ourselves why the legal structures are struggling to hold states to account for 
their violations. When confronted with states use of ‘plausible legality’, our existing 
international legal structures begin to crumble. It seems to be that this is only able to 
occur because a void in the legitimacy of the international human rights judiciary 
has surfaced. This has been exacerbated by the monist model in the international 
legal sphere and attempting to confine the exception within the norm, alongside 
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under-reporting of state actions and the dilution of a universal mandate through 
limitations, derogations and reservations to key international human rights treaties. 
As we have seen in our analysis, this is further hindered by creative judicial 
interpretation and framing of international obligations by states as a protective 
mechanism through which they can prevent potential accountability and maintain 
the veneer of legality. 
Importantly, this legality is capable of being manipulated by states because the 
international mechanisms cannot protect against it. If states held a high regard for 
international human rights law and its institutions which enforce the legal 
obligations, then there would be no capacity for states to frame ‘plausible legality’. 
As Follesdal (2013) advocates, the international human rights judiciary has an 
inherent ‘legitimacy deficit’.
491
 Although her understanding of this ‘international 
human rights judiciary’ includes the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, it also includes the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee for the ICCPR (1966), which we have drawn upon extensively in 
our analysis.  
Fundamentally, it is on account of the ‘veneer of legitimacy’ which the international 
human rights judiciary has constructed for itself, in establishing a model and 
standards and yet not equipping itself with the necessary tools to enforce or ensure 
compliance, that states are equally-placed to assert a ‘veneer of legality’.  
We can advocate for the need for legitimacy of the international human rights 
judiciary, by merely referring to our prior cases of constitutional crises where the 
domestic setting, usurped by authoritarian power, no longer has a democratic 
mandate and thus requires external judicial intervention. If the domestic judiciary is 
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acting undemocratically or not acting independently, or elections have been 
illegitimate- we can no longer rely on the internal infrastructures and checks and 
balances. This is the reasoning behind our international human rights judiciary, but 
its drafters were reluctant to grant them the necessary legitimacy to ensure their 
mandate is enforceable. During times of normalcy, it is easier to ensure compliance- 
but during exceptionalism, these structures crumble in protecting the ‘homo sacer’.  
As Follesdal explains: 
‘In order to move towards a more legitimate global basic structure we should not 
utterly reject the present international human rights judiciary, but rather identify 
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Chapter 7: Proposing an International Constitutional 
Court to fill this Void: The ‘Constitutionalisation’ of 
International Law  
 
‘The events surrounding 09/11 have apparently caused a shift in 
international legal thinking. While in the 1990’s there was much debate 
regarding diversity, recognition, and inclusion, the 09/11 attacks, arguably, 
have provoked something of a reorientation toward a search for a global or 





I.  Vindicating an International Constitutional Institution  
 
 Having established the sheer number of vitriolic situations on the domestic 
level, in an array of forms, which we are capable of referring to as ‘constitutional 
crises’, this has evidenced the growing need for intervention and an increased 
dialogue of constitutional issues on the international level. Having also identified 
the limitations of existing international law both in regard to its structure and its 
substantive standards and mechanisms, we have proven that merely reforming the 
existing system may not be adequate to redressing the issue of increasing domestic 
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‘constitutional retrogression’. Thus, I advocate for the establishment of a regulatory 
body which provides a check and balancing function, capable of acting as a 
watchdog over the constitutional progress and/or retrogression of states.  
Through the prior analysis, I have hopefully provided sufficient evidence of the 
turbulent constitutional situations in many states, some of which teeter on the edge 
of authoritarianism as a result. To test the accuracy of my claims, I have testified 
my theories by using case studies from a range of states and crises, which go some 
way I hope, in demonstrating the extent and urgency of the issue at hand. Thus, I 
proceed with my proposal for confronting this spectre which we are faced with in a 
post-09/11 world of fear, propaganda and increasing authoritarianism. I have 
established through my work that we can no longer grant states, which are in the 
midst of a ‘constitutional crisis’ the jurisdiction to determine their own fate and the 
fate of their often ill-informed, fearful populace. We must be preventative in our 
actions and grant the international community sufficient power and jurisdiction to 
allow an impartial judge to act as a watchdog over such struggling states. In this 
way, I strongly stress the urgency in creating an IConC to fill this void in the 
international legal sphere and prevent future abuse by authoritarian states and their 
destructive policies.  
In order to put forward such a proposal, I must lay the theoretical foundations for 
such a body. International institutions and international law are increasingly in the 
firing-line of criticisms over the disassociation of states with these bodies and laws, 
and thus their irrelevance in a 21
st
 century world of isolationist and nationalistic 
states. It is for precisely this reason that we should strengthen our existing 
institutions and bolster their power with new institutions and legal norms in order to 
concretise and reinforce the system as a whole and re-establish the respect and 




that it is capable of moulding itself to a changing world, and the 21
st
 century is no 
exception. Admittedly, the ‘War on Terror’, has catalysed new legal issues and 
ambiguities which require the attention of international lawyers. Some legal 
commentators argue that we are witnessing the decline of international law, but this 
appears to be an over-simplification of the situation, a scapegoat justification for an 
easy route out. Instead, we must think creatively and truly question what the 
international community is lacking and fill the void.  
We are increasingly witnessing the destruction of decades of progress by 
international institutions and international law; from the outset, it was their mandate 
to prevent ‘crisis’ situations from deteriorating into full-scale war and/or human 
rights violations, their mandate is still clear, but their power and jurisdiction is 
wavering. It is the duty of international lawyers, I assert, to work to empower these 
structures and institutions with the necessary tools to fulfil their mandate.  
On this basis, I advocate for the creation of an IConC; by acknowledging the pitfalls 
of our existing mechanisms, we are capable of deciphering the power gap which 
authoritarian states and states in the midst of ‘constitutional crises’ are exploiting to 
their advantage. If we merely add a further international legal mechanism to the 
existing structure, then I reluctantly admit that it would probably prove futile and 
suffer the same fate of unenforceability that have rendered other mechanisms 
‘toothless’. We need an institution which is ground-breaking in its mandate, its 
objectives and its power. An institution which stretches sovereignty and jurisdiction 
to their limits, akin to that of the newly-established ICC. If we look to the common 
denominator of issues which face all international mechanisms to varying degrees, 
it is the fact that a change of political leadership or direction by a state, can bring 
about a ‘constitutional crisis’, isolationist and nationalistic policies and a complete 




If respect and recognition of international law are so heavily dependent on stable, 
democratic states with favourable political leaders, then we need an institution in 
place to ensure the aforementioned conditions are met and maintained by states, in 
order to ensure continued respect and conformity with international standards. In 
this way, an IConC would act as a foundational protective mechanism to ensure the 
success and continuity of international law as a whole.  
Having hopefully provided a convincing argument for the overarching need for the 
construction of an IConC, alongside the deficiencies in the existing international 
institutions and legal orders which have created the void we see before us, we must 
turn to gauge how plausible it would be for such an institution to satisfy the 
necessary prerequisites to translate it from a purely abstract ideal, to a feasible 
solution. Thus, we turn to confront the key tenets of international law and its 
institutions and pose the question of whether we are capable of moulding a body of 
international constitutional legal doctrine, or a constitution from the existing 
structures. Can we translate the theoretical proposition into a fully-functional reality?  
 
II.  ‘Constitutionalising’ International Law   
‘[T]he legal project at the basis of global constitutionalism is, in the long 
term, the only realistic alternative to war, destruction, the rise of a variety of 
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 Increasing international legal dialogue has centred upon whether an 
international or global constitution is indeed emerging, to what extent and what role 
the potential ‘Constitutionalisation’ of international law could carve out for itself. 
As states have become more closely interconnected, we have seen a surge in the 
usage of terms such as ‘global governance’, ‘international community’ and a ‘global 
rule of law’.
495
 Although we can see a parallel trend in the detachment of some 
states from such a rhetoric, and increasing nationalism and independence from 
regionalism or supranationalism, for the most part the benefits of engaging with this 
international rhetoric are sufficient to entice most states into participating. I assert 
that it is due to the fragmentation and gaps in existing international legal 
mechanisms, that some states are capable of disengaging in the first place- if the 
model appears ill-equipped and embarking on a downward spiral into its own 
demise, then it seems inevitable that states begin to ‘abandon ship’, so to speak. The 
solution, it seems to me, lay in greater cooperation between states, reopening 
dialogue and moving forward together in the face of global problems.  
‘One legal umbrella that has been suggested as an expression of greater 




Although differing models and understandings of global constitutionalism do indeed 
exist, guided by the work of Christine Schwobel, who offers 4 possible ‘visions’ of 
a global constitution (social, institutional, normative and analogical 
constitutionalism), we will focus predominantly on ‘social constitutionalism’, oft 
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referred to as the international community school.
497
 This school of thought 
emphasises the idea that a: 
‘Paradigm shift [has] allegedly taken place, showing a move away from a 




At the forefront of ‘social constitutionalism’ is the eminent Bardo Fassbender, who 
has himself argued for concretising already clearly-identifiable elements of global 
constitutionalism, namely through recognising the UN Charter as a global 
constitution. 
499
 Christian Tomuschat propounds a similar view, in asserting that 
using constitutional rules to limit political power, both international and domestic, 
advances peace, individual rights and the rule of law.
500
 Fundamental to this 
understanding of global constitutionalism are the concepts of influence, 
accountability and participation.
501
 It is this sphere of accountability where an 
IConC could play an important role, aided by engagement with civil society, and 
ultimately striving to limit the ‘single locus of power’. 
502
 
If we move our focus to institutional constitutionalism, Anne-Marie Slaughter 
draws our attention to the extent of the existing interplay between the domestic and 
international spheres, comprised of ‘government networks’.  
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‘Although states still exist in the new world order, they relate to each other not only 




However, Slaughter asserts that a global constitution would not be possible unless a 
global government was formalised in tandem. 
504
 Considering the difficulties in 
establishing a concrete global government, she instead settles for the uncodified, 
more informal, use of principles and norms as a starting-point. Although many legal 
commentators and theorists are understandably sceptical of calls for a global 
government, this is indeed the direction in which the UN is already moving. 
According to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which was 
adopted in September 2015 at the UN Sustainable Development Summit, reference 
was explicitly made in the Preamble to ‘the scale and ambition of this new universal 
agenda’.
505
 With greater zeal than ever before, we are witnessing the international 
rhetoric of integration, a resurgence of universalism and collective solutions to 
shared global problems. Although a formal global government may not exist, the 
trend towards this goal and increasing evidence of its eventual realisation cannot 
preclude the construction of a global constitution.  
One of the concerns of many legal commentators has proven to be the interaction 
and hierarchical implications of having a potential international constitution, and 
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whether this would render domestic constitutions futile. Miguel Poiares Maduro 
examines this in more detail, through focusing on legitimacy. 
506
  
‘Maduro stresses the need to legitimise de facto power in constitutional terms. He 
shows that the form and locus of power have changed from what was traditionally a 
state monopoly. Traditionally, the form of power- the constitution of a nation state- 
and power itself coincided in the same locus, the state. Global governance, however, 
has caused a shift of power to global sites.’
507
 
In this way, a power shift has taken place from the domestic to the global. An 
inevitable by-product of this has proven to be some governments attempting to 
regain hold of their domestic power through a reinvigoration of authoritarianism 
and/or nationalism. Although a backlash can be evidenced, most states have instead 
engaged with the advantages of greater interconnectivity between states. However, 
the void of a formal global governance structure remains. If we were to establish an 
IConC, this would provide further impetus for such a formal institution for global 
governance.  
However, a formal executive governance structure on the international level is not a 
prerequisite, in my mind, for the advancement of the constitutionalisation of 
international law. I align myself with Robert Uerpmann, who asserts: 
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‘While examining the lack of such an executive authority in international law, he 
finds that there is, in fact, no requirement for such an authority in the international 
sphere…international law is a law of coordination rather than subordination.’
508
 
Normative constitutionalists have further drawn on the unique character of 
fundamental norms in the international sphere, which apply irrespective of 
sovereignty or consent. 
509
 




The former, jus cogens norms, (or peremptory norms) can be located predominantly 
in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and oft referred to as 
constitutional norms for the international community.
511
 Article 53 states therein 
that such norms are of such a nature that ‘no derogation is permitted’.
512
 Even if jus 
cogens are not a global constitution in themselves, they are sure to be considered 
part of it, and provide yet more evidence of the existing constitutional nature of 
international law. As Michael Byers asserts: 
‘Nowhere else in the international legal system is the ability of certain rules to limit 
a state’s ability to develop, maintain, or change norms so clear.’
513
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A similar argument has been of the importance of jus cogens norms, based on their 
inherent value, and not merely their effect on state power and sovereignty- it is their 
ethical rhetoric which warrants them an international constitutional nature, as 
propounded by Erika de Wet.
514
 In much the same way, erga omnes norms have 
similarly been characterised as having an inherently constitutional nature.  
As further evidence of constitutionalising international law, let us turn to the 
proposal of Geir Ulfstein who suggested the creation of a world court of human 
rights, which would act as a judicial organ to implement and empower ‘core values 
in the international community.’
515
 In much the same way, and proposing a similar 
mandate and function to our IConC, Ulfstein argues for a world court of human 
rights: 




Indeed, references to global constitutionalism have long been asserted by legal 
academics. As early as 1926, Alfred Verdross published a book entitled, ‘The 
Constitution of the International Legal Community.’
517
 Drawing on the various 
levels and spheres of jurisdiction and general principles of international law which 
he elevated to be beyond the state consent model, he offered a ground-breaking 
alternative to the traditional sovereignty model which prevailed at that time. Later, 
Verdross would transpose his original idea for the constitutionalisation of 
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international law through general principles, to a focus on the UN Charter as a 




A.   Deciphering a Constitutional Document 
‘[i]t is apparent…that the material content of the Charter of United Nations 
is indeed constitutional and that we are fully justified in treating the Charter 




 International lawyers have long been debating whether a document of 
constitutional norms has indeed surfaced naturally over time, to such an extent that 
we are indeed capable of asserting its existence, despite no formal recognition of 
such. Proponents in favour of recognising the foundational treaty of the United 
Nations, namely the UN Charter (1945) as the international constitutional document, 
include the aforementioned Bardo Fassbender and Ronald St. John Macdonald.  
Making reference to the aforementioned UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, it likewise stipulates the importance of the UN Charter therein: 
‘the new Agenda is guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, including full-respect for international law.’
520
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In order to fulfil the prerequisites to be classified as an international constitution, 
many legal commentators have drawn upon the need for there to be both formal 
institutional elements to the constitutional document, as well as substantive 
provisions. The UN Charter (1945) satisfied the former in laying down the 
numerous organs of the UN, their individual functions, powers and mandates, and 
with regard to the latter largely lays down its purpose and objectives in the 
Preamble and Chapter 1: 
‘To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction…[and] to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the 
attainment of these common ends.’
521
 
More specifically, the purpose of the UN has often been simplified into the 
maintenance of peace and security (Article 1(1)), the prohibition of the use of force 
(Article 2 (4)) and the sovereign equality of members (Article 2(1)).
522
  Pivotally, 
the supremacy of the norms within the UN Charter is laid down in Article 103. 
Macdonald asserts that this provision is: 
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If we were to utilise the UN Charter (1945) as the basis of our international 
constitutional framework, framing general objectives and granting powers to 
UN organs, and empowering its substantive provisions through elevating jus 
cogens and erges omnes to the level of international constitutional norms, its 
provisions would be beyond derogation and in-keeping with the consent 
doctrine. In this way, we could establish an IConC to oversee the 
implementation of these substantive provisions, offering an accountability 
mechanism and avenue through which civil society could take an active role 
in the application of international constitutional law in the domestic sphere.  
 
III.  An International Constitutional Court: The Proposal 
 
‘A resort for local and international human rights organisations and 
political parties in case of serious human rights violations and more 




In 1999, the former President of Tunisia, Moncef Marzouki, proposed the 
establishment of an International Constitutional Court, in order to ‘overcome the 
failure of international law to deal with abuses of democracy and human rights.’
525
 
He argued that the dictatorship of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and the 
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fraudulent elections which took place, demonstrated the need for an international 
mechanism to address cases of authoritarianism and excessive power of the 
executive, where the domestic setting had been compromised. Marzouki modelled 
his theoretical constitutional court on the International Court of Justice and the ICC, 
with the primary mandate of ruling on the legality of state elections. Utilising the 
United Nations Charter as the foundational premise for such a mechanism, he 
argued that there was a growing need for an institution which implemented and 
enforced these laws- this was, in his mind, ‘the missing link’.
526
  
The objective of his proposed Court would primarily be to standardise and 
concretise ‘universal constitutional and moral principles’ at first and then work for 
the eradication of authoritarian regimes and the breaking-down of unconstitutional 
power structures and political leaders.
527
 In the long-term, it was his hope that all 
states shared common constitutional laws with respect to human rights and 
freedoms.  
 
A.  1999 Recommendations, Foundations & Formalities 
‘Many countries of the world have signed international conventions and 
ratified treaties guaranteeing democracy and fundamental human rights, 
however, there is- as yet- no authority to ensure those commitments are 
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 At the crux of the need for an IConC is the idea that democracy and public 
freedoms will remain stalled in their protection at the international level if we 
continue to allow the domestic level to remain unchecked. The international 
mechanisms should indeed reinforce domestic protections of human rights and 
democratic values- where the domestic domain fails, the international mechanisms 
should have sufficient power to intervene. The mandate of his proposed IConC, not 
to be confused with the ICC, would be to act as a ‘regulatory body that denounces 
harmful constitutions, illegal charters and fraudulent elections.’
529
 His conceptual 
IConC would adjudicate on whether to formally recognise states as democratic or 
not, in accordance with the UN Charter, and advise those who do not fulfil the 
necessary criteria- thus serving both a consultative and judicial role. In this way, Mr 
Marzouki believed that this would deter authoritarian regimes and emancipate civic 
resistance by demonstrating model states and the ideal standards of democracy, 
which others would strive to imitate.  
Judicial oversight would be granted in determining the degree to which states are 
adhering to international standards of human rights, and how they are structured in 
terms of domestic constitutional protections. Such oversight would also extend to 
reviewing ‘disputed constitutions and laws within member states’.
530
 He asserted the 
need for an avenue for individual relief under the proposed IConC; often within 
authoritarian regimes the victims in need of redress are the citizens whose 
constitutional rights and freedoms have been violated. Thus, Mr Marzouki 
recognised the inherent need for individuals to have legal standing in the domain of 
international constitutional law. On this basis, he proposed that individuals could 
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bring a claim to the IConC ‘on the basis of the contravention of democratic 
behaviour and the international principles of human rights and freedoms.’
531
 
It has been especially noted that the ‘depreciation of the way national elections are 
held’,
532
 needs to be confronted by the international community. The manipulation 
of election results, illegal financing of election campaigns etc., are signs of 
‘constitutional crisis’ on the domestic level, with the additional issue of 
undermining treaty obligations which many of these states have ratified and shown 
their formal commitment to. Resultantly, the proposed IConC would need sufficient 
power to render illegal elections invalid and the ruling regime deriving from such, 
illegitimate. 
With regard to the question of enforcement and the widespread practice of state 
impunity, Professor Nasrawin, on behalf of Mr Marzouki, offered these thoughts: 
‘All attempts to impose rules of international law upon a sovereign state have been 
timid... This has resulted in an international culture of impunity, based on the 
principle of immunity of states towards the international law, which hinders the 
efficient enforcement of human rights.’
533
 
Although this may well be justifiable under the historical world order of the 
inviolability of sovereign states, this is no longer representative of how states 
function and the policies they pursue: pivotally, we can no longer entrust states with 
an unchecked responsibility to act in accordance with constitutional values and 
international human rights norms. It is on this basis that we must argue for 
international intervention, or we may as well abandon our existing institutions, and 
international law altogether. I align myself, alongside Professor Nasrawin, De Sena 
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and De Vittor, whom advocate for a ‘balancing of values’ between the competing 
international law principles of ‘the sovereign equality of states’ and the ‘protection 
of inviolable human rights’- the balance should tilt in favour of the latter and states 
should be prevented from drawing upon sovereign immunity to justify their 
deviation from human rights protections.
534
 Upon this basis, the Court’s decisions 
would be both final and binding on the states concerned.  
If we compare this with existing legal mechanisms, we can identify that it surpasses 
the scope and enforceability of the International Court of Justice, as the ICJ requires 
parties to have approved its jurisdiction in the case, and there is nothing which can 
ensure that a state does so. The ICC showcases a huge leap forward in terms of the 
extension of jurisdiction in the field of international criminal law, for certain 
crimes- but it remains hindered by the fact that many of the world’s superpowers 
refuse to ratify its founding statute which grants this jurisdiction, The Rome Statute 
(1998). Although Mr Marzouki commends the work of the UN Human Rights 
Council and the Human Rights Committee, their ability to translate democratic 
principles and human rights into international state obligations has proven difficult. 
This is the void in which an IConC is best-placed to fill.  
The bylaws which were drawn up for the proposed IConC stipulate that the number 
of judges shall be 21, and further details the mechanism for nominating candidates 
and their appointment. For ease of understanding, I quote Professor Nasrawin 
directly:  
‘Each member state of the UN shall nominate one candidate, and then a committee 
consisting of judges of the International Court of Justice, judges of the International 
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Criminal Court and members of the International Law Commission shall only select 
42 names from the list of candidates on the grounds of integrity, competence and 
experience. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall elect 21 judges from 
the list of candidates to serve as judges in the [IConC].’
535
 
In terms of determining a body of international constitutional norms, Mr Marzouki 
proposed that this should be comprised of ‘UN Pacts and other conventions’, and 
‘UN Resolutions consecrating the principle of democratic legitimacy and setting out 
the obligatory measures to be taken by states to ensure it.’
536
 The aforementioned 
bylaws further stipulated the range of legal instruments which would be utilised by 
the IConC to evidence their arguments, and serve as the basis of our universal 
understanding of international constitutional law.
537
 This included: The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
538
 The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966),
539
 The European Convention on Human Rights (1950),
540
 The Charter of the 
Organisation of American States (1951),
541
 The American Convention on Human 
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 The Inter-American Democratic Charter (2001),
543
 The 
Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000),
544
 and the Harare Commonwealth 
Declaration (1991).
545
 We will later critique this and limit international 
constitutional law initially to an international constitution, the UN Charter (1945), 
and international constitutional norms of jus cogens and erga omnes.  
Thus, we proceed to analysing the reception of the IConC by the international 
community, alongside the potential pitfalls of the proposal, in order to offer a 
riposte and fill the conceptual gaps which have materialised in recent years.  
 
B.  Initial Reception by the International Community 
 
 In 2011, Mr Marzouki restated his commitment to the creation of an IConC 
by forming a committee of experts on constitutional law and drafting the general 
mandate of his proposed International Constitutional Court and its bylaws. Later, in 
2012, during a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he again asserted 
the need for such an institution and asked that the international community allow for 
both its establishment and also grant it the jurisdiction to denounce and challenge 
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the policies and actions of those on the domestic level who neglect their 
constitutional norms and domestic human rights legislation, and in so doing, violate 
international law. 
546
Mr Marzouki then repeated his claims at the African Union 
Summit in January 2013, following which, the African Union ‘agreed to study the 
feasibility of such an institution.’
547
 
Later in 2013, International IDEA and the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation formed a 
symposium, in collaboration with the Office of the President of Tunisia on: ‘The 
Creation of an IConC: Means to Prevent Grip on the Democratic Institutions.’ 
IDEA Secretary-General Vidar Helgesen, with reference to the experiences of both 
Tunisia and Egypt, highlighted:  
‘the gap between the peoples’ aspirations having made revolution against 
dictatorship and the attitude of their governments.’
548
 
Although it certainly appears as though experts in international law and 
constitutional law alike are in agreement with the need for, and objectives of, such 
an IConC- ‘most agreed that further definition would be needed if such an 
institution was to be become a reality.’
549
 
Before his presidency came to an end, and in his final push for its establishment, Mr 
Marzouki hosted an international conference, ‘International Constitutional Court 
and the Requirements of Sustainability' in 2014.
550
 Although in the wake of said 
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conference, promises have been made to endeavour to translate this theoretical 
concept into a fully-functioning mechanism, progress in its realisation has stalled.  
Indeed, the public international law expert who was largely responsible for the 
International Law Commission’s draft statute for the establishment of the ICC, Mr 
James Crawford, identifies the pitfalls of Mr Marzouki’s proposal. In comparing the 
former with the proposed IConC, ‘he noted that several of the key factors which led 
to the creation of the ICC were missing’, but explained that if steps were taken to 
determine its feasibility and progress made to realise the proposal it was 
theoretically possible.
551
 At the crux of the construction of an IConC, a ‘large-scale 
mobilisation of civil society’ would be required, as would ‘the agreement of a core 
group of like-minded states to drive the process [forward].’
552
 These steps toward 
realisation largely mirror those proposed by Mr Marzouki himself in identifying the 
importance of a strong civil society, coupled with a group of key states who would 
act as role-models in striving towards the ultimate goal of an IConC, as we saw 
post-WW2 in the establishment of the UN and other international institutions.  
 
 
C.  1999-2017: Progress & Critiquing  
 
   In Professor Nasrawin’s analysis of Mr Marzouki’s proposal for an 
International Constitutional Court, he succinctly critiques many of the difficulties 
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which hinder its realisation. He acknowledges the problems associated with 
translating the theoretical into the practical domain, and thus his analysis is largely 
pragmatic in nature. Predominantly, he highlights the difficulties in cultivating 
‘cooperation between states on both regional and international levels.’
553
 Such a 
concern affects all international institutions in the same way, and thus should not 
preclude the creation of further institutions which would merely strengthen this 
cooperation; we should not allow the fear of non-cooperation or non-uniformity to 
constrain the objectives and endeavours of our international institutions. If we are 
overly-cautious in striving to realise an IConC, then the fear instilled in us by those 
who themselves fear its mandate and stand in opposition to all of the values it 
champions, will prove victorious. We must collectively strive for justice and the 
rule of law, even in the face of fear, terror and opponents who would deem it 
preferable to play the ‘waiting game’ and allow for human rights to be violated on 
mass in the interim. Thus, the potential fear of non-cooperation from states should 
not usurp our ideals and efforts to invoke positive change, we must instead find 
solutions when we uncover deficiencies.   
He further states that there is a ‘clear variation and disagreement on a unified 
definition of the concept of constitutional rights and freedoms between different 
political systems’, and this therefore precludes the proposed IConC from translating 
into a legal reality.
554
 What is deemed a constitutional right in one state, may not be 
considered as such in another. However, we are often too quick to forget that these 
hurdles were similarly confronted after WW2, and consensus was indeed found 
between states with the UN Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948). However, Nasrawin has voiced his concern over how we can 
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construct this ‘ideal’ and hold others accountable to it, when varying interpretations 
of human rights continue to prevail. He draws upon the differences between the 
Arab Charter for Human Rights (2004),
555
 created by the Arab League and the 
human rights contained in other regional mechanisms, for example the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950) to testify these claims. However, common 
denominators between states do indeed exist, as we have previously mentioned, in 
the form of the UN Charter (1945) and jus cogens norms etc. In the initial 
groundwork of an IConC, states can be engaged in the dialogue on the basis of these 
commonalities, permitting an IConC to later balance and examine the more 
complex intricacies states may have with possibly conflicting rights.  
Professor Nasrawin highlights the most fundamental of issues which does indeed 
require our further attention and creative problem-solving, namely the question of 
sovereignty. How should we persuade states to surrender a degree of their 
sovereignty to pursue this collective goal of an IConC? He correctly notes that:  
‘there will be increasing doubts and fears among small countries that this 
international judicial authority would be greatly controlled and influenced by 
politically powerful states to impose their views and their own ideas of human 
rights on the rest of the world.’
556
 
This fear of states, who have historically held greater power on the international 
stage, dictating the course of international constitutional law is a very real one and 
has historically tainted much of the work of many international institutions. 
Allegations of ‘western imperialism’ and the indoctrination of ‘universal’ values on 
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a diverse world are unfortunately commonplace in our international community. If 
we construct an IConC without confronting this issue then less-powerful states 
would likely prove to be mere pawns in the great game of superpowers 
‘westernising’ the world, but this time with a constitutional mandate. Indeed, we 
have seen allegations of this rhetoric at play in many of the cases brought to the 
ICC- some legal commentators have argued how there appears to be a bias towards 
focusing on criminal cases concerning African states. With such a backdrop, it 
seems unlikely that less-powerful states would be willing to submit to the authority 
of an IConC, if they fear a similar fate. It is my opinion that we have deviated from 
our mandate on the international stage, on account of superpowers often criticising 
too-harshly the policies and practices of struggling, developing or transitioning 
states, whilst holding themselves to an entirely different standard, despite often 
having greater resources available to them and thus theoretically capable of making 
better progress. To take but one example, the United States has often found itself 
preaching to less politically-powerful states on their human rights situations, but 
how are we capable of reconciling this with the fact that the US is the only UN 
member state who has failed to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) (1989)?
557
 For many, this UN treaty is foundational in its mandate and 
largely beyond dispute in our 21
st
 century world- however, the US’s exceptionalism 
gives rise to a double standard, and with any case of inequality it breeds distrust and 
a disconnect between peoples and states which produces diplomatic stalemate and 
ultimately renders international law futile.  
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It is evident that the work of international constitutional law is capable of 
determining and redrawing the parameters of state obligations towards human rights 
protections. Although the doctrine of consent is a powerful one in international law, 
the UN Charter (1945) through Article 103, alongside Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), allow for non-derogatory state 
engagement with constitutional elements of international law.  
Professor Nasrawin highlights the arguments of Karen and Helfer in identifying the 
potential for domestic courts and judges in utilising the rulings of an IConC in their 
legal reasoning, in order to strengthen their judicial power within a state which 
grants them limited authority.
558
 In stark contrast to this, many states and the judges 
therein already reject the notion of international law as a higher law and thus would 
be prone to also rejecting constitutional review decisions by an international body 
as a logical extension.  
‘In the United States, opponents of international legal authority regularly argue 
that the national democratic will should trump international legal obligations, that 
governments should not be able to use international law to circumvent domestic 
processes, and that national court rulings should be based purely on analysis of 
domestic laws and the domestic constitution.’
559
 
Far from a competition between international and domestic judges and their legal 
authority- it should instead be viewed as a convergence and collaborative effort. 
After all, the proposed IConC would be comprised of judges from the domestic 
sphere. This ‘alliance’ is fundamental to the success of the initiative. According to 
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Alter, whom Nasrawin cites: ‘the support of national constitutional courts can be 
both necessary and sufficient for the [IConC] to gain constitutional review 
authority.’
560
 It is such efforts to establish ‘constitutional obedience’ in the domestic 
sphere which will prove the most burdensome, and thus require the most creative of 
solutions. If we fail to realise such a collaboration and do indeed create a platform 
for individual redress at an IConC, the victims of this failure will be the individuals 
who ‘will be located between the hammer of his[/her] national constitutional court 




D.  Passing the Baton: Realisation 
‘The end of the presidential term of the Tunisian President Marzouki should 
not be seen as an abandonment of the idea that he fought furiously to 
implement in real life- namely an International Constitutional Court to act 
as an international independent judicial entity – with terms and conditions of 
enforcing the highest standards of democracy and protection for human 





 It is necessary to first reiterate my commitment to the foundational premises 
of the proposed International Constitutional Court of Moncef Marzouki, and I 
believe that the international community is indebted to him for not only his work 
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advocating for human rights in North Africa and the Arab world, but also in 
providing such a comprehensive and strong foundation for international 
constitutional law, upon which others are capable of analysing, scrutinising and 
strengthening. It is in our collective interest to question the world around us, which 
by extension also includes such proposals to alter and improve it. It is in this vein 
that I aim to build-upon the commendable work already achieved by Former 
President Moncef Marzouki and international lawyers alike in this domain of 
international constitutional law, even in the most trifling of ways. To anyone who 
shares a passion for the protection of human rights and the strengthening of 
international institutions which aid us in doing so, it is clear that progress is often 
only achieved through identifying legal voids and quandaries, undertaking said 
struggles, posing questions and solutions, reviewing the solutions of our peers and 
collectively moving forward.  
Thus, let us begin by analysing Moncef Marzouki’s conception of the composition 
of judges of the proposed IConC. Although one is inclined to concur with the 
legitimacy of the aforementioned proposal for the appointment of IConC judges, I 
fear the result may be tainted in favour of certain states with judges who have 
benefited from a certain legal education. At no point in the prior analysis of court 
composition does it stress the need for diversity in legal education, background etc. 
If the IConC falls victim to apparent prejudice or tilts in favour of western 
democracies, many authoritarian states, I fear, may merely ignore or refuse to grant 
the IConC jurisdiction to adjudicate their case. In this way, it grants such states the 
capacity to argue that the IConC is a tool of ‘western imperialism’, and equipped 
with propaganda in their domestic sphere, the populace therein would also be likely 
to come to this conclusion, rendering them incapacitated to pursue an individual 




judge who had been educated in an authoritarian state be capable of gaining 
appointment? Thus, I would instead advocate for a mechanism which would allow 
for greater diversity in judges, in the interests of democratic legitimacy- perhaps the 
nomination of one candidate from each UN member state, and then a rota of 21 
judges randomly appointed from those candidates with a non-renewable term of 3-5 
years.  
In addition, the potential in the proposed Court’s advisory function should, I assert, 
not be underestimated- as this is where the initial groundwork and potential for its 
recognition and respect could derive. Its advisory powers could allow judges to 
analyse potentially unconstitutional draft legislation prior to its enactment, and offer 
recommendations to ensure conformity with international standards.  
One further issue surfacing from an analysis of Moncef Marzouki’s proposition is 
his identification of certain international human rights treaties, which he argues will 
provide the legal basis for the court’s standard of an ‘international constitutional 
culture’. Though he draws attention to numerous key human rights treaties, and I 
must caveat that I am unsure of whether this list was intended to be comprehensive 
or not, but the list does appear to have a regional bias. By refusing to take account 
of regional understandings of ‘constitutional culture’ in the contexts of the Middle 
East and Asia as a whole, we are again potentially leaving the IConC open to 
allegations of ‘western imperialism’. Are we merely joining our regional human 
rights treaties together into one location? If so, what becomes of Asia who do not 
have such a human rights mechanism or regional human rights framework? 
Although the ASEAN system is perhaps a precursor of progress to come in the 
sphere of human rights protections in Asia, not only is it not included in the 1999 
proposal of the IConC, but its mandate is constrained to a very specific area of 




‘constitutional culture’ if the opinions of people in vast areas of the world are not 
included in our lens?  Furthermore, if we are to construct an IConC on the basis of a 
regional understanding of a ‘constitutional culture’, then our endeavours are likely 
to be destined for failure; we need look no further than the continuous conflicts and 
balancing between regional understandings of human rights and international 
standards to identify that the two notions often do not align and are far from capable 
of converging to form a ‘universal’ standard.  
Although Professor Nasrawin, in recounting the IConC proposal of Moncef 
Marzouki, has duly noted the need for this institution to hold sufficient power and 
jurisdiction to render legal decisions which are both respected and enforced, ‘it is 
beyond doubt that constitutional obedience is a culture.’
563
 For Nasrawin, there is no 
need to locate ‘constitutional rhetoric’ or ‘constitutional legal doctrines’,
564
 in order 
to advocate for ‘an international constitutional review authority’- thus the issue is 
largely neglected in his analysis. However, I must depart from this reasoning, 
despite the complications that this gives rise to. Though I am inclined to agree with 
the existence of a ‘constitutional culture of obedience’, this is too idealistic for most 
states and leaves such a vast ‘margin of appreciation’ to domestic authority that it is 
capable of rendering any decision of the proposed IConC open to the rebuttal: ‘it is 
not in our culture’. Later, perhaps we can argue that a ‘culture’ exists, but whilst we 
live in a world where states are often reluctant to accept an international body 
preaching a ‘culture’, we need to serve evidence of the constitutionality of 
international law, and its sources.  
It is the belief in higher norms of universal human rights and freedoms which 
should be prioritised and protected against the efforts of individuals or political 
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parties whose self-interested agendas of cultivating power-monopolies threaten the 
very crux of human rights and international law. Therefore, it is the translation of 
this theoretical ‘constitutional culture’ into a domain where states respect the 
jurisdiction and mandate of a proposed IConC, that will prove most problematic, I 
believe. As some states show signs of retreating into their domestic sphere, how can 
we reinvigorate engagement with the international community and its institutions? 
It is necessary, I assert, for any proposed international institution to showcase from 
where it has derived its power and jurisdiction, and leave no space for potential 
deviation or rejection of its mandate. To do so, we must not merely argue the 
existence of a ‘constitutional culture’ to an international community comprised of a 
diverse array of cultures. We too often see ‘cultural relativism’ invoked 
inappropriately on the world stage to defend unconstitutional state behaviour and 
actions- we cannot allow it to taint the progress of any more international 
institutions. States are more receptive to rules, laws and evidenced norms which are 
capable of withstanding even the most creative of legal interpretation and 












IV.  The International Criminal Court: The Model? 
‘The court project does not threaten sovereignty but demands that 




 I align myself, alongside Mr Marzouki, in advocating for the creation of an 
IConC, based loosely on the example of the ICC. Although he constructs his 
proposal for an International Constitutional Court wholly upon the ICC model, I 
instead think it is more valuable to critique some of the ways in which the ICC has 
struggled to live up to its expectations in terms of its implementation. In terms of its 
purpose, granting of powers and how it was constructed, there are of course lessons 
to be learnt. However, its implementation has been widely criticised by many 
leading academics. As a ground-breaking and innovative construction in the recent 
history of international law, it is understandable why Mr Marzouki would have 
chosen to naturally draw upon the ICC as a model for his proposed court. But if we 
are to delve beneath the surface of the ICC, we can in fact identify many areas 
which require reform and thus we should refrain from merely blindly applying an 
ICC model in its entirety.  
The ICC has proven to be ground-breaking in punishing war criminals for the most 
serious of international crimes, and not allowing for a legal or physical vacuum 
wherein criminals can hide. The ICC aims to empower the mandate of striving for 
international criminal justice and fighting against impunity. It has largely provided a 
complementary function to domestic courts, instead of attempting to usurp the 
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authority of domestic courts, and in this way, has avoided the sovereignty debate. 
With a budget of 139.5 million Euros in 2016, the ICC has thus far heard 23 cases 
before its Court and ICC judges have issued 29 arrest warrants, with 8 persons 
detained by the ICC, 3 charges have been dropped and 13 persons are yet to be 
located.
566
 Owing to the support of states, however, the ICC has proven highly 
successful in locating those whom they have issued arrest warrants for, and 
effective in bringing them to justice.  
It has, however, been undermined somewhat by many of the most powerful states in 
the international community refusing to sign its founding treaty, The Rome Statute 
(1998).
567
 There is also increasing criticism that the focus of the ICC in 
investigating and prosecuting war criminals has drawn too heavily on African states, 
and thus a regional bias has come to the fore. As a result, some states are detaching 
from the ICC and withdrawing their initial consent to jurisdiction through the 
aforementioned Rome Statute (1998). But on the whole, the ICC has received 
recognition by more than 120 states who have adopted the aforementioned founding 
treaty,
568
 although the extent of state engagement with the institution has of course 
varied, the internationalisation of criminal law with a judicial and investigative 
function shows how the international legal community is capable of ensuring that 
legal mechanisms remain current and relevant to domestic realities and global 
problems.  
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A.  Lessons in Institution-Building: Establishing an IConC 
‘The driving force behind international criminal law…is faith- always 
inspired and often exuberant. Faith was necessary in order to actually 




 Resulting from the crimes which gripped the international community with 
shock and disgust in the 20
th
 century, it was arguably inevitable that such a court 
with an international criminal law mandate would be eventually constructed to 
prevent future atrocities of that nature and scale. On account of the fact that many 
violations of international law resulting from that time were left unpunished, the 
international community responded with conviction. The Nuremburg and Tokyo 
tribunals were constructed in the aftermath of WW2, coupled with the UN General 
Assembly accepting the need for a permanent international court for the future. 
Although these efforts were stalled in their realisation, the end of the Cold War 
brought further impetus behind such a mechanism. Whilst recognising the inherent 
need for an eventual permanent international criminal law court, but restrained in 
terms of its construction, the international community instead consistently created 
ad hoc criminal law tribunals to confront specific violations of international law. 
Most recently, this has taken the form of the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY, 1993), Rwanda (ICTR, 1994), alongside the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL, 2002) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC, 
2003).  
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In 1998, a conference in Rome took place to formally create such a permanent 
institution, through the Rome Statute (1998). To distinguish between the former ad 
hoc tribunals and this permanent court, the ICC has a broad mandate and 
jurisdiction, whereas the ad hoc tribunals have a limited and specific mandate, and 
thus this limits their jurisdiction. In terms of jurisdiction and legal standing, 
therefore, the ICC is at the forefront of international legal developments. If we 
compare the ICC to the ICJ, for example, the former is able to try and convict 
individuals, whereas the ICJ is confined to settling inter-state complaints. Although 
there is of course still demand for inter-state complaints, the effect of initiating a 
complaint against another state has such a high diplomatic and political cost, that 
for the most-part states will refrain from using this mechanism, and it has been 
rendered arguably futile.  
One of the ways in which the ICC has proven ground-breaking in its construction is 
in terms of the jurisdiction which it holds. The jurisdiction of the ICC lay in its 
complementarity to domestic courts, who prove unwilling, unable or simply do not 
prosecute criminals. 
‘This might occur where proceedings are unduly delayed or are intended to shield 
individuals from their criminal responsibility.’
570
 
As such, priority in jurisdiction always starts with the domestic context, and if it 
proves unwilling or simply does not act, then the international mechanisms step in 
(Article 17(1) Rome Statute (1998)). In this way, sovereignty remains intact. This 
innovative complementary jurisdiction has allowed the ICC to largely avoid the 
sovereignty arguments which international institutions often face. Upon ratifying 
the Rome Statute (1998), states have agreed to the jurisdiction of the ICC. From that 
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point onwards, any alleged perpetrator of international criminal law who is a 
national of a state party or who commits a crime in the territory of a state party, can 
be brought before the ICC for investigation and potential prosecution. In this way, 
the jurisdiction of the ICC is deeply woven into the very fabric of the states, and 
thus many states do not believe there to be a conflict between state sovereignty and 
the pursuit of international criminal justice. There are, of course, some states who 
continue to view the ICC and its mandate as a potential threat to state sovereignty, 
for example the United States.
571
 
The United Nations Security Council also has the power to refer a case to its remit, 
in line with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (1945),
572
 as do states- both 
of which grant the ICC the power to investigate whether a war crime took place 
before adjudicating on the matter. Thus, it serves both a fact-finding and judicial 
function- which could be mirrored by the proposed IConC.  
Some commentators have noted that the ICC has progressed slowly and has failed 
to prosecute war criminals with sufficient speed, considering how costly the 
mechanism is. However,  
‘if we judge it by its deterrent effect, then we just need to be reasonably convinced 
that it’s actually changing the behaviour of tyrants and ilk around the world, and I 
think there is some evidence of that.’
573
 
The powerful deterrent function of the ICC is capable of being transposed into the 
field of international constitutional law, through identifying states which are failing 
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to uphold the rule of law and human rights protections, and have largely been 
rendered illegitimate by their exceptionalism. This soft tool of legitimacy is strong 
against the international community.  
Thus, we are forced to posit the question of why states have consented to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, despite the widely-held belief that states are increasingly 
shielding themselves from outside intervention and the loss of any additional 
sovereignty, beyond what they have already consented to. It seems to me that 
perhaps states ratified the Rome Statute (1998) of the ICC, because it was largely in 
their interests to do so. Fundamentally, the structure of the ICC itself, as we have 
just seen, does not threaten the sovereignty of states, it is complementary in nature. 
The common denominator in the states which have not merely consented to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, but have complied with its mechanisms and actively 
supported its work, despite it targeting their state and its war criminals, are either 
transitioning states or developing states, who arguably engaged with the mechanism 
to perform and showcase their legitimacy to the international community.  
Perhaps, for numerous states, emerging from authoritarianism, development or 
transitioning, the ICC provided a chance through which they could legitimise their 
state and show the progress they had made to the wider world, in order to 
incentivise further investment, aid etc. The ICC, therefore, offered a way into the 
international legal sphere, an opportunity to legitimise their state, and with 
legitimacy comes power. This legitimising pursuit predominantly allows for greater 
foreign-investment in their domestic sphere. As ever, investment and money are 
often the driving force to incentivise states.  
With regard to allegations of the costliness of the ICC, considering the small 
number of convictions, it is necessary I believe to make a cost comparison between 




preventative or reactionary mandate. The ICC annual budget for 2016 was €153 
million,
574
 bearing in mind that that the mandate is a wholly reactionary one of 
investigating alleged crimes. Although on the surface this may appear costly, the 
UN peacekeeping budget between July 2016 and June 2017 stood at US$7.87 
billion;
575
 importantly, this also has a largely reactionary function. The ICC budget 
does not seem so vast when contextualised with other reactionary international 
institutions. I assert, however, that if we were to invest in preventative institutions, 
this would reduce the costliness of these reactionary institutions. Arguably UN 
peacekeeping costs would be lower if we could prevent states from descending into 
conflict and political crises in the first place. We should focus on empowering and 
funding projects and initiatives which prevent this descent into crisis, at which point 
the UN institutions are forced to pump vast amounts of money into restoring 
normalcy and order. Although this appears to be a logical deduction, it is surprising 
to find that actually preventative, fact-finding and investigatory missions are hugely 
under-funded in comparison to their reactionary counterparts. For example, the 
annual budget between 2016 and 2017 for the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) amounted to US$ 190.5 million. 
576
 In 2004, the budget 
for the Special Procedures mechanisms of the OHCHR amounted to a mere US$1.5 
                                                             
574 Niklas Jakobsson, ‘The 2016 ICC Budget – More Money, More Problems?’ (Justice Hub, 
17 September 2015) Available at:  https://justicehub.org/article/2016-icc-budget-more-
money-more-problems Last accessed July 2017.  
575
 United Nations Peacekeeping, ’Peacekeeping Fact Sheet’ (31 May 2017) Available at:  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml Last accessed July 
2017.  
576 United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, ‘OHCHR’S Funding 
and Budget’ Available at:  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/FundingBudget.aspx 






 In this way, many of the preventative international mechanisms are 
hugely underfunded and unsupported, and rely on voluntary contributions.  
Therefore, when we look at the cost of domestic crises not only in terms of the 
effect on human rights protections, the long-term effects of instability and 
exceptionalism, alongside the financial costs, it seems logical that the international 
legal community needs to place greater emphasis on preventing such crises from 
becoming fully-fledged in the first place. This preventative function would be 
fulfilled by an IConC in advising and investigating complaints of illegitimate 
elections, unconstitutional actions and denouncing constitutions which do not 
comply with international constitutional standards, prior to materialising into total 
exceptionalism and authoritarianism, which will later prove to be an even greater 
burden to the international community both politically and financially.  
Even aside from this cost analysis of the ICC, you cannot put a price on the 
deterrent effect it surely showcases to the international community, and has ‘[served] 
an important expressive and jurisprudential function’. 
578
 However, this is of course 
difficult to reconcile with the reality that the average cost per conviction at the 
Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR) stood at approximately US$30 million, and yet in Rwanda 
the average cost of living is less than US$2 a day.
579
 This balancing of various costs 
is a daily difficulty for the international community, but I assert that generally 
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speaking, there should be greater funding and resources granted to preventative 
initiatives.  
Furthermore, as a result of complementary jurisdiction used by the ICC, this has 
allowed for greater engagement with and participation of the domestic civil society 
in enforcing international criminal law.  
‘International criminal law now reaches deep into national jurisdictions. Over the 
past decade, national courts have increasingly prosecuted and punished 
perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In Rwanda 
alone, at least 10,000 individuals have come before national courts, and may 




It would be fundamental to the success of an international constitutional venture to 
engage civil society in this dialogue in much the same way.  
 
B. Critiquing the Implementation of the ICC: A Doomed 
Model? 
 
 Although the ICC’s construction as an institution on the international level 
is widely considered to be a great success of international lawyers, widespread 
criticisms have surfaced in terms of how the ICC has implemented its powers in 
reality.   
                                                             




It provides an interesting insight into the inner-workings of international legal 
mechanisms if we question why some states decided to cooperate with its mandate, 
and others have chosen to disassociate themselves from it altogether. An even-more 
thought-provoking question is:  
‘What are we to make of the fact that in its 11-year history, the International 
Criminal Court has prosecuted only Africans?’
581
 
Is this to be viewed as the ICC discriminatively targeting African states and African 
war criminals, or is this instead numerous states, who just so happen to be in Africa, 
pushing themselves to the forefront? The defence against allegations of bias from 
the ICC, take the form of: 
‘The ICC is hardly an institution that looks anti-African. Its largest block of 
members 34 of its 122 states- are from Africa, and they were central in negotiating 
the Rome Treaty that established the court.’
582
 
However, by targeting certain states in their initial work, the ICC has carved out a 
reputation amongst many legal commentators and the international community as a 
whole for having a certain bias against African states. Although targeting states, 
during its initial implementation, who wish to prove their legitimacy on the 
international stage may indeed be advantageous to all parties- the point at which this 
turns to a regional bias becomes a dangerous balancing act to avoid at all costs if 
mirrored by an IConC.  
In addition to this, as previously mentioned, the ICC has been accused of being too 
costly and requiring too much manpower in order to function effectively. As such, 
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the ICC has limited the scope of cases it is willing to accept, limiting its jurisdiction 
to cases with ‘sufficient gravity’, in order to ensure that the primary responsibility 
lay with individual states to try their own cases. This high threshold and the gaps 
which it creates in the enforcement of international criminal law, ultimately limits 
the effectiveness of the ICC. 
Numerous legal commentators have also criticised the ICC for how it has managed 
the interplay between peace and justice, in line with Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
(1998) which is capable of suspending prosecutions at the request of the UN 
Security Council. Although peace and justice are often considered to go hand in 
hand, at times they are in fact at logger-heads with one another: 
‘ICC investigations and prosecutions will actually harm local populations in 
conflict territories. By prosecuting militia leaders or central political figures that 
are actively engaged in ongoing conflicts, the Court’s actions can drive a wedge 
into peace negotiations. The tension between peace and justice during 
reconciliation talks is most apparent when militia leaders and government heads 
claim that they will not agree to any peace settlement until they are granted 
impunity from ICC prosecution.’
583
 
Although this is a difficult balancing act between achieving justice for victims, and 
jeopardising peace for the masses, this could arguably be aided by an IConC in 
overseeing transitioning states, ensuring legitimate elections take place and 
constitutional documents are in line with international standards. Although the ICC 
may not be empowered to ensure peace-processes and transitions run smoothly, this 
is most certainly a void that an IConC is capable of bridging.  
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C.  Alternative Models: Food for Thought 
 
 Faced with the limitations of the existing mechanisms of international law 
which are proving largely ill-equipped in protecting human rights, some legal 
scholars have advocated for a World Court of Human Rights in recent years to 
address many of the issues which I have identified in this paper.
584
 The age-old 
criticism that human rights discourse is mere rhetoric until they are enforceable has 
catalysed newfound creativity in the sphere of international law.  Human Rights 
have, in recent decades, become increasingly judicialized. There is increasing 
recognition and acceptance that in our vitriolic world of increasingly authoritarian 
and exceptional states, there is a greater need to advocate for a stronger and more 
enforceable body of international human rights law with urgency. As we have seen 
in our discussions, we must allow for no legal void to exist- if such gaps exist then 
this is where the ‘homo sacer’ will fall victim. We must look to innovative ways of 
constructing a mechanism which combats these common issues.  
Following the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, the government of 
Switzerland advocated for an ‘Agenda for Human Rights’, and at the forefront of 
these discussions was a proposed World Court of Human Rights. 
585
 Such efforts 
have culminated in the drafting of statutes for the proposed institution in 2009, 
highlighting potential practical issues and offering pragmatic solutions. Such 
proposals, alongside the draft statutes, have been theoretically advanced by Manfred 
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Nowak, Julia Kozma and Martin Scheinin, aided further by the International 
Commission of Jurists. 
586
 
In the initial groundwork completed to advocate for a World Court of Human 
Rights, Scheinin identifies one of the main hurdles facing our existing body of 
international human rights law- namely constraining human rights obligations to 
states exclusively as the duty-bearers. Scheinin explains: 
‘The exclusive focus of human rights treaties and their monitoring mechanisms [is] 
states as the duty-bearers. This no longer corresponds to the realities of our 
globalized world where other actors besides states, such an international financial 
institutions and other intergovernmental organisations, transnational corporations 
and other non-state actors enjoy increasing power that affect the lives of individuals 
irrespective of national borders, and therefore possess also the capacity to affect or 
even deny the enjoyment of human rights by people.’
587
 
The extension of legal personality, to fully protect human rights across all potential 
violators and in the name of all potential victims, would be an important aspect of 
any proposed new institution to advance greater human rights protections. The draft 
statutes of the World Court of Human Rights were constructed on the basis of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, elevating this legal drafting as highly skilful and 
negotiating difficult terrain in international law- our proposed IConC has been 
advanced on much the same basis. 
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One further lesson we can draw upon from this proposed model, and use as a 
driving force behind our proposal, can be seen in arguments made by Scheinin to 
explain why states would indeed consent to the jurisdiction of such a court. 
Although many legal scholars might assert that such efforts are unrealistic, too 
idealistic and impractical to the demands and power-complexities of our 21
st
 
century world, he offers four reasons to explain why states would engage with such 
a mechanism: 
‘Firstly, many states wish to demonstrate their unwavering commitment to human 
rights.’ 
‘Secondly, many states wish to see more consistency in the application of human 
rights law. Bringing all UN human rights treaties within the jurisdiction of a single 
human rights court that will simultaneously apply all treaties accepted by the state 
in question.’ 
‘Thirdly, this will improve foreseeability and legal certainty.’ 
‘Fourthly, states should welcome the initiative of expanding the binding force of 
human rights norms beyond states only, to cover also international organisations, 




Prior initiatives also took the form of a proposed International Court of Human 
Rights in the 1940’s, but ultimately it lost majority-support and lacked the driving 
force from states to push the efforts forward. It is my view that many of the issues 
we are currently witnessing in our 21
st
 century globalised world have an inherently 
constitutional nature; we are in the midst of a world in a ‘constitutional crisis’. It is 
with this backdrop that we must confront human rights issues. Alongside this, 
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having proven that our existing international legal structures have already carved 
out for themselves a constitutional mandate, and having identified constitutional 
documents and norms which we could easily utilise, on account of their widespread 
recognition and acceptance by the international community, it certainly seems as 
though an International Constitutional Court would be well-placed to fill the legal 
void which myself and legal scholars have likewise identified. What remains clear 
is that an institution is urgently required in order to piece together the gaps which 
we can identify in our body of existing international human rights law.  
  
V.  Refining the Model: Initial Steps 
 
 As we can witness from the case of the ICC, the institution we see before us 
today, complete with all of its vices and virtues, was not born overnight. Ad hoc 
tribunals came before it, as did a vast amount of research and work undertaken by 
the International Law Commission (ILC): 
‘to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial 
organ to prosecute individuals charged with genocide.’
589
 
In fact, the ILC had drafted a statute for an ICC as early as 1951, with a revised 
version in 1953, but the UN General Assembly stalled in passing it.
590
 Resultantly, 
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it took 40 years before a judicial organ with a permanent mandate was actually 
formally established. Although the international community erred on the side of 
caution with regard to the establishment of an ICC, it seems that, when we consider 
that international constitutional law largely already exists in the form of the UN 
Charter (1945) and jus cogens, transposing this from theory to a legal reality does 
not pose such a great threat as the proposed ICC did back in the 1950’s.  
We saw persistent international criminal legal issues being addressed through 
temporary ad hoc tribunals, without truly going to the root of the problem for a long 
time. We should refrain from making the same mistake in the ambit of international 
constitutional law. Instead of settling for temporary solutions, we should instead be 
proactive in reforming the international legal mechanisms to reflect the needs and 
realities of states and contemporary global issues, namely a proliferation of 
domestic examples of ‘constitutional crises’.  
In much the same way as the ICC’s construction was stalled and pacified through 
ad hoc mechanisms, a proposed IConC has proven to be on the radar of the 
international community for quite some time, but the issues found in ‘constitutional 
crises’ have been dealt with by specific and largely limited-mandate institutions. 
For example, with the vast number of illegitimate elections taking place across the 
world, which in turn has impacted on the continuation and/or rise of authoritarian 
powers and a general deviation from human rights protections, instead of using this 
as further evidence for the need for a formalised IConC, the international reaction 
has been timid in instead codifying an unenforceable UN Declaration of Principles 
for International Election Observance and Code of Conduct for Election Observers 
(2005). We can draw similar parallels in the way in which the ‘War on Terror’ has 




attacking the root of the issue, specific measures are taken which fail to grasp at any 
substantial progress, largely due to lacking enforceability.  
As a result, in the international constitutional sphere we have been left with 
insufficient tools to adequately grapple with domestic ‘constitutional crises’- a 
dense body of existing international legal mechanisms which collectively fail to 
confront the crux of the issue, individually-mandated and yet with no formalised 
common ground or links between them to strengthen the system as a whole, despite 
clear theoretical commonalities. Resultantly, a void has emerged between the 
existing legal mechanisms which sporadically confront constitutional crises and the 
reality of the substantial issue at hand. An IConC could potentially bridge the void 
between the existing mechanisms and structures, and the domestic reality, in a way 
which ensures full accountability and participation. The model upon which these 
existing mechanisms have been built, fails to take into account the dualism between 
the exception and the norm, and said mechanisms have attempted to place the 
exception within the norm. 
 Through the construction of an IConC we would be capable of firmly 
disassociating the exception from the norm, by placing the exception within the 
jurisdiction of an IConC. Distinguishing between the norm and exception, through a 
dualist model, would be fundamental to paving the way for progress with regard to 
widespread evidence of constitutional crises.  
In order to move this proposal forward, however, we must be capable of not merely 
locating international constitutional legal doctrine, but also deciphering a method of 
implementation and an appropriate understanding of jurisdiction which will not 
compromise or be seen to threaten the sovereignty of states. Regarding the former, 
we have located evidence of a constitutional document, in the form of the UN 




the UN Charter (1945) as the basis of our international ‘constitutional culture’ then, 
owing to the fact that states have already consented to its contents, we are sure to 
jump over the sovereignty hurdle and allow for jurisdiction to pass. In light of the 
fact that 120 states have granted complementary jurisdiction to the ICC, it seems 
likely that many states would be likely to do so also for the sphere of international 
constitutional law. On a similar basis, a mechanism of complementarity could be 
established for the proposed IConC, wherein domestic constitutional courts would 
act as the court of first instance for alleged violations of international constitutional 
law, but where states did not do so, or were unwilling to do so, or indeed a domestic 
constitutional court did not exist, an IConC would intervene. Predominantly, the 
IConC would serve an advisory and investigatory function, carrying out much of the 
work that Special Rapporteurs have carried out in previous years, but with a limited 
mandate.  
Fundamentally, if we were to transfer complementary jurisdiction from the ICC to 
an IConC, we would need to address one of the issues we have seen prevail with 
regard to domestic implementing legislation of the ICC- namely domestic 
legislation not mirroring that of international criminal law, and therefore the court 
of first instance (so to speak) in the domestic sphere often cannot try an alleged 
perpetrator because there is no domestic legislation upon which the case can be 
brought. 
Pivotally, there needs to be a convergence between international constitutional law 
and domestic constitutional law, in order for complementarity to work effectively. 
This lack of convergence has placed a greater burden on the ICC, as many domestic 
courts are simply unable to try cases, because they do not have the legislation with 
which to do so. In this way, the proposed IConC would require states to ensure that 




aided by the advisory and investigatory functions of the IConC. This would avoid 
the inherent issues we have located in the implementation of complementary 
jurisdiction with the ICC, and spread the burden of caseload across states and the 
IConC.  
As we have demonstrated in our analysis, international constitutional law has long-
played a role in the international legal community, despite no formal label being 
attached to it. The lack of a formal label, does not, however prevent an international 
constitution from being treated and accepted as such. We merely must take the 
necessary steps to ensure that the international legal structures adequately reflect not 
merely the needs and issues of states, but also that the formal reality corresponds to 
the theoretical. 
To truly confront ‘constitutional retrogression’, we must not be apathetic in our 
pursuits, and we must not make piecemeal and fragmented progress, which will 
ultimately hinder the long-term goal. We must choose institutional fearlessness and 
build bridges where we can identify gaps, in order to truly emancipate the ‘homo 
sacer’ of authoritarian regimes.  
If we are able to concentrate on implementing the key tenets of the UN Charter 
(1945), as our first initial steps in recognising international constitutional law, this 
would provide the necessary foundational protective mechanism which would 
strengthen all existing structures of international human rights law and prevent the 
possibility of future deviation from individuals and political parties who seek power 






Chapter 8: Emancipating a Twofold ‘Homo Sacer’:  
Concluding Remarks 
 
‘Keeping proportion. Adhering to the ways of democracy. Upholding 
constitutionalism and the rule of law. Even under assault and even for the 
feared and hated, defending the legal rights of suspects. These are the ways 
to maintain the support and confidence of the people over the long haul. 




To conclude, let me begin by first drawing upon some general 
undercurrents we can decipher in how we can better understand the predicament of 
the 21
st
 century ‘homo sacer’. I assert that the ‘homo sacer’ is capable of taking two 
forms, one with regard to outcaste individuals within a state during periods of 
exceptionalism, and the other, outcaste states within the international community. In 
the same way that the former requires legitimising by the state, to translate them to 
‘qualified life’, so too must the international community ‘qualify’ the lives of states. 
Having discussed this, I will in turn map the logic and flow of this paper, to once 
more reiterate how we have linked our evidenced examples of constitutional crises, 
our classification of such as ‘constitutional retrogression’ and proposed an 
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international constitutional solution, having carefully analysed and examined 
possible alternatives in the existing international legal mechanisms.  
Firstly, some general observations on the nature of states and their fear of being 
branded the ‘homo sacer’ of the international community, and how this is capable 
of being used as a tool to incentivise states to legitimise themselves on the 
international stage through a constitutionally-mandated mechanism. We can identify 
a similar approach successfully taken by the ICC in legitimising transitioning or 
developing states- the soft tool of legitimacy is indeed a powerful one. In an 
increasingly globalised, interconnected and interdependent world, many states find 
themselves competing for everything- all striving to be the superpower of the future, 
entrusted with influencing and tailoring international political, economic, security 
and legal agendas. However, before states can enter this race, they must be 
recognised by their state counterparts and thus their legitimacy comes under review. 
In this way, states obtain their legitimacy though gauging opinions of themselves 
from other states.  Thus, their ultimate fate rests largely in the hands of others. Most 
states strive to take a more prominent role on the global stage, desiring to reap the 
benefits and rewards commonly-associated with globalisation, namely- foreign 
investment, wealth, economic aid and political and military alliances etc. At the 
crux of inter-state relations are the foundational prerequisites of trust, confidence 
and consistency. States wish to know that their investments are sound and protected, 
they need to have faith that their aid is not funding authoritarianism, which in turn 
gives them bad publicity and standing. Thus, it appears that being the ‘homo sacer’ 
of the international community is arguably not a wise choice for states if they ever 
hope to engage in, and reap the significant benefits of, inter-state relations.  
What states lack in being constrained to the life of ‘homo sacer’ is legitimacy, their 




recognised formally perhaps, but lack sufficient legitimacy for other states to 
interact with them diplomatically, economically, politically etc. In this way, states 
can no longer operate in a vacuum.  
Thus, in creating an institution, namely an International Constitutional Court 
(IConC), with the primary purpose of stripping back states to their ‘bare life´ and 
making determinations of their legitimacy through analysing their rule of law, 
elections and democratic processes, their constitutional structures and protections 
and thus their protections of human rights and compliance with key international 
human rights treaties, we can render such states into two categories. By labelling 
those who fail to prove their legitimacy into the remit of ‘homo sacer’, we indirectly 
empower the citizens therein to protest and strive for normalcy within their 
domestic domain, in order to prevent them from living on the margins of 
international society. For states rendered ‘illegitimate’, it would serve to mobilise 
the civil society therein. If coupled with recommendations, and guidelines for 
improvement, the IConC could offer illegitimate states the support they need in 
order to concretise a more stable democratic structure, a respect for the rule of law, 
and thus greater protections for human rights and compliance with international law. 
Those states who conform to international standards of human rights protections, 
and uphold constitutional protections and the rule of law in their domestic setting 
would prove to be role-models for other states to learn from- ultimately, creating an 
interactive dialogue between states to aid a gradual convergence towards a culture 
of international constitutional law. For most democratic states who already advance 
human rights protections with a strong rule of law foundation, this determination of 
legitimacy will prove a relatively simple one, merely a ‘formal seal’. Initially, 




targeting transitioning and developing states, who are keen to prove their legitimacy, 
but refrain from crossing the line into an alleged regional bias.  
In so doing, we are capable of not only emancipating the ‘homo sacer’ states of the 
international community, the states who sit at the margins, but also emancipate the 
‘homo sacer’ within said states. Thus, serving a dual emancipatory function.  
From the outset, in Chapter 1, we began with the proclamation of a multi-faceted 
and deeply-entrenched crisis, exceptionalism, which is increasingly grasping at the 
foundational tenets and essence of democracy and the protection of human rights. 
We vocalised our disappointment in the existing legal institutions which have failed 
to adequately counter the betrayal of human rights, in favour of authoritarianism 
and their exceptional mandate- quashing all that lay in their path and rendering them 
the ‘homo sacer’. However, we stood firm in our commitment that apathy and 
acceptance of the usurpation of the norm by the exception is not the answer; 
creative and optimistic solutions must be sought to ensure that international law 
remains relevant and respected by the international community. The increase we 
can decipher in authoritarian power cannot merely be categorised as a natural ebb 
and flow in human progress- we must not settle for the depths of the troughs we 
have witnessed through history, we must choose proactivity and fearlessness. Our 
proposed solution, the missing piece of the puzzle- the need to constitutionalise 
international law.  
Chapter 2 served as a reminder of what exactly was at stake, drawing upon the 
example of the descent of Weimar Germany into the Nazi regime after 1933. It laid 
down how we should understand and measure ‘constitutional crises’, the distinction 
between normalcy and exceptionalism, and the ultimate price of being rendered the 
‘homo sacer’ of a state and the implications of such on human rights protections. 




elevate humanity and universal human rights above domestic law and sovereignty: 
international law shall not be confined to a transient, ‘spell-like’ state.  
We then tailored our understanding and categorisation of domestic ‘constitutional 
crises’ to two possible situations- (Category 1) ‘States of Exception’ & (Category 3) 
‘struggles for power beyond the boundaries of ordinary politics’, and proceeded in 
Chapters 3 and 4 with evidencing the multiplicity and pervasive nature of 
exceptionalism in the domestic sphere and the effect this has had on human rights 
protections and the general departure away from respecting constitutional law when 
confronted with substantiated, although it is often unsubstantiated, threats to a state, 
or threats to state power. Regarding Category 1 crises, we examined exceptionalism 
in the wake of 09/11 in the United States, Australia and France and then analysed 
how the international legal community attempted to confront the ‘War on Terror’ 
within its existing mechanisms, and ultimately failed to protect the ‘homo sacer .́ 
We then turned to evidence Category 3 crises, drawing on the positives of ‘people 
power’ in confronting unconstitutional executive power and resuming a state of 
normalcy, as can be seen with Iceland, The Republic of Korea and The Republic of 
Tunisia. However, where illegitimate elections take place, often plagued by 
corruption and secrecy, highlighted in the examples of Haiti and the Russian 
Federation, authoritarianism and exceptionalism become a vicious and perpetual 
cycle.  
Therefore, having testified a world of increasingly-pervasive domestic 
‘constitutional crises’, in Chapter 5 we mapped the commonalities, and ultimately 
deciphered that this ‘democratic decay’ can be attributed to ‘constitutional 
retrogression’ by states, as opposed to the common misconception that states are 
witnessing ‘authoritarian reversion’. Resultantly, our proposed solution to this 




focus on strengthening the predicates of democracy, namely: legitimate elections, 
protecting freedoms of speech and association and advancing the administrative and 
adjudicative rule of law. Moving forwards, our proposed constitutional solution 
would need to prove both preventative in regard to confronting ‘constitutional 
retrogression’ and also reactionary in combating ‘authoritarian reversion’.  
We must respond to the warning-signs, no matter how robust the constitutional law 
or constitutional design of states may appear on the surface; in a post-09/11 world 
tainted by ambiguities, facades, fear and propaganda we are no longer able to stand 
at the side-lines and wait for states to digress off the path to such irreparable extents 
that it compromises the very fabric of international law and existing legal 
mechanisms.  
Pivotally, during exceptional times, we must construct exceptional mechanisms and 
not rely on our existing international legal mechanisms which provide for 
conditions and standards to be implemented during periods of normalcy. These 
institutions and mechanisms are strong, carefully-crafted and have largely proven 
effective in advancing their goals- but it is vital to remember that their goals largely 
sit outside of exceptional circumstances. As we have demonstrated in our discussion 
in Chapter 6, how effective have these institutions proven when faced with the new 
threats posed by exceptionalism and authoritarianism? We must distinguish in our 
international legal system between exceptionalism and normalcy through 
constructing a dualist system of human rights protection, mirroring the same 
dualism we can see in the domestic legal sphere. We can no longer allow the 
exception to dilute the universalism and enforceability of the norm. Furthermore, 
we must build an institution which serves as a foundation to string together the 
mandate of all previous mechanisms, strengthening the system as a whole and 




This paper has been an attempt to build on the foundations set by Mr Marzouki, 
outlined in Chapter 7, in establishing the next phase and direction of international 
human rights law- namely, a focus on legitimacy, and cultivating mechanisms 
which are capable of responding to exceptionalism and the challenges it brings 
through the construction of an International Constitutional Court, centred upon the 
UN Charter (1945) as its foundational constitutional legal document. Having 
considered the lessons that can be taken from the initial establishment and 
performance of existing institutions, and taken into account the observations and 
thoughts of a wide cross-section of legal and constitutional commentators, we have 
crafted a set of guiding principles and the overarching direction of, an International 
Constitutional Court.   
I have sought to evidence the inevitably complex challenges of such an 
implementation, along with the shortcomings of the international community’s 
previous endeavours in the fields of both criminal and human rights law. In building 
on the foundation this provides, we would be better-equipped to not only furnish the 
operating theatre with the appropriate equipment for periods where exceptionalism 
takes hold of states, but also to put in place preventative measures to uncover 
symptoms before they materialise and worsen the condition of the core body, whilst 
upholding our post-WW2 constructs of model standards and norms for maintaining 
the ‘healthiest’ states we can. It is only in such a way, aided by an International 
Constitutional Court, that we can truly entrench the widest possible protection of 
human rights and constitutional law, during both periods of normalcy and 





The game of authoritarianism and exceptionalism is a dangerous one, one which is 
capable of crippling and disfiguring all that we hold to be true and just- in the words 
of former US President, Barack Obama:  
‘We lose ourselves when we compromise the very ideals that we fight to 
defend. And we honour those ideals by upholding them not just when it is 
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권위주의 세력의 부상에 맞서 인권을 
보호하는 국제법이 지닌 한계: 
"국제 헌법재판소" 건립을 위한 제안 
 
Katherine Elliott 
Seoul National University 
College of Law 
  
지금 국제 공동체는 조각나 있다. 세계는 완전히 
글로벌화되어 연결되어 있고, 갈등 상태에 있는 정치적 
연합과 이해 관계를 중립화하고, 균형을 잡는 권력 분산 
구조와 기구가 여럿 있음에도 불구하고, 권위주의와 
국수주의가 점점 활개를 치고 있다. 이러한 상황은 국가 간 
긴장에 의해 계속 악화되고 있으며, 이러한 긴장은 종종 
국가들이 결국 본격적인 군사 개입 및/또는 무력 행사를 





그리하여 우리 중 많은 이들은 '공포 상태'에 살고 있다. 
여기서 우리의 정치 대표자들은 모르는 '타인'에 대한 공포를 
불어넣고, 이것을 정치적으로 유리한 정책을 실행하는데 
이용하며, 자신의 헌법적 인권 의무에서 벗어나 '예외 상태'가 
정당화된다고 들먹인다. 
이러한 '공포 상태'에서 우리는 영구적인 '예외 상태'에 눈이 
멀고, 이 속에 갇히게 된다. 국민들이 국가 고립주의 및 
자신이 살고 있는 자국의 헌법과 인권 보호를 위하여 무시한 
국제기구 및 국제법은 최종 피해자로 드러난다. 
나는 권위주의적 국가에 의한 향후 이탈을 막기 위하여 
국제법의 헌법과 그 권한을 강화하여, 국제법 시행 가능성 및 
영향력에 대한 예측불가능성과 맞서야 한다고 주장하는 
바이다. 특히 인권 보호와 관련하여 이러한 국제법의 역할이 
중요하다. 
1999 년 튀니지 정부에서 전 튀니지 대통령 모하메드 몬세프 
마르주키(Mohamed Moncef Marzouki)는 국제 공동체에 "국제 
헌법재판소"의 건립을 제안했다. 이것은 비헌법적 행동과 
선출을 맹렬히 비난하기 위한 것이다. 이러한 노력들이 "국제 
헌법재판소"의 건립을 위하여 나아가고 있지만, 본 논문에서 
필자는 그 다음 주자가 되어, 이론적인 면에서 그러한 기관의 




미디어는 매일 우리가 집단적으로 두려워해야 할 새로운 
집단, 개인, 그리고 국가에 대해 전하고 있다. 하지만 
장기적으로 보면, 공포와 고립주의는 우리가 두려워하도록 
가르침을 받는 행동보다 인권의 지위에 더 큰 해악이 될 
것이다. 그러한 원초적 본능은 충동적이고 직관력이 
떨어지며, 국제기관과 국제법에 의해 이뤄진 수십 년간의 
진보를 훼손하게 될 것이다. 그러한 상황을 막는 것이 
국제기관과 국제법의 임무이고, 우리는 이것이 가능하도록 
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